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ABSTRACT 
This study examines the role civil society has played in bringing about political change in 
the totalitarian regimes of the former Communist Bloc in Eastern Europe and the 
authoritarian states challenged by the Arab Spring. Specifically, this thesis creates a list 
of criteria for evaluating the presence of a good (meaning vibrant and liberal) or bad 
(meaning anti-democratic and non-liberal) civil society, and uses these criteria to predict 
the long term prospects of democratization in the four countries studied: Poland, Russia, 
Tunisia, and Egypt. The study finds that the presence of a good civil society or the 
majority of its criteria enhances the prospects of democratization in countries undergoing 
political transitions, while the lack of all or most of its criteria significantly decreases the 
likelihood that a democratic system will take root. 
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In the wake of the uprisings in the Arab world a lot has been argued about the 
seeds of democracy finally taking root in the Middle East and North Africa. Western 
governments, enthusiastic over the events of the Arab Spring, envisioned a new wave of 
democracy spreading across the region. This initial outburst of enthusiasm, however, has 
cooled off considerably since the events of 2010 and 2011, as the transitioning Arab 
countries encounter serious difficulties on their way to democracy.  
Academics and policy makers continue to debate the conditions and necessary 
factors for successful transition from autocracy to democracy. One method of better 
understanding this process of transition is to compare cases across time and space. 
Eastern Europe, which went through the process of democratization in the 1990s, is a 
useful set of cases for comparing the conditions under which democracy takes root with 
the current uprising of popular revolts in the Middle East and their potential for 
democratic transition. Both regions experienced mass-based revolts and demands for 
democracy. Similarly, both regions languished under decades-long autocracies. 
Furthermore, some countries in Eastern Europe made the transition to democracy more 
easily and quickly than others, while some countries continue to struggle with embracing 
basic democratic principles; the same pattern appears to be taking shape within the 
Middle East as well.  
In the wake of Eastern European democratic transitions one factor in particular 
has received considerable attention in Western academic circles: a free and lively civil 
society. Academia now widely acknowledges that without the presence of a vibrant civil 
society, a democratic system is less likely to take root in transitioning societies. This 
becomes especially important with regard to the revolts of the Arab Spring. As recent 
events in Egypt have shown, if power-holders are largely left unchecked by the 
autonomous forces of a vibrant civil society, the adage “one man, one vote, one time” 
might easily become reality.  
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Recognizing the need to conduct cross-regional studies in order to enhance the 
efficiency of democracy promotion initiatives, this thesis focuses on the study of civil 
society and its effects on the process of democratic transition. Specifically, it will address 
the following questions:  
• How does civil society influence democratic transition? 
• Are all forms of civil society useful for democratic transition, or are some 
forms more valuable than others? 
• Are there types of civil society that actually inhibit the transition to 
democracy and, if so, what are they? 
• Are Eastern European conceptions of civil society applicable to the 
Middle East? If not, how can a comparative basis be established in order 
to conduct a cross-regional study? 
A. METHOD OF INQUIRY  
Based on democratic transition literature, the thesis begins by constructing a 
framework to compare and analyze cases of democratic transition in Eastern Europe and 
in the Middle East, following the Arab Spring. The thesis will also draw on the literature 
to provide definitions of democracy, democratization, and civil society, based on certain 
characteristics. Furthermore, the thesis will draw from academic literature to propose a 
causal relationship between democratization and civil society. Exploring civil society and 
how it affects democratization, may give further insight into the role that certain types of 
civil society play in democratic transition.  In addition, factors contributing to the 
emergence of civil society, or factors blocking its emergence, will be explored. 
This framework will then be applied in looking at case studies of democratic 
transition in Eastern Europe. Specifically, the thesis will conduct four case studies of 
countries with different degrees of success in democratization. For Eastern Europe, the 
thesis will investigate Poland, a country that has arguably traversed the process of 
democratic transition, and Russia, a country that continues to founder in its move to 
democracy. These case studies will test the hypotheses regarding the role of civil society 
in the successful or incomplete transition to democracy in these countries. The thesis then 
considers two cases in the Middle East: Tunisia, which has made considerable strides 
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towards successful democratization; and Egypt, which appears to be sliding back into less 
democratic practices since the overthrow of Mubarak in 2011. 
From the literature on democratic transition, the thesis tests the following 
hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1:  
The lack of a vibrant civil society, other things being equal, prohibits the 
emergence of viable democratic systems. In other words, the stronger civil society, the 
greater the chances democracy will take root in countries undergoing democratic 
transition. 
Hypothesis 2: 
The more autonomous a civil society is from the state, the more civil society can 
foster the development of democracy. 
Hypothesis 3: 
The more integrated a civil society is across regional, ethnic, and class 
boundaries, the more civil society can foster the development of democracy. 
Hypothesis 4: 
The greater a civil society’s ability to take advantage of political opportunity 
“holdovers” (such as, a history of civil society and/or democratic practices), the more 
civil society can foster the development of democracy. 
Ultimately this thesis finds that introducing the concepts of a good (meaning 
vibrant and liberal) and bad (meaning anti-democratic and non-liberal) civil society 
enables the conduct of cross-regional studies between Eastern Europe and the Middle 
East specifically. It also finds that a vibrant civil society based on the active participation 
of its members, the empowerment of civil societal organizations (CSOs) vis-à-vis the 
state, the autonomy of CSOs from the state or religious authorities, the beneficial effects 
of a wide range of cross-cutting cleavages in society, the presence of political opportunity 
“holdovers,” and adherence to the basic norms of civility, including trust, cooperation, 
reciprocity, and tolerance, significantly increases the prospects of democratic transition 
and reduces the risks of an authoritarian reversal. On the other hand, a bad civil society 
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lacking most of these traits is likely to reproduce the authoritarian patterns of regime 
behavior. Finally, while not giving an answer to the relative weights of each of these 
criteria in terms of promoting democratization, the study demonstrates that due to the 
absence of the self-restraining concept of civil society, in the Middle East civility and its 
underlying values become a crucial factor for the emergence of a good civil society.  
Chapter II begins by providing a short overview on the debate surrounding the 
different conceptions of civil society. It provides a working definition of civil society that 
is centered on the idea of grassroots associational and collective activism located within 
the public space delimited by the family, political society and the state. Based on a list of 
six objective criteria, the thesis then introduces the concept of a vibrant civil society that 
promotes democratic transformation and a bad civil society, which largely reproduces 
patterns of authoritarian behavior. 
The study tests these criteria by analyzing four case studies, two in Eastern 
Europe and two in the greater Middle East. Chapter III analyzes the political 
transformation in Poland in the late 1980s, and finds that the presence of all the criteria of 
a good civil society significantly contributed to the relatively smooth process of 
democratization in the country. Chapter IV examines the political transition in Russia in 
the period leading to the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and finds that civil society was 
severely lacking in most characteristics of a good civil society, which hindered the 
emergence of a viable democratic system.  
Chapters V and VI focus on two countries that were significantly affected by the 
uprisings of the Arab Spring. An analysis of Tunisia in Chapter V finds that the traits of a 
good civil society outweigh the presence of the criteria of a bad civil society, which has 
helped the country to become a prime candidate for democratization in the region. On the 
other hand, in the case of Egypt (Chapter VI), the study finds that, as long as the 
advocates of a good civil society remain in the minority, the predominance of bad civil 
society renders the prospects of democratization dim.  
Chapter VII provides a summary of the observations resulting from this study, 
and the implications for democratic transition. The conclusions drawn from the Eastern 
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European case studies, and their application in terms of the Middle East, demonstrate that 
a good civil society is indeed a significant catalyst of democratization, and this 
observation also applies to the Middle East. The thesis concludes by finding that, despite 
the differences in the conceptual interpretations of civil society, cross-regional studies of 
Eastern European and Middle Eastern civil societies contribute to a better understanding 
of the role civil society plays in democratization. 
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II. CIVIL SOCIETY AND DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter provides the theoretical underpinnings of the concept of civil society 
by first reviewing the current literature and identifying important gaps. The chapter then 
goes on to establish the link between civil society and democratization and finds that, 
even if there is a great deal of debate over the significance of civil society in bringing 
about democratic change, the necessity of its presence and its favorable effects on 
democratization are largely undisputed. From these discussions, the chapter then provides 
the framework for comparing civil societies and their effects on democratization in 
Eastern Europe and the Middle East. 
A major finding presented in this chapter is that in transitioning countries with a 
vibrant civil society, authoritarian reversal is much less likely than in those countries 
where civil society is either weak or non-existent. In addition, the debate surrounding the 
existence or non-existence of civil society in the Middle East and its effects for 
democratization is largely due to the lack of a definition of what constitutes a vibrant 
civil society. To remedy this shortcoming, the present study introduces the notions of 
good civil society, which promotes democratization, and bad civil society, and exhibits 
non-liberal, anti-democratic traits. This differentiation allows for the comparative 
application of the concept of civil society in Eastern European and Middle Eastern 
contexts. 
The rest of this chapter will provide an overview of the debates about civil 
society, give a clear definition of the concept and list its constituting elements, establish a 
link between civil society and democratization, and briefly touch upon the current 
research on democratization and civil society. It concludes with the development of a set 
of criteria necessary to evaluate civil society. 
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B. DEBATES ABOUT CIVIL SOCIETY 
Today, there is no general agreement among scholars and theorists about the 
meaning of civil society, its constituting elements, or the social, economic, and political 
functions it is supposed to perform. What is more, civil society’s role in bringing about 
democratization continues to be a hotly contested topic among academics, particularly 
after the events in the Arab world revitalized a discussion, which seemed to come to a 
rest in the wake of Eastern Europe’s transition to democracy. This debate is largely 
fueled by the alternating views scholars and theorists hold about the concept of civil 
society; therefore, before introducing a working definition of civil society for this thesis, 
it is useful to provide a historic overview of the development of the concept and its 
alternating interpretations. 
The emergence of the alternative conceptions of civil society can best be 
understood by examining two major traditions prevalent in literature related to Western 
civil society. The liberal (Lockean) idea of a self-regulating civil society, and of a limited 
government, first emerged in the late seventeenth to early eighteenth century, when the 
growth of market economies, coupled with the Age of Discovery, brought about a crisis 
in social order. People began to attribute social order not to some external entity, such as 
God or King, but to the workings of society itself. One of the early proponents of civil 
society was John Locke, who in his “Second Treatise” suggests that civil society—not yet 
separated from the State or political society—is the realm of political associations men 
created after having left the primordial and unregulated “state of nature” and having 
entered into a state of mutual contract and consent based on the rule of law and 
democratic participation.1 As a consequence of the newly gained freedom, the security of 
person and  property, and the ensuing social order, a state of civility emerged, which was 
maintained by the legal and judicial instruments of the state. It is important to note that 
according to the Lockean view, individuals submit to the authority of society, that is, they 
enter into a social contract with the community on the basis of freely given consent, and 
this consent can be withdrawn if their life, liberty, and property are not guaranteed. 
                                                 
1 Adam B. Seligman, “Civil Society as Idea and Ideal,” in Alternative Conceptions of Civil Society, 
eds. Simone Chambers and Will Kymlicka (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002), 15. 
 9 
Advancing this concept, the thinkers of the Scottish Enlightenment (i.e., Adam 
Smith, David Hume, and Adam Ferguson) argued that civil society—already having been 
separated from political society—emerged from the necessity to bond individuals 
together, based on the concept of reciprocity. According to this view, reciprocity attempts 
to reconcile private and individual interests with public and social good, through 
conscious commitments based on the moral sentiments of individuals.2 According to 
Adam Smith, the rational pursuit of self-interest, that is, the recognition that individual 
interests can only be satisfied by cooperating with others, leads to social cohesion and a 
more sophisticated division of labor.3 
Contrary to former views, civil society was no longer an artificial construct but a 
product of the progressive evolution of societies, characterized by moral and cultural 
accomplishments and, most importantly, by the subjection of the government to the rule 
of law.4 This concept of social evolution, however, also raised the problem of the nature 
of relationships between developed and primitive communities existing next to each 
other. As an answer to this, Adam Ferguson claimed that civil society does not need to 
represent complete harmony; instead, civil societies have to clearly define themselves in 
relation to others, even if that involves competition and means of hostility.5 
The liberal tradition of civil society was probably best articulated in the works of 
the eighteenth-century French thinkers, Montesquieu and Alexis de Tocqueville, who 
define civil society as a counterbalancing force of independent bodies limiting the 
absolutist state. For Montesquieu, these independent bodies were the wealthy towns and 
estates of medieval Europe, while for de Tocqueville, they were the local associations of 
citizens “acting together in the affairs of daily life.”6 These intermediary associations do 
not exist merely outside the political structure, they also actively engage with politics by 
                                                 
2 Mark Jensen, Civil Society in Liberal Democracy (New York: Routledge, 2011), 30. 
3 Neera Chandhoke, State and Civil Society: Explorations in Political Theory (New Delhi; Thousand 
Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 1995), 75. 
4 Ibid., 91. 
5 Keith Tester, Civil Society (London; New York: Routledge, 1992), 47. 
6 Michael Walzer, “The Idea of Civil Society: A Path to Social Reconstruction,” in Civil Society and 
Democracy: A Reader, ed. Carolyn M Elliott (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2003), 5. 
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educating citizens, facilitating communication and holding power-holders accountable. 
Thus, these social associations, while acting as a filter against absolutist power and 
providing protection for individuals against the abuse of the majority and the state, 
simultaneously promote the emergence of civic virtues and facilitate consensus building.7  
In summary, according to the liberal theory, while civil societies have to defend 
themselves with all means against the despotic nature of more primitive communities, 
internally civil society is based on a system of rights protecting individuals from state 
oppression. This system of rights, however, can only be maintained if the state adheres to 
the common rules and principles established by the social contract.8 If it does, civil 
society itself is able to temper passions, curb the un-moderated pursuit of private interest 
and politically educate its citizens, and thus, maintain the civility of society.9 
Finally, a thorough account of the constituting elements of the libertarian version 
of civil society is given by the prominent American political philosopher Michael 
Walzer, according to whom liberal civil society should “include all social groups that are 
or can be understood as voluntary and non-coercive, thus excepting only the family, 
whose members are not volunteers, and the state, which, even if its legitimacy rests on 
the consent of its members, wields coercive power over them.”10 
The other tradition, which is commonly referred to as the critical theory of civil 
society, nurtures considerable doubts about the self-regulating capability of civil society. 
According to the German philosopher Hegel, one of the early critical theorists, civil 
society is a historically produced sphere of ethical life based on the emerging needs of 
mankind for having access to welfare and civil law.11 In his view, however, individuals 
are essentially egoistical and selfish, and thus, to prevent civil society from 
disintegrating, there is a need for the state to regulate society. The state must maintain 
                                                 
7 Chandhoke, State and Civil Society, 111. 
8 Ibid., 36. 
9 Ibid., 34. 
10 Jensen, Civil Society in Liberal Democracy, 69. 
11 John Keane, Civil Society: Old Images, New Visions (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 
1998), 50. 
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civility of society through laws and organizations. For Hegel, it is the independent 
association and public opinion, both key components of civil society, which fulfill a 
political and ethical mediating role between the individual and the state. 
Karl Marx, similar to Hegel, regarded civil society as a sphere of egoism, self-
interest and conflict, having emerged out of the need to bring order to social relationships 
beyond that of small-scale societies. Contrary to Hegel, however, he found that it is not 
the state that can maintain the civility of civil society, but the contradictory interests 
threatening civility have to be reconciled from within civil society.12 Within civil society 
the capitalist elite, however, have gained almost unlimited power; thus, in his view, civil 
society essentially becomes a synonym for class oppression. According to Marx, while 
the political sphere is gradually transformed through the introduction of rights, equality 
and justice, this transformation has left civil society largely untouched. Therefore, Marx’s 
solution for civilizing civil society is to reunify state and society through a revolutionary 
transformation.13 
For the Italian theorist Antonio Gramsci, the institutions of civil society, such as 
churches, clubs, universities, unions, and parties, serve the hegemonic purposes of the 
ruling elite by promoting the ideas necessary to maintain the status quo. In his view, the 
family is included in civil society because it is a vehicle of shaping the political attitudes 
of citizens, and thus, is central to the ideological socialization of the masses.14 For 
Gramsci, civil society is the realm where the state in the form of a moral force regulates 
and controls the activities of individuals without having to resort to coercion.15 This 
concept of civil society leads Gramsci to conclude that the Russian Revolution in 1917 
could only succeed because the state was not supported by a civil society deeply 
entrenched in the minds of individuals. 
                                                 
12 Chandhoke, State and Civil Society, 134. 
13 Ibid., 138. 
14 Simone Chambers, “A Critical Theory of Civil Society,” in Alternative Conceptions of Civil 
Society, eds. Simone Chambers and Will Kymlicka (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002), 90–91. 
15 Tester, Civil Society, 141. 
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On the other hand, civil society in the Gramscian view is also the sphere of 
contestation, where subaltern classes can challenge the power of the dominant classes and 
the state. In order to successfully contest power, subaltern classes have to first 
hegemonize the social relations of civil society, which can only be achieved through a 
widespread social, political and cultural revolution.16 
Contrary to liberal theorists, who see civil society as the realm of individual 
voluntarism, according to critical theorists such as Jean L. Cohen and Andrew Arato, 
civil society’s defining element is communicative autonomy, which refers to “the 
freedom of actors in society to shape, criticize and reproduce essential norms, meanings, 
values and identities through communicative (as opposed to coercive) interaction.”17 The 
main difference between the two approaches is that, while liberals see state encroachment 
that limits individual choices as the main threat to civil society, according to critical 
theorists, power and money (that is the state and the economy) both have the capability to 
corrupt the ways in which we interact, and thus threaten the autonomy of civil society. 
Furthermore, power and money not only threaten civil society itself, but they can also 
distort the public sphere, which is the sphere where actors of civil society hold power-
brokers accountable through institutions such as political parties, interest groups, welfare 
associations, social movements and religious bodies.18 According to the famous German 
critical theorist Jürgen Habermas, a democratic public sphere cannot be safeguarded 
merely by instituting legal and constitutional provisions, but it is largely the 
responsibility of an energetic civil society to keep it intact.19 
In summary, critical theorists argue that apart from the lack of a self-regulating 




                                                 
16 Chandhoke, State and Civil Society, 154. 
17 Chambers, “A Critical Theory of Civil Society,” 93. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Ibid., 97–98. 
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effects on civil society by breeding conflict among differing economic and political 
interests, and therefore a state capable of enforcing order is required to maintain the civil 
character of civil society.20 
To conclude, the importance of the alternative concepts of civil society becomes 
clear by looking at the differing meanings that it assumes for “democratizers” from all 
around the world. While, for example, dissidents in Eastern Europe, in line with the 
liberal tradition, viewed civil society as a sphere of citizen activity beyond the direct 
control of the government, and thus capable of forming a counterweight to state power, 
reformers in the Middle East will need to introduce a concept of civil society that 
embraces elements of both traditions: civil society there needs to act as an intermediary 
zone against state encroachment, while at the same time, arm-in-arm with the state, it also 
has ensure that the civility of society is maintained by a common set of values and 
principles enshrined in the rule of law.21 
C. DEFINING CIVIL SOCIETY 
Acclaimed political sociologist Larry Diamond defines civil society as “the realm 
of organized social life that is open, voluntary, self-generating, at least partially self-
supporting, autonomous from the state, and bound by a legal order or set of shared 
rules.”22 An important aspect of this comprehensive definition is the reference to the 
autonomous, self-supporting nature of civil society, because, as will be argued in the 
thesis, a civil society that is intertwined with the state and dependent upon receiving 
funds from the regime cannot act as a catalyst for democratization. Diamond further adds 
to his interpretation that civil society “involves citizens acting collectively in a public 
sphere to express their interests, passions, preferences, and ideas, to exchange 
information, to achieve collective goals, to make demands on the state, to improve the 
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structure and functioning of the state, and to hold state officials accountable.”23 These 
functions of civil society further the development of social capital, defined by American 
political scientist Robert D. Putnam, as “features of social organization such as networks, 
norms, and social trust that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit,” 
increase citizen awareness and the civility of interactions between citizens, and improve 
democratic governance.24 It is important to note that in his normative definition Diamond 
refers to the functions of a liberal and democratically inclined civil society, but this study 
will also introduce the notion of a civil society that lacks all these characteristics.  
Another interesting contribution to defining the meaning of civil society is Adam 
B. Seligman’s The Idea of Civil Society.25 The author tries to put the term civil society 
into a more sober perspective, at a time when the liberal Lockean concept of civil society 
espoused by Eastern European activists (and consequently adopted by Western social 
scientists) was considered as a panacea for all social problems. According to Seligman, 
the most important ingredient in reviving the concept of civil society is trust, which is 
expressed both in individual relationships and the creation of social institutions. This 
approach highlights the notion that social capital and civility are important building 
blocks of civil society.  
In The Dynamics of Democratization: Elites, Civil Society and the Transition 
Process, Graeme J. Gill examines the role of movements within civil society during 
democratic transformations.26 The author’s main aim is to give a descriptive account of 
the process of democratic transition focusing on political actors, the role of uncertainty 
and negotiations. Gill argues that civil society, with its actors demanding democratic 
change and offering the regime negotiating partners to engage with, plays a central role in 
the negotiations leading to transition. The volume offers some insight into the different 
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types of negotiating postures opposition elites assume vis-à-vis non-democratic regimes, 
but it fails to establish a strong connection between democratization and civil society, 
instead explaining transition as a product of different factors, including economic crisis, 
regime disunity, political mobilization and international pressure. 
Gill, makes an interesting claim worth further investigation, concluding that some 
degree of liberalization is necessary before civil society can thrive. This study will refer 
to this notion of liberalization as political opportunities open to civil society, which can 
appear in the form of more liberal laws and regulations introduced by the regime or a 
general slackening of state repression.27 
In line with the liberal tradition, Saad Edin Ibrahim defines civil society as “[a]ll 
non-governmental and non-hereditary organizations that occupy the public domain 
between family and state, and are constituted by the free will of their members in order to 
promote a common cause or interest, or express a common point of view.”28 According 
to Ibrahim, members of civil society “observe the values of due respect, compromise, 
tolerance, and the peaceful management of diversity and disagreement.”29 This definition 
supports the notion of a self-regulating civil society, which is based on the values of 
civility, but fails to acknowledge that civil societies, especially in authoritarian regimes, 
are not always like this, which has important implications for its capability to further 
democratization. 
Finally, examining the constituting elements of civil society, Thomas Carothers 
and Marina Ottaway argue that civil society, in its simplest form, refers to the “zone of 
voluntary associative life beyond family and clan affiliations but separate from the state 
and the market,” and is usually made up of nonprofit organizations, religious 
organizations, labor unions, business associations, interest and advocacy groups, 
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societies, clubs, and research institutions, as well as more informal political, social, and 
religious movements.30 For the purposes of this study, this list of components will be 
used to evaluate the overall quality of civil society. 
At this point, it has to be mentioned that notably missing from Carothers’ and 
Ottaway’s list are political parties. The reason for this is that political parties are usually 
seen as part of the political society, which has been treated separately from civil society 
since the works of the eighteenth century Scottish philosophers. The difference between 
civil society and political society can be best understood in the following way: while the 
self-organized associations of civil society usually attempt to influence power-holders, 
political society is comprised of parties trying to contest power in political institutions. 
Alfred Stepan calls political society the politicization of civil society organizations 
(CSOs) for the purpose of developing democratic pressure on the state and creating a 
democratic state apparatus.31 This statement has important implications: while civil 
society might be able to influence political decision makers—because of its inability to 
aggregate differing views and interests in society as broadly as political parties are able to 
do—without a viable political society, civil society by itself is not capable of bringing 
about democratization.32 
Graeme J. Gill even argues that without politically acting autonomous groups 
capable of functioning freely without state interference and restrictions, civil society 
cannot exist and, thus, even if associations pursuing members’ interests in the public 
sphere exist within society, without political activism those groups only constitute civil 
society forces, but not civil society itself.33 As in authoritarian environments, it is 
unlikely that civil society groups can act politically without state interference and 
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restrictions; for the purposes of this study this concept, however, would unnecessarily 
hamstring attempts to investigate the substantial role civil society plays in bringing about 
democratization. 
In addition, if we accept Stepan’s claim that political society is the politicization 
of CSOs, it is easy to see that—due to the rootedness of political society in civil 
society—if CSOs do not themselves espouse core democratic values, such as tolerance 
and cooperation, political forces based on those CSOs will likely not become champions 
of democratization. In addition, even more than civil society, political society is held 
under the close scrutiny of the state, limiting and shaping it through laws and regulations, 
and trying to relieve it of its autonomy. Thus, while political and civil society both have 
to fight state interference, it is civil society in which the first seeds of democratization can 
develop. Therefore, this study limits itself to investigating certain criteria of civil society, 
based upon which prospects for democratization can be established. 
D. GOOD VERSUS BAD CIVIL SOCIETY 
Most scholars view an active and vibrant civil society as a precondition for 
democratization. Even so, the cases of the Weimar Republic and more recently the 
former Yugoslavia show that a vibrant and developed civil society can also nurture 
gravely anti-liberal and anti-democratic forces. Citizens in the civil society can retreat 
into insular groups with clearly defined barriers, where membership strengthens a sense 
of “us,” and outsiders are viewed as “them.” A bad civil society is based on limited 
civility, a civility which does not cross group boundaries.34 The consequences of this 
limited civility are distrust and misunderstanding instead of trust and cooperation, the 
primary features of a good civil society. 
How does bad civil society evolve? Discontent—often based on a sense of 
alienation, a general lack of political efficacy or meaningful participation in public life—
makes people turn to groups that seemingly offer solutions for their 
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frustrations (often by providing targets to blame).35 These groups, if organized within 
rather than across group boundaries, often promote anti-democratic or anti-liberal values, 
which leads to the development of bad civil society.36 
This leads us to the question of how much internal democracy or civility is needed 
in a group to regard it as part of good civil society. Cohen and Arato offer a minimal 
definition, according to which even a strictly hierarchical group like the Catholic Church, 
can be part of a democratized civil society if its members have agreed to the hierarchy of 
the group, the rest of the society and the state are convinced that the members have 
agreed to the current structure of the organization, and if the members are free to leave 
the group in case of disagreement.37 In order for a group to be an integral part of good 
civil society, this minimal definition has to be expanded with the requirement to renounce 
violence and respect the views of other groups. Norton’s definition of civility is based on 
this latter condition. According to Norton, “[c]ivility implies tolerance, the willingness of 
individuals to accept disparate political views, and social attitudes.”38 In addition, for the 
purposes of this study, civility will also include the notions of trust, reciprocity, and 
cooperation, because as Wanda Krause asserts, the presence and the combined strength of 
all of these values is essential for the emergence of a good civil society.39  
The importance of these values becomes clear by considering their effects. In 
order to participate in collective institutions, such as labor unions, business associations 
and churches, individuals must be capable of establishing trust towards other members.40 
In fact, the lack of interpersonal trust is generally seen as one of the main factors 
allowing authoritarian regimes to survive. Reciprocity, including social interaction in the 
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form of sharing, giving and helping, “strengthens relations between members and 
organizations, and solidifies networks in which members can rely on one another to 
cooperate,” while “nondiscriminatory forms of cooperation are a key to establishing 
norms that support plurality.”41 Finally, tolerance refers to the notion that people with 
diverse beliefs, traditions and practices can peacefully coexist and enjoy the same 
rights.42 As Krause puts it: 
When groups pursue interests and a version of the common good among 
competing positions, they contribute to the vibrancy of civil society. 
However, if intolerance toward competing beliefs and practices is 
articulated and practiced, then civility suffers.43 
Diamond lists some useful conditions that set civil society organizations apart 
from other groups in society. These points can also be used to distinguish a good civil 
society which can act as a catalyst for democratization from a bad civil society which 
merely reinforces patterns of authoritarian behavior. First, civil society pursues public 
ends instead of private goals and thus is open to all citizens.44 This is an important 
characteristic of a good civil society, which is inclusive, as opposed to a bad civil society, 
where membership is usually exclusionary. Second, civil society tries to influence 
decision-makers within the state in order to achieve certain policy changes, and in case 
the state remains unresponsive to societal demands, certain civil society organizations or 
movements might even try to remove power-holders, but as long as they do not commit 
violence and do not seek to assume power, they remain parts of the civil society.45 Thus, 
while a democratic civil society essentially excludes groups committing violence, in a 
bad civil society disparate views are often met with hate and intolerance that can easily 
turn into violence.46 Third, a good civil society advocates pluralism and diversity, which 
is in stark contrast to the anti-liberal and anti-democratic practices of bad civil society 
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organizations.47 Finally, civil society organizations usually do not represent the totality of 
interests of a given individual or community, which motivates citizens to join several 
organizations, associations or movements, promoting pluralism and diversity, and thus 
leading to a strengthening of cross-cutting cleavages within society.48  
A bad civil society, on the contrary, is largely made up of insular groups where 
members usually do not belong to various groups. This point also highlights the need for 
a civil society sporting a dense network of associational life: the greater civil society is in 
terms of sheer numbers, the greater the likelihood that a wider range of views and 
interests are represented by its organizations, and the more likely it is that individuals 
embracing a complex set of interests will join several organizations, reinforcing cross-
cutting patterns of potential social cleavages.49  
The importance of cross-cutting cleavages in civil society is best understood by 
examining the societal effects of strong ties (based on family or clan relationships) versus 
weak ties (that can be found, for example, within voluntary associations), where the 
strength of a tie is determined by a “combination of the amount of time, the emotional 
intensity, the intimacy, and the reciprocal services which characterize the tie.”50 A bad 
civil society is made up of strong but closed social networks that are usually internally 
homogeneous and cohesive, limiting interactions with those outside the network and thus, 
leading to the atomization of society.51 On the other hand, weak ties are more likely to 
cross group boundaries, and thus promote social interaction. The importance of weak ties 
is also highlighted by Putnam, who claims “networks of civic engagement that cut across 
social cleavages nourish wider cooperation,” and thus promote the emergence of 
democratic governance.52  
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In summary, when considering the role civil society plays in bringing about 
political change it is worth referring to Sheri Berman who argues that “[t]he growth of 
civil society should not be considered an undisputed good, but a politically neutral 
multiplier—neither inherently ‘good’ nor ‘bad,’ but dependent for its effects on the wider 
political environment and the values of those who control it.”53 One of the main tasks of 
this thesis is to differentiate between a good civil society, which facilitates 
democratization, and a bad civil society, which strengthens non-liberal forces. 
E. ESTABLISHING THE LINK BETWEEN DEMOCRATIZATION AND 
CIVIL SOCIETY 
It is widely believed that civil society plays a crucial role in democratization as it 
promotes the emergence of a participatory civic culture, the dissemination of liberal 
values, the articulation of citizen’s interests, the recruitment of new political leaders and, 
thus, ultimately furthers the accountability of decision-makers and limits the power of the 
state.54 Linz and Stepan list a free and lively civil society as one of the crucial 
requirements (next to the rule of law, a state apparatus, an institutionalized economic 
society and a relatively autonomous political society) as necessary for a democratic 
system to emerge and function.55 Moreover, they argue that a lively and independent 
civil society with its capacity to generate political alternatives and monitor the state is a 
crucial criterion at all stages of the democratization process.56 Diamond adds to these the 
notion that a civic community sporting the horizontal ties of trust and reciprocity is able 
to sever the vertical ties of authority and dependency at the local level, enabling a 
“transition from clientelism to citizenship,” and thus, deepening democracy.57 Finally, as 
Nick Troiano puts it: 
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[Civil society] is supposed to moderate attitudes, promote social 
interaction, facilitate trust, and increase solidarity and public spiritedness. 
Through a dense network of relationships and associations, civil society 
creates the conditions for social integration, public awareness and action, 
and democratic stability.58 
One of the first studies about the links between democratization and civil society 
was conducted by the Frenchman Alexis de Tocqueville when he visited the United 
States in the 1830s. In his work Democracy in America de Tocqueville concluded that 
one of the main conditions for the functioning of democracy in the United States is its 
citizens’ propensity for civic associations.59 Building on de Tocqueville’s findings, 
American scholars have suggested that the quality of public life and the performance of 
social and political institutions are heavily dependent on the norms and networks of civic 
engagement.60 The reason for this is elaborated by Putnam, who argues that civic 
engagement fosters the creation of social capital.61 The more social capital a community 
possesses, the more its members are able to communicate and collaborate effectively with 
each other in order to attain common goals, which on the one hand promotes civil 
solidarity and thus improves the quality of public life, and on the other hand increases the 
performance of social and political institutions based on the democratic values of trust, 
cooperation and solidarity.62 
Furthermore, with regard to the current study, the importance of social capital is 
underlined by the fact that in authoritarian regimes, where the formal institutions of civil 
society are restricted or forbidden, citizens form informal networks and organizations,63 
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based on the basic components of social capital, such as trust and cooperation, in order to 
gather information, disseminate democratic ideals and engage in social activism.64 
At this point it is important to note that despite de Tocqueville’s claims that 
associations have to sport a sizeable membership to have any power in democracies, in 
terms of social capital bigger is not always better.65 Only those classic secondary 
associations, in which members actively engage with each other on a regular basis, can 
effectively foster social capital.66 For example, Putnam argues that mass-membership 
organizations, such as environmental and feminist groups, do not further social capital, 
because its members—though they are attached to common symbols, common leaders or 
common ideals—aside from paying membership fees or reading newsletters often do not 
communicate or cooperate with each other.67 Thus, these organizations, despite having 
grown in size and numbers in the past decades, do not necessarily contribute to the 
creation of a vibrant civil society. 
Having learned about the importance of civic engagement necessarily leads to the 
question of how does a participatory civil society exert influence within a democratic 
political system. According to Philippe C. Schmitter and Terry Lynn Karl “[m]odern 
political democracy is a system of governance in which rulers are held accountable for 
their actions in the public realm by citizens, acting indirectly through the competition and 
cooperation of their elected representatives.”68 This definition, however, reduces 
democracies to the mere presence of elections, where in the period between elections 
citizens have no influence whatsoever on policy-makers. Most authoritarian regimes 
today hold some sort of elections at the local or even national level. Even if these 
elections would be considered largely free and fair, those regimes would not pass for 
democracies. Therefore, to qualify their definition, Schmitter and Karl add that, in 
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democracies in the period between elections, citizens have certain means at their disposal 
to try to influence public policy; these means are in essence the institutions of civil 
society, such as interest associations, social movements or advocacy groups.69 This claim 
naturally begs the question, which is also going to be addressed by this study, whether 
citizens in authoritarian regimes, where elections are either non-existent or are less than 
free and fair, can exert influence on public policies through the institutions of civil 
society.  
Further research in this area is also warranted by studies which claim the 
existence of a positive relation between civic engagement and democratization. Natalia 
Letki, for example, proposes that participation in the voluntary associations of civil 
society has positive effects for democratization as it socializes “individuals into 
cooperative behavior,” provides them “with a number of skills necessary to effectively 
shape politics at the local and national level” and expands “their formal and informal 
networks, which they may use for other, political or social, purposes.”70 
Joshua Cohen and Joel Rogers provide an even more elaborate assessment of the 
democracy-enhancing functions of voluntary associations.71 They claim that associations 
can provide policy-makers with information on the preferences of the membership, what 
impact proposed legislation is going to have or how current laws are implemented and 
accepted by the members.72 This helps decision-makers to get a better understanding of 
popular demands and thus to address those demands and grievances by more circumspect 
laws and regulations. On the other hand, members can use the information channels 
provided by associations to present their demands effectively to political elites, thus 
enhancing those channels of interaction between state and society that are characteristic 
of democracies. Associations also help to equalize representation, that is, through their 
capacity to pool resources they can enable members with fewer economic opportunities 
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to present their views and demands to a wider audience and to policy-makers.73 This 
enables disadvantaged parts of the population to take part in the public discourse in 
democracies. Furthermore, associations provide a public space for citizens’ education, 
where members embrace democratic values like tolerance and cooperation.74 It is in these 
public spaces where members espouse the underlying principles of civility, the capability 
to build trust and to accept disparate views. Finally, associations provide an alternative 
form of social governance, that is, building on the bonds of trust and cooperation 
established among its membership, as well as the established channels of communication, 
they can help to formulate and execute public policies, and thus, reduce transaction costs 
for states.75 Put another way: 
At its best, civil society provides an intermediate layer of governance 
between the individual and the state that is capable of resolving conflicts 
and controlling the behavior of members without public coercion. Rather 
than overloading decision makers with increased demands and making the 
system ungovernable, a viable civil society can mitigate conflicts and 
improve the quality of citizenship—without relying exclusively on the 
privatism of the marketplace.76  
This allows the state to withdraw from certain areas of public life, which 
strengthens the self-regulatory powers of society by furthering the autonomy of civil 
society. Again, it has to be emphasized that civil society in general and the various forms 
of voluntary associations in particular can only fulfill their democracy enhancing role if 
they themselves embrace values such as trust, tolerance, reciprocity and cooperation. 
This study would not be complete if it did not take into account those who 
question the role civil society plays in furthering democratization. Among the critical 
theories, modern transitology is especially salient, having coined the term “democracy 
without democrats,” to allude to the notion that “third wave” countries do not need to 
have a society that strongly embraces democratic values, or have a high level of political 
participation, to make the transition from an authoritarian regime to a more democratic 
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system.77 Instead, according to its tenets, what is needed are reasonable and artful 
politicians who might not qualify as “genuine” democrats, but can support those 
democratic forces within society that would otherwise be too weak to act as catalysts of 
democratization on their own.78 While this study acknowledges the importance of 
political entrepreneurs in promoting democratization (as has been referred to in 
highlighting the role political society plays), even modern transitologists agree that 
countries lacking a civil society that espouses democratic values and holds power-holders 
accountable are more likely to experience a reversal in the achievements of 
democratization and therefore might fall into the category of quasi-democracies.79 Thus, 
while there is a reasonable debate among theorists over the significance of the role civil 
society plays in democratization, the necessity of its presence in the process is largely 
undoubted. 
F. THE COMPONENTS OF CIVIL SOCIETY 
This study focuses on the institutional and non-institutional components of 
modern civil society in the Middle East and in Eastern Europe. Such components include 
advocacy and service providing non-governmental organizations, professional syndicates, 
business associations, labor unions, the church and social movements. In this section, a 
short overview of the different components of civil society is provided. 
One critical component of civil society is the groups that organize individuals. 
These groups and organizations have several names but, in this thesis, will be known as 
non- governmental organizations (NGOs). According to a definition provided by Mary 
Kaldor, NGOs are institutional and generally professional; they include voluntary 
associations, charities, foundations or professional societies, and they are usually 
formally registered. Organizations can be defined as “purposeful, role-bound social 
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units.” NGOs are organizations which are voluntary, in contrast to compulsory 
organizations like the state or some traditional, religious organizations, and they do not 
make profits like corporations.80  
NGOs can be divided into two groups. Service provision NGOs focus primarily 
on offering public services the state is unwilling or unable to provide, like health care, 
education or legal services. Advocacy NGOs usually conduct activities, such as lobbying 
or public mobilization and campaigning around particular issues, like human rights or 
environmental protection. 
Another component of civil society is formed by professional syndicates, which 
are well established and highly politicized organizations. They serve their “members’ 
interests and provide services that fulfill their needs as well as help in drafting of laws 
that affect their professions.”81 Several professions pool into syndicates, such as judges, 
lawyers, physicians, journalists, engineers or professors. Similarly, business associations 
organize to support businesses and economic growth, and to further the interests of their 
membership. Members are usually recruited from both the private and the public sectors, 
and as such, these associations usually have close ties to state officials.82 Finally, labor 
unions form to serve their members’ interests in terms of wages and working conditions. 
They usually boast high membership levels and are tightly controlled by the state.83 
Religious groups in the Middle East are not dealt with separately because most of 
them are well organized and engage in service delivery and thus are treated as Islamic 
service providing NGOs. The church in Eastern Europe refers to the Catholic Church in 
Poland and the Orthodox Church in Russia. 
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Finally, social movements are an important phenomenon in civil society building. 
McAdam et al. define a social movement as “a loose collectivity acting with some degree 
of organization, temporal continuity, and reliance on non-institutional forms of action to 
promote or resist change in the group, society, or world order of which it is part.”84 
Cohen and Arato argue that social movements are key ingredients of a vigorous civil 
society and are an important manifestation of civic participation in the public sphere.85 
This is so because, while creating new associations and addressing new publics, social 
movements also increase the egalitarian character of existing institutions and strengthen 
public discussion within civil society.86 Thus, social movements, such as the labor 
movement, the civil rights movement, and the feminist movement, aim to democratize 
and de-traditionalize civil society itself.87 
The advantage of social movements is that they are able to bypass existing 
political channels in order to exert influence; however, in doing so, they often lack 
internal democracy, and to attain their goals, the members often engage in civil 
disobedience, such as strikes, sit-ins, boycotts, or mass demonstrations.88 
Finally, civil disobedience can be an important link between civil society and 
democratic change. Civil disobedience can be understood as “vigorous acts of deliberate 
law breaking or extroverted acts of disputed legality, whose stated aim is to bring before 
a public either the alleged illegitimacy or ethical or political indefensibility of certain 
government laws or corporate or state policies.”89 This, coupled with its self-limiting 
nature, implies that civil disobedience cannot be understood as being a sign of incivility. 
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Furthermore, by expanding the range and forms of public participation, and leading to 
additional rights, civil disobedience can act as a catalyst of democratization.90 
G. LITERATURE ON DEMOCRATIZATION AND CIVIL SOCIETY IN 
EASTERN EUROPE AND THE MIDDLE EAST  
The following section provides an overview of the existing literature on 
democratization and civil society in Eastern Europe and the Middle East. While this list 
by no means presents a comprehensive account of the studies available in the underlying 
area of research, it nevertheless offers insight into strengths and possible shortcomings in 
the existing literature. 
Beginning with the literature on democratic transitions, Larry Diamond, in 
Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation, examines whether new democracies are 
likely to stabilize what the prospects of democratic reversal are, and whether a “fourth 
wave” of democratization might be impending. 91 In light of the recent developments in 
the Arab world, the latter question could not be more acute. Contributing to the study of 
democratic transition, Diamond classifies the different political systems as more or less 
democratic based on the actions of the regime, the characteristics of elections, civil 
liberties, and the state of political culture. The author asserts that a multitude of factors—
like new parties, a vibrant civil society, a functioning legislature and the rule of law—are 
necessary for democracies to take root, but the process is by no means a fixed sequence, 
nor has it a fixed timetable. With regard to the importance of civil society in the process 
of democratization, this inconclusiveness leads to the famous question about what comes 
first, the chicken or the egg? Nevertheless, besides stating the importance of a liberal-
pluralist past, Diamond concludes that the more vibrant and autonomous a civil society 
is, the more likely democracy will emerge. 
The topic of democratization and civil society in Eastern Europe is covered by a 
large and extensive body of literature. In Post-Communist Politics: Democratic Prospects 
in Russia and Eastern Europe, Michael McFaul offers an overview of the complexities of 
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the collapse of the communist rule in the region and the problems posed by the process of 
democratization.92 Concerned primarily with a descriptive account of historical events in 
Hungary, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Russia, the author identifies the time of elections 
as a key variable for a negotiated, peaceful transition toward democracy. The author 
argues that the sooner elections are held after the fall of the old regime, the more 
incentives political parties can offer to their respective constituencies, and the more 
influence the political parties have in shaping political developments during the 
transitional period. Unfortunately, the role social forces played in these processes of 
transformation receive only minor attention. 
Much like the uprisings in the Arab world in 2010‒2011, the sudden fall of 
Communism in Eastern Europe took most Western observers by complete surprise. The 
unexpectedness of the events naturally begs the question whether scholars in the West did 
overlook some essential factors that brought down most of the decades old totalitarian 
regimes. Civil society proffers itself as one of those underestimated factors. The volume 
The Reemergence of Civil Society in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, edited by 
Zbigniew Rau, shows the relevance civil society played in bringing about the radical 
changes in the region.93 While Rau uses civil society in a liberal, Lockean sense by 
claiming that it “is a voluntary association of individuals and their associations 
participating in political life and forming a moral community” incompatible with state 
collectivism, the other authors have a fairly different concept of the term—ranging from 
equating civil society with property rights and the rule of law to claims that instead of 
being a synonym for capitalist polyarchy, civil society should move in the direction of a 
more open democracy.94 This results in different, sometimes even contradicting 
explanations about the reemergence of civil society in Eastern Europe and the Soviet 
Union.  
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The four case studies presented in the book offer various reasons for the 
appearance of a vibrant civil society, including the power of a collective memory, the role 
intellectuals play and the importance of nationalistic sentiments in “rallying people 
around the flag,” the latter claimed to be a necessary, albeit insufficient, precondition for 
the development of a liberal civil society, although the causal direction in this case is far 
from clear. 
The Arab Spring bears some important similarities to the variance of successful 
democratic transition in Eastern Europe. A good source to start research on the uprisings 
in North Africa and the Middle East in 2010 and 2011 is The Arab Uprisings: What 
Everyone Needs to Know, written by historian James L. Galvin.95 In a question-and-
answer format, the book explores all aspects of the revolutionary protests in the Arab 
world, including a search for its causes, the motivations of the participants and the role of 
the youth, the military and religious groups. The author does not take a big risk by 
concluding that the popular protests did not have a single cause and by claiming that it 
remains to be seen whether the uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt really will mean the end of 
autocracy. Taking a deeper look into the various independent variables causing the 
protests and their correlation might allow for making some educated guesses about the 
prospects of democratization in the affected Arab countries. 
Democratization and Development: New Political Strategies for the Middle East, 
edited by Dietrich Jung, tries to offer an alternative to the dominant viewpoint held by 
political theorists, including Samuel Huntington, that Islam is inherently incompatible 
with democracy.96 By claiming that contrary to widely held beliefs the Arab region is not 
politically homogeneous, Jung sees chances for democratization in the Middle East. In 
Dancing with Wolves: Dilemmas of Democracy Promotion in Authoritarian Contexts, 
Oliver Schlumberger, on the other hand, argues that Western-oriented theories of 
democracy are not applicable to the region and efforts should be made to support an 
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adequate internal agency and to foster elites.97 In another article, Thomas Scheffler 
claims that the assumption that homogeneous states are more prone to democracy is not 
applicable to the Arab world, because pan-Arab movements are based on what he calls 
“monoethnicity.” According to Scheffler, transnationalism, like anti-globalization 
movements, might foster democratic initiatives. In his concluding remarks Jung argues 
that democratization is a process wrought with conflict and, in the short term, this may 
lead to instability in the Middle East.98 
Probably the most comprehensive work on the question of civil society in the 
region is the volume Civil Society in the Middle East, edited by Augustus Richard 
Norton, which predates the Arab Spring.99 The views expressed by the authors assert that 
even with limited rights, social organizations in many countries of the Arab world have 
reached a critical mass, and possess the necessary space to foster the development of a 
civil society through interactions with each other and the state. Norton assumes that a 
vital and autonomous civil society is a necessary (albeit insufficient) condition of 
democracy. The two main issues addressed by the volume are whether the notion of civil 
society can be applied to the Middle East and whether Islamists should be considered a 
part of it. Eva Bellin supports the use of the term civil society as a tool of analysis, 
because Arab intellectuals and activists have themselves opted to do so. In another of her 
articles, Bellin argues that “[b]y retaining the term civil society we will combat the 
tendency toward Middle East exceptionalism and invite comparative, cross-regional 
analysis of this dynamic process, “a notion, which supports the conduct of a comparative-
study between civil societies in the Middle East and Eastern Europe.100 On the 
integration of Islamists, Saad Eddin Ibrahim asserts that in Islam there is nothing 
inherently contradictory to democracy and civil society and as long as religious-based 
parties and associations adhere to the norms of civility and pluralism they should be 
considered part of civil society. Ahmad Moussalli argues that radical and violent 
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fundamentalism is largely a result of state action. Nevertheless, the fairly optimistic tone 
expressed throughout the volume about the prospects of the development of civil society 
in the Middle East is put in perspective by Mustapha al-Sayyid who concludes that, 
besides the state, society itself also has demonstrated a great deal of intolerance for 
pluralism and liberal values, which casts doubts on its civil character. 
Contrary to the views expressed in the Norton volume, in Democracy in the 
Balance: Culture and Society in the Middle East, Mehran Kamrava argues that Middle 
Eastern culture and society, and especially Islam, hinder the development of democracy 
in the region.101 Kamrava finds that Islam is not prone to change in the future, and the 
lack of democratically inclined intellectuals and properly formed social classes inhibits 
the development of a liberal civil society. The author distinguishes between two types of 
democracies: quasi democracies are a result of negotiations among political elites, while 
viable democracies are based on civil societies with a democratic political culture. 
Kamrava claims that civil society must be in place before proper democratization can 
unfold. He rejects the political crafting theory of Giuseppe Di Palma, which asserts that 
initiatives for transition by authoritarian forces might result in a democratic outcome, on 
the grounds that while the outcome of these bargaining processes may be democratic, 
they might lack the social and cultural components inherent in democracy.102 The major 
shortcoming of the book, however, is the fact that Kamrava never gives a clear definition 
of civil society; instead he simply enumerates certain characteristics of it, including 
tolerance, homogenous national culture and democratically inclined individuals. 
Despite the growing interest for civil society in the Arab world, the applicability 
of the term to the Middle East—mostly because of the Western connotations it comes 
with—continues to be a hotly contested topic in academic circles.103 On the one hand, 
there are those like Saad Eddin Ibrahim and John L. Esposito, who note that civil society 
                                                 
101 Mehran Kamrava, Democracy in the Balance: Culture and Society in the Middle East (New York, 
NY: Chatham House Publishers / Seven Bridges Press, 1998).      
102 Mehran Kamrava, Democracy in the Balance: Culture and Society in the Middle East (New York, 
NY: Chatham House Publishers / Seven Bridges Press, 1998), 13. 
103 Berna Turam, “The Politics of Engagement Between Islam and the Secular State: Ambivalences of 
‘Civil Society,’” The British Journal of Sociology 55, no. 2 (2004): 263. 
 34 
existed in the Middle East long before the term was even developed in the West and that 
Islamic history provides ample evidence of non-state actors, institutions and 
organizations serving as intermediaries between state and society.104 On the other hand, 
Keane observes that numerous Islamic scholars reject the Western notion that civil 
society has to be based on secularism, arguing that the continuous reference to secularism 
only helps to keep authoritarian regimes in power.105 
For the sake of conducting a comparative study, and to reject notions of Arab 
exceptionalism, the study forgoes conclusions about the applicability of the term civil 
society to the Middle East, and instead introduces the ideas of good (meaning liberal) and 
bad (meaning non-liberal) civil societies. In addition, the study will include within the 
concept of good civil society all those Islamic associations and movements that renounce 
violence.  
Furthermore, the thesis does not wish to address the question of whether Islam is 
compatible with democracy, as there is significant literature addressing this question with 
a host of theorists arguing for (Ibrahim, 1998; Filali-Ansary, 1999; Pool, 1994) and 
against (Gellner, 1983; Kamrava, 1998; Huntington, 1991) the notion of a democratic 
Islam. At this point, it is sufficient to say that there is nothing inherently anti-democratic 
in Islam. Quite to the contrary, several crucial components of democracy are also present 
in the Qur’an and the teachings of the Prophet Muhammad, such as the freedom of 
expression, freedom of conscience and the sanctity of life and property.106 
A large part of the debate surrounding the role of civil society in bringing about 
democratization derives from the confusion about alternative conceptions of civil society, 
as well as the lack of clear definitions and components of the term. Norton asserts that a 
vital civil society is a necessary condition of democracy, but he does not further elaborate 
what constitutes vitality. One of the challenges for this thesis will be to suggest a more 
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refined approach in using the different concepts of civil society, as well as to define a 
clear set of conditions that are necessary to qualify a civil society as being able to 
promote democratization. 
H. EVALUATING CIVIL SOCIETY  
As presented, a civil society embracing the norms of civility has several 
democracy enhancing aspects. The present study, however, does not attempt to examine 
whether those democracy enhancing aspects are sufficient to bring about democratic 
transformation. Referring to Linz and Stepan’s list of necessary requirements, civil 
society, even if it embraces core democratic values, is only one of several critical 
components that need to be in place if a viable democratic change is to be achieved.107 
What is more important for the purpose of this thesis is the question whether a vibrant 
civil society, called good civil society in this study, is indeed necessary for democratic 
change to take root or put it in another way: can a viable democratic system emerge in 
spite of a civil society exhibiting non-liberal, anti-democratic traits? 
In order to answer this question a set of criteria has to be introduced capable of 
measuring the “goodness” of civil society and its institutions. To begin with, in assessing 
the quality of civil society organizations three indicators proposed by Wanda Krause in 
her study Women in Civil Society: The State, Islamism, and Networks in the UAE will be 
used: participation, empowerment and civility.108 
The level of participation refers not just to voter turnout at board or leadership 
elections in CSOs, but also to active collaboration among members to achieve common 
goals. It is said to occur “when people organize around specific interests, negotiate, and 
collaborate to reach particular ends.”109 At this point it has to be noted that high 
membership numbers in CSOs do not necessarily imply a high level of participation, as 
membership usually also includes passive individuals whose main contribution is limited 
to paying membership fees, a phenomena which, according to Putnam, does not further 
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the creation of trust and cooperation among individuals.110 Empowerment implies the 
extent to which civil society organizations, as a consequence of the active participation 
and collaboration of its members, are capable to influence power-holders and have an 
effect on the institutional environment.111 Civility, which also encompasses the beneficial 
aspects of social capital, includes the interrelated values of trust, reciprocity, cooperation, 
and tolerance.  
In addition to the aforementioned indicators, in analyzing civil society the level of 
autonomy of CSOs will be investigated. The importance of autonomy is given by the fact 
that civil society is only able to fully assume its role as a mediating sphere between state 
and individual if it is not controlled or co-opted by external forces, be it by the state or by 
religious authorities. Autonomy, however, does not mean that CSOs can do whatever 
they want; CSOs have to function within the legal limits of political action, which 
essentially excludes activities based on violence.  
Furthermore, as presented, while social atomization and strong ties are usually 
signs of a bad civil society, the presence of cross-cutting cleavages avoids the emergence 
of insular groups and furthers the development of a good civil society and thus constitutes 
another important criterion in this study. 
Finally, as Diamond notes, countries with a liberal-pluralist past and previous 
civic traditions that can be recovered are more likely to develop a democratic civil society 
than those countries which lack a similar past or where civic traditions were weak.112 
Moreover, periods of expanded political opportunities may also lead to the emergence of 
so-called political opportunity “holdovers,” which provide civil society with memories of 
a more liberal environment of collective mobilization during periods of heightened 
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repression.113 These “holdovers” can promote the reconstitution of civil society in the 
wake of political liberalization, and thus it is important to include their examination in the 
present study.  
In summary, as presented, a good civil society has many democracy enhancing 
functions, but probably the function most feared by authoritarian regimes is its capacity 
to produce a critical rational discourse capable of holding power-holders accountable. 
State accountability, however, is a function of the practices of the citizens inhabiting civil 
society. Only a self-conscious, vibrant and politically active civil society has the 
capability to impose limits on state power, whereas a passive, largely co-opted civil 
society is likely to encounter an unresponsive state.114 Furthermore, a civil society that is 
itself not democratic, and that lacks the critical conditions of civility, is not likely to act 
as a catalyst for democratization. Therefore, the main aim of this study is to examine 
whether in the countries selected civil society is able to fulfill the “messianic” role 
Diamond, Stepan, Linz, and other proponents of the democratic theory attribute to it. 
I. CONCLUSIONS 
In summary, this chapter asserts that a vigorous civil society is a necessary, albeit 
insufficient condition for democratic change. It also finds that the voluntary associations 
of civil society have favorable effects on democratization, such as instilling democratic 
values in people and holding power-holders accountable. Thus, it is argued that the 
presence of a vibrant civil society significantly decreases the likelihood of an 
authoritarian reversal.  
In addition, the chapter claims that in the case of civil society quantity does not 
equal quality. A civil society with numerous organizations, if it is bereft of its autonomy 
and exhibits non-liberal values, can reinforce authoritarian patterns. Thus, to distinguish 
between a vibrant civil society that can act as a catalyst of democratization and a weak 
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civil society that blocks democratic change, the chapter introduces the notions of good 
and bad civil society. Table 1 presents the differences between the two: 
 
Good civil society Bad civil society 
Is inclusive, open to all; exhibits a dense 
network of associational life; weak ties 
promote cross-cutting cleavages 
Is exclusionary; has a few insular groups 
exhibiting strong ties; social atomization  
Has CSOs that advocate values such as 
trust, reciprocity, cooperation and 
tolerance; reject violence  
Has CSOs that display non-liberal and anti-
democratic attitudes; violence as an 
expression of hate and intolerance 
Has CSOs whose members actively 
participate in board elections and 
collaborate to achieve common goals 
Displays nominal participation in CSOs, 
e.g., to paying membership fees; low voter 
turnouts in board elections 
Has empowered CSOs capable to achieve 
tangible political results 
Has collective action that does not 
influence decision-makers 
Enjoys autonomy from state and/or 
religious authorities 
Has CSOs that are largely co-opted and/or 
are heavily dependent on state funding 
Spurs memories of a liberal-pluralist past 
furthering the emergence of good civil 
society 
Exhibits absence of liberal-pluralist 
traditions reinforcing illiberal patterns of 
behavior 
Table 1.   Comparison of Types of Civil Society and Their Criteria. 
The following chapters investigate case studies of civil societies in Eastern 
Europe and the Middle East, based upon which the central hypotheses regarding civil 
society’s role in democratic transition can be tested. Civil societies will be examined 
based on the criteria established, namely participation, empowerment, civility, autonomy, 
cross-cutting cleavages and political opportunity “holdovers.”  
Eastern Europe’s transition to democracy will include studies on Poland and 
Russia. While Poland made a successful transformation into a liberal democracy, 
transformation in Russia is lacking in several aspects, and its political system today is 
best described as semi-authoritarian in nature. Despite sporting similar Soviet-type 
regimes, political transformation in the two countries took diverging paths, which is 
attributed to differences in the quality of civil society. 
 39 
The Middle East’s transition to democracy will include studies of Tunisia and 
Egypt, two countries where the uprisings of the Arab Spring successfully deposed long-
standing rulers. While Tunisian civil society was strongly suppressed, even in Middle 
Eastern terms, civil society in Egypt—compared to other nations in the region—enjoyed 
a long period of relatively unfettered development, best represented by its highly 
institutionalized nature. Despite the more favorable conditions of civil society 
development, Egypt’s path to democratization is riddled with stumbling blocks and 
detours, while political transformation in Tunisia seems to be relatively smooth in 
comparison. Differences in the nature of both civil societies shed light on the reasons for 
the divergence of the two paths. 
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III. POLAND: CIVIL SOCIETY’S ROAD TO VICTORY  
A. INTRODUCTION 
Poland stepped on the final path of democratization in the summer of 1989 when 
Solidarity gained an overwhelming victory in the first (semi-) democratic elections held 
in a country of the Eastern Bloc. The results surprised many observes on both sides of the 
Iron Curtain as Poland, after the experience of martial law in the early 1980s, and despite 
the slow political liberalization in the second half of the 1980s, was still widely regarded 
as one of the more repressive states in Eastern Europe. An analysis of Polish civil society, 
however, proves that Solidarity’s strong showing in the elections was no accident as it 
was the culmination of a process that began already in the second half of the 1970s. 
Despite its head start, Poland was soon overtaken by other transitioning countries in the 
Eastern Bloc; the presence of a vibrant, good civil society made sure that in the country 
where Solidarity saw its birth the process of democratization was irreversible.    
Drawing from the criteria established in Chapter II (see Table 1), Poland’s civil 
society will be evaluated accordingly. This chapter argues that civil society in Poland was 
not able to achieve lasting success in its struggle against the regime in the 1950s, 1960s, 
and early 1970s, because it did not embrace the notion of cooperation. This changed in 
the second half of the 1970s, when a triangle of cooperation emerged between the 
workers, the intelligentsia and the Catholic Church that was able to challenge the state 
and ultimately led to the creation of the Solidarity movement. While the state tried to 
suppress the burgeoning civil society by introducing martial law, by that time Polish civil 
society had already developed strong political opportunity “holdovers” that allowed it to 
survive the ensuing period of harsh repression. When, as a result of changes in the 
political opportunity structure the regime was forced to slacken repression, it was only a 
matter of time until civil society regained its former strength. The chapter concludes by 
arguing that Polish civil society displayed all characteristics of a good civil society, 
which allowed Poland to firmly set out on the path towards becoming a true democracy. 
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B. A DEFUNCT CIVIL SOCIETY  
State-socialist systems, especially under the early period of Stalinism, created a 
dense network of state-controlled organizations and movements with mandatory 
memberships. These organizations were created in order to colonize public space and 
hinder the emergence of autonomous voluntary associations.115 During the process of de-
Stalinization in the late 1950s some of these organizations acquired a modicum of 
autonomy which they used to accumulate considerable resources and provide their 
members with wide ranging benefits.116 Some of them ventured even so far as to 
occasionally defy state-policies while representing their corporate interests. After having 
gained a small share of the public space, however, these organizations soon encountered 
the limits of their autonomous existence when the state-socialist regimes, accusing them 
of being agents of Western imperialism or advocating fascist reactionism, dissolved these 
organizations, only to restore them later in the 1960s, under tight state-control. These 
newly replaced or restored organizations were often granted some degree of autonomy in 
order to bestow them with a semblance of credibility.117 
During the period of post-war reconstruction, Poland’s need to obtain resources 
from all sectors of civil society prompted the communists to adopt a relatively liberal law 
on associations in 1946, which allowed most CSOs, including Catholic groups, to operate 
freely. This liberal period did not last long, and between 1949 and 1952 all associations 
were disbanded or forced to merge with state-controlled organizations.118 
The state-socialist regime’s first major crisis occurred in June 1956 when workers 
in Poznan took to the streets demanding better wages, which soon turned into mass 
protests against the political system. As the protesters did not communicate and cooperate 
with other CSOs, they were unable to restrain the rampages of the thousands of 
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sympathetic workers, and the demonstrations were violently put down by the military.119 
Nevertheless, the protests were not fruitless as the strikes ultimately led to the election of 
Wladyslaw Gomulka as First Secretary of the Polish United Workers’ Party (PZPR) in 
October 1956. Gomulka, in exchange for gaining the population’s passive acceptance of 
the existing political order, initiated a handful of liberal reforms, during the period known 
as the “October Thaw.” Reforms included acknowledging the development of workers’ 
self-government in factories and, most notably, granting the Catholic Church a high 
degree of autonomy.120 
The Catholic Church, because of its historic role in preserving Polish identity, was 
in a unique position that allowed it to remain the only official structure independent of 
state institutions throughout Communist rule. The Church boasted a vast organization: at 
the end of the 1970s it consisted of 14,000 churches across 7,000 parishes and employed 
about 20,000 priests.121 The Catholic University of Lublin, the only university behind the 
Iron Curtain not controlled by the state, and other theological organizations, such as the 
Clubs of Catholic Intelligentsia, were places where people could freely exchange their 
views and thoughts.122 
The regime’s liberal reforms, however, proved to be temporary in nature, and 
beginning from the 1960s, the state reversed many of its former reforms, becoming less 
responsive to societal demands. When in 1968 the regime prohibited the national theatre 
play Forefathers’ Eve by Adam Mickiewicz, one of the most famous pieces of Polish 
resistance literature, student protests broke out demanding freedom of speech and other 
civil liberties, and they were soon joined by universities from across the country. The 
regime branded the protests as an anti-Polish Jewish conspiracy and forced half of the 
Jewish population in Poland to leave the country. Sowing mistrust between the workers 
and the intelligentsia successfully isolated the student movement from the rest of society 
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and repressed the remaining protesters.123 As a consequence of the divisions created 
within civil society, students, the intelligentsia, and the Catholic Church did not join the 
workers in their protests two years later.124 
C. THE RE-EMERGENCE OF CIVIL SOCIETY 
In December 1970, a massive increase in food prices sparked workers’ protests in 
Gdansk. Lessons learned from the disaster of the 1956 protests in Poznan, led to the 
creation of an inter-factory structure to facilitate cooperation between the various 
working populations, which for the first time also articulated political demands, such as 
the creation of independent trade unions and publications free from party censorship.125 
The protests were again violently put down by the military, leaving 45 workers dead. The 
news of the brutality of state repression led to the dismissal of Gomulka and the election 
of Edward Gierek as First Secretary. Strikes, however, flared up again in Szczecin and 
Lodz in February the next year prompting the government to revoke the price increase. 
As a consequence of the declining economy, social peace did not last long. In 
June 1976 the government again announced a large increase in consumer prices; workers 
in Radom and Ursus immediately took to the streets demanding, in addition to a pay rise, 
the establishment of autonomous union organizations.126 The regime, while violently 
repressing the protests, revoked the price hike the same day. Contrary to 1970, this time 
the intelligentsia and the Catholic Church supported the workers by calling for an end to 
the repression and assisting the victims of state persecution.127  
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In September 1976, 14 prominent intellectuals established the Committee for the 
Defense of Workers (KOR) to provide support for the families of imprisoned workers 
and for those brought before courts. KOR did not commit itself to an ideological 
perspective in order to prevent barriers, such as those that hampered the effective 
cooperation of CSOs in 1956 and 1968, from emerging.128 The organization operated 
under the banner of openness and truthfulness and thus rejected procedures to detect 
government infiltrators, trusting those who wished to join the group.129 KOR did not 
question the structures of state-socialism; it aimed to establish autonomous social bonds 
and grassroots associations in order to protect individual rights against totalitarian 
repression.130 
The fact that KOR was made up of intellectuals enjoying great respect in Poland 
provided it with moral legitimacy and a defensive shield against excessive state 
repression. Thus, when in May 1977 the regime clamped down on the organization 
arresting many of its members, several groups inside and outside of Poland, as well as the 
Catholic Church, mounted a campaign in their defense. The regime ultimately had to 
back off and in July all imprisoned KOR activists were released.131 
After emerging from prison in 1977, the KOR activists gave up the promotion of 
independent trade unions and changed their name from KOR to the Committee for Social 
Self Defense in order to allude to their wider political and cultural task of creating an 
alternative public space for the democratic opposition in totalitarian Poland.132 When 
amid the fear of repression and intimidation the intellectuals of KOR publicly reached out 
to support those societal groups most in need, they gave birth to the very idea of civil 
society in Poland.133 
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The organization achieved its first success when in July 1977 the government 
announced an amnesty for all the workers who were imprisoned during the 1976 protests. 
Following this success, KOR expanded its activities to provide support for victims of any 
type of human rights abuses.134 Inspired by KOR’s success several opposition groups 
formed in the second half of the 1970s, such as the Declaration of the Democratic 
Movement in 1977, the Movement for the Defense of Human and Civil Rights in 1977, 
the Flying University in 1978 and the Confederation for Independent Poland in 1979, and 
many of those actively sought cooperation with KOR.135    
Moreover, promoting the re-emergence of civil society, Polish Cardinal Karol 
Wojtyla was elected pope in October 1978. Under the name Pope John Paul II, he visited 
Poland in June 1979, and the open-air church mass he celebrated in front of millions of 
people helped to lower the barrier of fear and provided an impetus for the emerging 
alliance of workers, students, intellectuals and the Catholic Church; this led to the 
foundation of Solidarity a year later.136 
D. SOLIDARITY IN THE AIR 
In July 1980, a renewed price increase sparked a series of regional workers’ 
strikes, which were initially limited to individual businesses and avoided street 
demonstrations, as a result of the painful experiences gained in 1956, 1970, and 1976.137 
The government’s strategy to appease large striking enterprises through limited 
concessions encouraged workers across the country to strike for a pay increase and thus 
the protests continued unabated throughout August.138 On August 14, the workers of the 
Lenin Shipyard in Gdansk joined the strikes and, despite the management’s concession to 
their demands, continued with the protests as a sign of solidarity with the workers of 
other, smaller firms which had less clout and therefore feared repression by the regime. 
This consciousness of solidarity was based on the strong primary social relations created 
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among the workers in factories, which endowed them with a sense of class unity and 
allowed them to reach across different sectors.139 On August 16, the Inter-Factory Strike 
Committee (MKS) was founded under the leadership of Lech Walesa in order to 
represent the mutual interests of both small and large enterprises.140 Its establishment 
provided the institutional framework for the emergence of the Solidarity trade union. 
The MKS, supported by advisors and experienced opposition lawyers from the 
KOR and the Clubs of the Catholic Intelligentsia, engaged in negotiations with the 
government over a list of 21 demands, including the right to create independent trade 
unions, a reduction in work hours, and free access to the press.141 Over the following 
weeks, the government ceded to most demands, and on September 22, 1980, the 
Independent and Self-Administrative Trade Union Solidarity was established, and Lech 
Walesa was elected as the head of the National Coordinating Commission (KKP), the 
union’s executive organ. Between September and December 1980, Solidarity’s 
membership rose from 750,000 to about ten million, and it was officially registered as an 
independent labor union outside the trade union apparatus of the state-party in November 
of that same year.142 Moreover, Solidarity’s huge membership was far from passive; by 
December 1981 about one-fifth of the Polish population had participated in mass protests 
at least once.143 
Over the following months, however, frustration grew among the workers as the 
government deliberately delayed the implementation of the agreements struck in Gdansk. 
The growing discontent ultimately culminated in the Bydgoszcz crisis in March 1981, 
when Solidarity and peasant activists striking at the headquarters of the satellite United 
Peasants’ Party (ZSL) for the creation of an independent farmer’s union were brutally 
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beaten up by the police.144 The KKP denounced the violence and called for an immediate 
nationwide general strike and a subsequent full-scale government investigation. This 
proposal, however, was not shared by Walesa who threatened to resign if the KKP did 
not endorse his call for an interim warning strike followed by a national general strike. 
The KKP ultimately gave in knowing that mobilization would be less effective with 
Walesa holding an opposing view.145 
The national warning strike of March 27, 1981, was a complete success; Poland 
came to an almost complete standstill with over one million members of the state-party 
participating in the strike against the will of its leadership.146 The ensuing negotiations 
with the government, during which the Roman Catholic Primate took on a role as an 
intermediary, resulted in a compromise agreement: the regime accepted the right of 
peasants to form Rural Solidarity but did not commit itself to concrete steps to allow for 
its creation. Nevertheless, the next day the KKP initiated the process that would lead to 
the creation of the legal peasants’ union in May 1981.147 Although Rural Solidarity 
lacked the appeal of Solidarity itself, it became nevertheless an influential actor of civil 
society with 1,500,000 peasants joining the union out of the 3,500,000 owners of private 
farms in Poland.148 In addition, similar to Solidarity, which had many members of the 
ruling PZPR among its ranks, a significant part of the ZSL’s constituency joined Rural 
Solidarity.149 This intermixing of memberships led to the emergence of alternative views 
and promoted internal changes not just in the newly established CSOs, but also in the 
pillars of the totalitarian state structure. Members of the official state organizations, 
having joined the emerging civil society forces, did not restrain themselves when it came 
to participating in collective action. For example, in January 1981, ZSL activists 
participated in the occupation of administrative offices in Bromberg.150 
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While Walesa got his way and the national general strike was called off, the 
Bydgoszcz crisis led to the emergence of authoritarian patterns of behavior and a wide 
variety of dissenting forces within the Solidarity movement who thought that the 
compromise agreement with the government did not go far enough. The spokesman of 
Solidarity, Karol Modzelewski, for example, resigned soon after the events of 
Bydgoszcz, accusing Walesa of acting like a “king.”151 The emergence of dissenting 
views became evident during the October convention of Solidarity when Walesa was re-
elected as chairman over three opponents, albeit with only 55 percent of the vote. Walesa 
faced campaign slogans from his adversaries that urged voters to choose between 
“dictatorship” and “democracy.”152 
Soon after its creation Solidarity developed a network of local and regional 
institutions that reached into almost every sphere of Polish society. This vast network had 
to be administered by a bureaucratic force of over 40,000 people who were paid out of 
union dues collected and distributed locally (with only three percent going to the KKP), 
in order to enhance their accountability towards the movement’s rank and file.153 The 
power of the purse thus remained firmly in the hands of the movement’s base, which 
ensured that, despite Walesa’s propensity for authoritarian behavior, overall Solidarity’s 
leadership was becoming more democratic.154 
The KKP’s overall strategy, articulated by intellectuals in the leadership, was to 
keep the state-party alive and thus avoid Soviet intervention and support the 
government’s austerity measures in exchange for broader popular participation in 
decision-making.155 Amidst the worsening of the economic crisis this strategic position 
was increasingly attacked by dissenting forces among the rank and file within Solidarity, 
which demanded a more radical posture vis-à-vis the state. The Club for the Service of 
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Independence, for example, called for free national elections, while the National 
Federation of Self-Governing Bodies proposed “active strikes” where workers would 
distribute their products directly to the population.156 
Despite the blossoming of civil society in Poland, political opportunities for 
further liberalization were in decline by the summer of 1981. The Soviets, who viewed 
the democratization of Polish society with suspicion, decided to refrain from intervening 
in Poland only when General Wojciech Jaruzelski, who was elected prime minister just 
before the Bydgoszcz incident in March 1981, promised that the Polish army would 
repress Solidarity in due course.157 When workers took to the streets across the country 
in early October as a result of food shortages and sharp price increases, Jaruzelski, as the 
new First Secretary, saw this as justification to commence preparations for martial 
law.158 On December 13, 1981, Poland was effectively put under military occupation. In 
the ensuing period all forms of autonomous associational life, such as Solidarity and 
Rural Solidarity, were disbanded and members of opposition movements were jailed en 
masse. 
E. FROM REPRESSION TO DEMOCRATIZATION 
Contrary to the regime’s efforts to atomize society and strangle the burgeoning 
civil society with martial law, CSOs maintained the spirit of Solidarity and continued to 
cooperate even under adverse circumstances. Most notably, the Catholic Church, which 
retained its independence, provided shelter for dissidents and autonomous cultural 
activity in its institutions.159 Similarly, the Polish Red Cross furnished assistance to 
imprisoned Solidarity activists and distributed international aid to people in need.160 
Moreover, small, loosely connected groups of friends, the Committees for Social 
Resistance (KOS), called for the self-organization of an underground society that would 
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ultimately lead to the liberalization of Poland.161 This underground society was 
constituted by a variety of mutual support systems, communication networks, discussion 
clubs, independent education and publications, and its members often engaged in a 
boycott of official institutions.162 
Despite the regime’s hopes to return to the status quo before Solidarity, this did 
not occur after the lifting of martial law in 1983. Instead, a wide array of social initiatives 
emerged, and because there was no overarching movement to unify them, society as a 
whole became much less controllable by the state and the former opposition leaders. The 
new social movements, such as the environmental movement, usually avoided co-
optation by the state. On the one hand, the regime was not able to offer meaningful 
incentives in exchange for political quiescence due to the increasing economic hardships. 
And on the other hand, the existence of a more radical political opposition, such as KOS, 
lowered the barrier of fear against state repression for the activists of these movements 
and made them more willing to cooperate with each other.163 Moreover, as the issues 
promoted by these new social movements usually touched upon pressing concerns of 
Polish society (such as environmental pollution), the government, in order to avoid 
oppositional involvement, often engaged in direct negotiations with the representatives of 
these social initiatives, which raised public awareness over the issues in question and led 
to the empowerment of these groups.164 Thus, even though Solidarity was outlawed, its 
spirit created political opportunities for emerging social movements by expanding the 
space available to public dialogue on “nonpolitical” issues.165 
One of these new emerging social movements was the Freedom and Peace 
Movement (WiP), which was founded in April 1985, by activists from the banned 
Independent Student Union. The group formed in response to a young draftee’s 
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sentencing to two-and-a-half years in prison for his refusal to take the military oath. 
Although WiP had only a core of about one hundred activists, their perseverance in the 
face of state repression and their ability to take advantage of the organized structures of 
the opposition (e.g., the underground press), coupled with the occasional assistance and 
protection provided by the Church, allowed the peace movement to survive.166 The 
movement also avoided regime co-optation by refusing to cooperate with the official All-
Poland Committee of Peace (OKP) which was under strict state control. It did, however, 
cooperate with other civil society forces, such as human rights groups and the 
environmental movement, by putting human rights and ecological issues on their 
agenda.167 WiP’s legitimacy among the opposition was greatly enhanced when it attained 
freedom for its imprisoned activists, who remained behind bars even after the Jaruzelski 
regime announced a limited amnesty for political prisoners in June 1986. WiP further 
gained exposure by informing foreign audiences about the prisoners’ fate, thus putting 
pressure on the state-party, which did not want to risk losing much needed foreign loans 
in the face of increasing economic problems.168 Moreover, the peace movement also 
achieved one of its main goals when the government, not wanting to risk its new liberal 
image in front of international donors, legalized the alternative service in early 1988 for 
those who objected to military service.169 
Jaruzelski, by introducing a limited form of political liberalization, hoped to 
obtain the support of the opposition’s leadership for his economic reforms. However, 
following the call of Solidarity’s former leadership over 50 percent of the population 
refused to agree to the regime’s reform plans in a referendum in November 1987; at that 
time, the regime became convinced that it could not govern without the support of 
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society.170 Thus, when price increases triggered massive wildcat strikes in May and 
August 1988, the government, through the president of the Warsaw Club of Catholic 
Intelligentsia, engaged in secret talks with the former leaders of Solidarity.171 
By the late 1980s the still illegal Solidarity was not the only labor union vying for 
the support of workers. The semi-autonomous, decentralized All-Poland Alliance of 
Trade Unions (OPZZ), formed in November 1984 to replace the recently dissolved state-
controlled Communist Trade Union (CRZZ), became a formidable contender since it 
claimed to organize over 60 percent of the Polish workforce.172 The competition for new 
members and resources between the two major labor organizations led to higher 
militancy and a growth in protest actions, as both the OPZZ and Solidarity were 
recruiting supporters mainly from the same constituency.173  
When on December 18, 1988, the Solidarity Citizens’ Committee (KO’S’) was 
formed in Warsaw to engage in formal negotiations with the regime, the long-standing 
dispute between workers and intellectuals put on the sidelines by the martial law re-
emerged again. While workers prevailed throughout Solidarity’s legal existence, the 
newly established KO’S’ was dominated by intellectuals, especially from the capital, and 
workers, farmers and women were only sparsely represented.174 Thus, during roundtable 
negotiations preparing the ground for pluralism in Poland through a four-year transition 
period, the working-class character of Solidarity was severely weakened. The self-
appointed elite of the KO’S’ also disrupted the relationship between the leadership and 
the rank and file of the movement, which had been maintained by the democratically 
elected KKP during the fifteen months of Solidarity’s legal existence.175 Disputes about 
the undemocratic nature of the KO’S’ led to the resignation of three of its original 
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members, including that of former KOR activist and later Prime Minister Tadeusz 
Mazowiecki.176 The intellectuals of the KO’S’ defended the undemocratic process of 
their selection by arguing that a re-established KKP would have implied too many 
divergent views and factions to function effectively during the negotiations with the 
regime; moreover they knew better what was best for Poland.177 Thus, in this period of 
transition, Solidarity struggled to regain the popularity and strength it enjoyed in 
1980‒1981, boasting a membership that was only a fraction of its former self. By mid-
1989 the re-legalized Solidarity had only managed to recruit two million members as 
opposed to the former ten million. Moreover the staff was constituted mainly of 
newcomers; only 30 percent of the members of the KO’S’ were trade union activists in 
1980‒1981.178 
Since Solidarity lost much of its former appeal, the opposition represented in the 
roundtable talks began to focus on organizing local Citizens’ Committees across Poland. 
Most of Solidarity’s new membership was again made up of the industrial working class; 
therefore, the movement’s leadership promoted the recruitment of the white-collar social 
classes to the Citizens’ Committees, which foretold the upcoming interest group struggle 
over who would bear the brunt of the inevitable economic adjustment programs.179 
The roundtable negotiations, during which the Catholic Church played a 
significant role as an intermediary between the opposition and the government, aimed to 
support the legalization of Solidarity but also to have a moderating effect on excessive 
oppositional demands. The talks ultimately ended in an agreement on April 5 that led to 
the re-legalization of Solidarity, Rural Solidarity and the Independent Student Union, and 
called for semi-democratic elections in June.180 Under the terms of the agreement only 35 
percent of the seats in the Sejm (Poland’s legislative assembly) were eligible for the 
opposition, while all one hundred seats of a new-to-be-established Senate were to be 
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elected democratically. The elections resulted in an overwhelming victory for Solidarity: 
it obtained 99 seats in the Senate and 35 percent of the mandates in the Sejm. Moreover, 
the former satellite parties, the ZSL and the Democratic Party defected from the 
government, which enabled Solidarity to form a coalition government despite the limits 
put on opposition participation in the elections. On August 25, Tadeusz Mazowiecki 
became the first non-communist prime minister in a Warsaw Pact country.181 
Solidarity’s overwhelming victory was a result of the comprehensive oppositional 
identity it created during the roundtable talks. Despite the regime’s efforts to conduct the 
negotiations with several separate groups (such as the OPZZ, women’s groups, and 
Catholic groups), the opposition managed to frame the talks as a two-party negotiation 
between the government and Solidarity.182 In addition, the key to the opposition’s 
successful efforts of mobilization was the transformation of local parishes and Clubs of 
Catholic Intelligentsia into local Citizens’ Committees.183 Thus, “[b]y linking support for 
Solidarity with the Church, voting became part of the duty of all Catholics in Poland.”184 
F. CONCLUSION 
Although Poland ultimately celebrated its first fully democratic elections in 
October 1991, two years after the 1989 round table negotiations, by that time the country 
was firmly on the path of becoming a liberal democracy. Moreover, Poland was the first 
country in the former Eastern Bloc where civil society engaged in negotiations with the 
regime over the peaceful transition to democracy. Having been under martial law during 
the early 1980s, the sudden crumbling of the repressive regime (which was made 
complete by the overwhelming electoral victory of the political opposition in the summer 
of 1989) was unexpected on both sides of the Iron Curtain. Naturally, Gorbachev’s 
renunciation of the Brezhnev Doctrine provided the necessary political opportunity to 
begin deconstructing the state-socialist system. Without the presence of a good civil 
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society, however, the smooth transition to democracy would have been hardly possible. 
In the following paragraphs the arguments for the “goodness” of Polish civil society are 
proposed. 
Participation in associational life and collective action was extraordinary 
throughout most periods of Polish state-socialism. This was true not just during the 
relatively liberal period of the late 1970s, and especially throughout the 15 months of 
Solidarity’s legal existence, but also when civil society was reduced to the mere presence 
of official state associations during earlier, more repressive times. Contrary to common 
belief, the mandatory membership in these large organizations, despite their apolitical 
nature, was almost never just formal. People were obliged to take part actively in the 
associational life of these organizations (such as the pioneer movement for the youth and 
the “obligatory” May Day parades), which taught them the foundations of collective 
action. Not surprisingly, many of these official associations, especially professional 
organizations, became hotbeds of public dissent during the 1980s.185 
Moreover, participation in unauthorized collective action was higher in Poland 
than in other countries of the Eastern Bloc, where regimes were usually able to buy off 
popular dissent. In Poland, on the other hand, even though regime repression was similar 
to that of other state-socialist countries, workers (and not just workers as the case of the 
1968 student movements shows) repeatedly took to the streets to demand economic 
improvement, and throughout the 1970s, increasingly political concessions. In addition, 
the birth of the Solidarity movement in 1980 introduced a new dimension of collective 
participation, when workers continued with their strikes to support other protesters even 
after their own initial demands had been met. 
Finally, in terms of sheer numbers participation in associational life was also 
extremely high in Poland. Naturally, due to their mandatory nature membership in state 
organizations was almost equivalent with the respective numbers of the total populace 
(the CRZZ, for example, boasted a membership of nearly 12,000,000 in the 1970s). But 
surprisingly, once the barrier of fear came down as a result of mass collective action and 
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state retreat, participation in voluntary movements also skyrocketed with Solidarity 
boasting an astonishing membership of 10,000,000 in a country of 35,000,000.186 
Although being limited in their political agenda, CSOs in Poland nevertheless 
developed a sense of empowerment vis-à-vis the state. In their struggle for concessions 
CSOs were naturally aided by the low social legitimacy of the regime and the collective 
actions of workers, whose demands for better living conditions were usually met by the 
state. This of course encouraged other civil society forces (such as KOR) to press on with 
their demands and the state often had to give in to retain a modicum of legitimacy. After 
the regime lifted martial law, the empowerment of civil society was aided by two 
additional factors. First, the worsening economic situation increasingly forced the regime 
to resort to economic aid coming from international donors (mostly Western countries), 
which usually provided their assistance on the basis of certain conditions. By pointing to 
areas where the state did not honor its commitments, this increasingly enabled CSOs to 
put pressure on the regime.  
Moreover, after the slackening of state repression and the release of former 
Solidarity leaders from prisons, the regime was increasingly facing a potent political 
opposition whose empowerment it had already witnessed and feared during Solidarity’s 
legal existence. This momentum enabled emerging social movements that were not or 
were only loosely connected to this opposition to conduct a public discourse on issues 
that were deemed apolitical in nature. As the regime did not want to fuel opposition 
activity the bar for “political correctness” was set higher and higher. The ultimate 
empowerment Polish civil society achieved was during the roundtable talks in early 1989 
when CSOs sat down with the government to negotiate as an equal partner. Having 
achieved this status, democratic transition became only a matter of time. 
While it is obvious to equate the autonomy of Polish civil society with the 
forming of the independent trade unions in general, and the creation of Solidarity in 
particular, it is also important to note that it was with the emerging intellectual 
movements in the second half of the 1970s (most notably KOR) that independence first 
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took root in civil society. Those movements resisted co-optation by the state and operated 
openly to underline their independence from the regime. Later, between September 1980 
and December 1981, a myriad of CSOs experienced for the first time the merits of 
autonomous collective action. Although the burgeoning independent associational life 
was abruptly put to an end by the introduction of martial law, civil society did not regress 
completely into a sphere devoid of any autonomy. On the one hand, after the experience 
of Solidarity, the regime usually had to grant the newly established CSOs (such as the 
OPZZ) some autonomy in order for them to retain at least some credibility. On the other 
hand, even though the public space available to it was limited, the main goal of the 
underground civil society with its network of “virtual” CSOs created by the dissidents 
was to gain an autonomous space devoid of state interference. Finally, the uniqueness of 
Polish civil society was given by the fact that throughout the period of state-socialism it 
could resort to a largely independent Catholic Church, whose institutions provided a 
venue for alternative views and thoughts. 
Solidarity, being a mass movement incorporating the majority of the Polish adult 
population, was laced with cross-cutting cleavages. After all, Solidarity’s very existence 
was based on the notion of workers reaching out to other, unknown workers, which later 
evolved into an alliance of workers, professionals and intellectuals of all classes and from 
all over the country. To underline the movement’s kitchen-sink nature, it was joined by 
people from both sides of the ideological divide; many members of the PZPR also joined 
Solidarity without perceiving an incompatibility of interests of the two organizations. 
Naturally, all this implied that a wide array of thoughts and beliefs clashed together 
within the movement that led to the emergence of dissent and competition. In the process, 
however, often people’s own views and beliefs changed, transforming their organizations 
of origin, and thus, society itself.  
Moreover, apart from Solidarity, the Catholic Church’s role was also important in 
strengthening cross-cutting cleavages. Playing the role of an intermediary, it first brought 
together the workers and the intelligentsia and enabled later the negotiations between the 
regime and the opposition. Its churches, parishes and other institutions provided shelter 
for people regardless of class and ideology, which furthered the intermixing of views and 
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ideas. After all, while Solidarity managed to unite a significant portion of the populace 
against totalitarianism, the Church’s role in preserving Polish identity provided it with a 
symbolic force that transcended class and ideological boundaries. 
In terms of a liberal-pluralist past, Poland already enjoyed a relatively vibrant 
civil society before the Communist takeover. The regime’s attempts to eradicate the 
collective memory of this past failed miserably when, beginning from the late 1970s, 
civil society began to reinvent itself culminating in the emergence of Solidarity. In order 
to deal a mortal blow to civil society, as a last-ditch effort the state-socialist party 
introduced martial law, but by that time it was already too late. During the 15 months of 
Solidarity civil society had developed a robust structure of political opportunity 
“holdovers,” which allowed the dissidents to create a parallel civil society that would 
outlast martial law and put Poland on the path of democratization. 
Finally, and probably most importantly, civil society in Poland abounded in 
civility and its inherent values. Most notably, the ultimate success of Polish civil society 
showed the importance of cooperation. As long as CSOs acted on their own, like the 
workers in 1956 and 1970, or the intelligentsia in 1968, they achieved only limited 
success. When they acted together, however, the power of the regime began to erode 
quickly. But what was the underlying basis for the cooperation of the different actors of 
society? It was primarily the ethical code of a self-limiting civil society, which did not 
challenge the power of the state-party and advocated values such as human rights, dignity 
and openness that brought together the Catholic Church and the intellectuals in the 1970s 
and 1980s in their efforts to support the striking workers.187  
The workers on the other hand soon recognized that if they wanted lasting results, 
cooperation among themselves, as the brutally suppressed strikes on the Baltic coast in 
1970 showed, was not enough, and thus, they gladly accepted the helping hand of the 
Church and the intelligentsia in 1976. The strength of this triangle of cooperation was 
revealed by the events leading to the emergence of Solidarity and the sudden retreat of 
the regime. Ultimately, cooperation achieved a new dimension when the various forces of 
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civil society, such as Solidarity, the OPZZ, women’s groups and Catholic organizations, 
spoke with one voice during the roundtable talks to form a unified opposition able to 
challenge the regime. Eventually, this cooperation fell apart after having successfully put 
Poland on the path of transition, but after all, it is the competition of divergent views and 
beliefs that make democracy work. 
Naturally, cooperation also implied the presence of trust and reciprocity, which 
were first embraced by the intellectuals of KOR in 1976, when they openly provided aid 
for workers in need. Remarkably, these values did not disappear even after the 
introduction of martial law, when providing aid to dissidents and people in need could 
incur harsh repression if revealed by the authorities. Lastly, the whole movement of 
Solidarity, with the wealth of views, thoughts and beliefs it encompassed, would not have 
worked without tolerance being its guiding principle. 
When Solidarity emerged victorious from the elections in June 1989 and Poland 
embarked on its irreversible road to democratization, the rapid collapse of the state-
socialist regime might have astonished many observers, but as this chapter has shown the 
ultimate outcome was by no means a surprise. While favorable changes in the political 
opportunity structure led to the rapid dismantling of the totalitarian regime, it was a 
Polish civil society displaying all characteristics of a good civil society that firmly set 
Poland on course to becoming a liberal democracy. 
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IV. RUSSIA: CIVIL SOCIETY LEFT ON THE SIDELINES 
A. INTRODUCTION 
When the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) formally ceased to exist on 
December 26, 1991, hopes in the West were high that a democratic Russia would emerge 
from the ruins of the former Cold War enemy. After all, the economic and political 
reforms of Gorbachev, enshrined in the policies of perestroika and glasnost, were 
rightfully regarded as having precipitated the dissolution of the totalitarian regime. 
Moreover, when Gorbachev, having released the genie from the bottle, desperately tried 
to backtrack on his liberal policies, he was effectively countered and later deposed by 
Boris Yeltsin, Russia’s new democratically elected President. However, Yeltsin, striving 
to strengthen his presidential powers, soon became oblivious to the support he received 
from the democratic movement in his struggle against Gorbachev and instead surrounded 
himself with the former members of the Soviet political elite, the nomenklatura. Thus, 
instead of a democratic polity, the dissolution of the Soviet Union saw the emergence of a 
semi-authoritarian Russia governed by a personalist, populist and plebiscitary regime left 
largely unchecked by a stunted civil society.188  
The following analysis sheds light on why civil society was unable to contribute 
to Russia’s further democratization. Drawing from the criteria established in Chapter II, 
Russia’s civil society will be evaluated by that criteria (see Table 1). This chapter argues 
that, although Russia boasted a relatively vibrant associational life in the 1920s, during 
the Stalinist period, the embryonic beginnings of civil society were completely erased by 
the totalitarian regime. Civil society was not able to recover from this trauma until the 
second half of the 1980s, when Gorbachev’s reforms provided favorable political 
opportunities for the re-emergence of autonomous collective action. However, trying to 
reconstitute itself, civil society lacked the necessary uniting factors, such as solidarity, 
cooperation and a common “enemy” that would have enabled it to ward off the political 
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elite’s attempts of co-optation. Thus, reduced to being a football for power-brokers in the 
struggle for political supremacy in the early 1990s, civil society failed to push the 
emerging Russian Federation towards greater democratization.    
B. EARLY TRACES OF CIVIL SOCIETY 
At the end of the Tsarist period, Russia showed traces of a nascent civil society as 
a result of the vibrant associational activity of citizens taking advantage of the limited 
public space granted by the authoritarian state, such as professional associations of 
engineers and teachers, mutual aid societies, groups focusing on art and associations 
protecting public health.189 Despite closing many prerevolutionary social organizations 
and, most notably, severely restricting the autonomy of the Russian Orthodox Church, 
voluntary associations continued to flourish even after the Communist takeover and well 
into the 1920s with a host of fairly independent workers’ clubs emerging and writers 
enjoying a high degree of freedom. After Joseph Stalin assumed full control of the Soviet 
Union at the end of 1928, the opportunities for voluntary civic activism and for 
independent trade unionism, however, were gradually abolished, and by 1932, the 
majority of autonomous CSOs were liquidated.190 
In order to channel and contain civic action, the Communist Party of the Soviet 
Union (CPSU) created a network of official organizations encompassing all major social 
groups, such as the mass youth organization Komsomol, the Union of Writers and 
various peasants,’ workers’ and women’s councils. Instead of representing the interests of 
their constituencies, these bureaucratic and hierarchical organizations primarily served 
the needs of the regime elite, leaving little room for independent grassroots activism.191 
Alternative thought and action emerged only after the Twentieth Party Congress of the 
CPSU in 1956. This period ushered in the era of de-Stalinization heralded by Nikita 
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Khrushchev and manifested by the quasi-public criticism of the cult of personality, the 
strengthening of collective decision-making at the top of the state-party and the relative 
decline in state repression. In the ensuing period the regime cut back efforts to control 
every aspect of daily life, and while political protest continued to be suppressed, 
repression was mostly directed against persons publicly breaking the rules.192 Moreover, 
the regime relaxed the restrictions imposed on culture in order to counterbalance the 
crisis of legitimacy it had brought upon itself by its criticism of Stalinism. This cultural 
opening facilitated the emergence of alternative views and thoughts, particularly among 
the urban youth and the intelligentsia, and the arts and literature became the first areas 
where values such as solidarity, inner freedom and creativity could be expressed.193 
Another area where the “thaw” initiated by Khrushchev spurred the emergence of critical 
thinking was the practice of science, which was reflected in the high proportion of 
academicians among future dissidents.194 The period of political liberalization, however, 
was short-lived and between the end of the 1950s and the early 1960s, the regime again 
increased repression against critical intellectuals. 
C. THE HUMAN RIGHTS MOVEMENT 
A turning point in the emergence of the political dissident movement was the trial 
against the writers Andrei Sinyavsky and Yuli Daniel, who were sentenced to prison in 
1965 for unauthorized publishing in the West.195 In response, 80 intellectuals, including 
60 members of the state controlled Union of Writers, fearing a relapse into the excessive 
repression of the Stalinist era, signed 22 open letters of protest addressing the restrictions 
of individual rights and freedom. In the ensuing period occasional and isolated protest 
actions were held in several cities in defense of human and minority rights, as well as 
against the conduct of political trials and the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968.196  
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A more structured dissident movement emerged when the samizdat (self-
published) bulletin Chronicle of Current Events was created by representatives of the 
critical intelligentsia on April 30, 1968, which despite repressive measures against the 
authors became the center of political dissent in general, and of human rights in 
particular, for the next 15 years.197 Several human rights groups operated under the 
umbrella of the Chronicle. Created in 1969, The Initiative for the Protection of Human 
Rights in the USSR was the first Soviet human rights group with an informal membership 
of 15 people, predominantly from Moscow. Issuing collective petitions and open letters 
of protest, the group was dissolved in 1974 after several of its members were arrested. 
The Committee for Human Rights in the USSR was founded in November 1970 in 
Moscow by eight well-known intellectuals, including Academy of Sciences member 
Andrei Sakharov and writer Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn. Amidst massive repression it only 
operated until the end of 1973; despite this it became the first independent formal 
association of citizens in the post-Stalinist period. The Assistance Group for the 
Implementation of the Helsinki Accords, also known as the Moscow Helsinki Group 
(MHG), was founded on May 12, 1976, by eleven activists, and continued to operate until 
1982, when almost all of its members were arrested.198 While the MHG managed to 
professionalize human rights work by engaging in activities such as the collection and 
publication of information on human rights violations and offering assistance to the 
victims of repression it also lost touch with the broader milieu of critical intellectuals 
primarily focused on cultural dissidence, leading to the group’s increased isolation.199 
Finally, The Relief Fund for Political Prisoners and Their Families was created in 1974 
on the initiative of Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn and Aleksandr Ginzburg. It aimed to provide 
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dissident organizations abroad, such as KOR in Poland. Despite the arrests of several of 
its founding members, the group’s reliance on predominantly foreign funding allowed it 
to continue its activities until 1984.200 
Following the Soviet Army’s invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 and 
Solidarity’s emergence in Poland in 1980, the repression against the human rights 
movement intensified during the final years of the Brezhnev and the Andropov regimes 
in 1982‒1983. Leading human rights activists, such as Andrei Sakharov, were either 
exiled or arrested or they emigrated abroad.201 Having emerged in the late 1960s, the 
Soviet human rights movement ultimately received its mortal blow with the dissolution of 
the samizdat Chronicle of Current Events in 1983. 
Acknowledging the need for greater social involvement in policy making in 1986, 
Mikhail Gorbachev introduced the concept of glasnost, an increased openness and 
transparency in handling government information and activities, primarily in order to 
gain the support of the intelligentsia for his reform initiatives. Gorbachev’s liberalizing 
policies led to the emergence of thousands of voluntary associations. According to 
official estimates by the end of 1987, about 30,000 informal associations existed and a 
year later their number had doubled. Gorbachev’s policies also led the revitalization of 
the human rights movement.202 
In the second half of the 1980s, the first advocates of a new human rights 
movement in the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR) were also 
released political prisoners campaigning for the freedom of their imprisoned inmates. The 
first of these groups was created in Moscow in 1987. Despite being active in staging 
demonstrations its protests usually involved only a couple of people; this was largely due 
to the lack of cooperation with other CSOs.203 Another human rights group, Press Club 
Glasnost (PCG), was more successful in attracting public interest. Established by well-
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known human rights activists in July 1987, PCG’s main goal was to provide a forum for 
discussions on human rights issues for people with different social backgrounds.204 In 
July 1989 the PCG reorganized itself in order to reconstitute the MHG, which had been 
disbanded in 1982. In efforts to take the wind out of the sails of the thriving human rights 
movement, the regime established the Public Commission for International Cooperation 
on Humanitarian Problems and Human Rights in November 1987. Highlighting that its 
55-person membership included prominent Soviet writers, scientists, lawyers and church 
leaders, and that its activities were financed by the Soviet Peace Fund, a collection of 
voluntary donations from ordinary citizens, the Public Commission made great efforts to 
prove its independence.205 Nevertheless, it enjoyed many privileges compared to other 
unregistered human rights groups, such as having official premises, being able to 
organize trips to the West and officially receiving guests. These benefits exposed its 
government-backed status.206 
D. THE ENVIRONMENTAL MOVEMENT  
The 1950s and 1960s saw the emergence of environmentalism in the RSFSR. The 
memberships of environmental groups boomed as people of different societal 
backgrounds joined the emerging organizations. One of the earliest representatives of the 
environmental movement was the All-Russian Society for Conservation (VOOP) created 
in 1924. Having been dissolved during the period of Stalinism, it resumed its activities in 
the wake of the liberal policies of the Khrushchev regime in the second half of the 1950s. 
VOOP regained and even extended its former membership with more than 1,000,000 
people participating in its public campaigns, such as the identification of environmental 
malpractice and the cleaning up of small rivers.207 As a result of its success in mobilizing 
people VOOP soon encountered the limits of Khrushchev’s political liberalization when 
the regime co-opted its leadership and thus effectively deprived the organization of its 
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autonomy. Therefore, despite becoming the largest environmental organization in the 
world by the mid-1980s, with a membership exceeding 37 million, VOOP’s co-opted 
status prohibited it from exerting meaningful influence on state-policies.208   
In the late 1950s, plans to develop the area surrounding Lake Baikal, which is the 
largest reservoir of fresh water on Earth and a national symbol to Russians, unleashed a 
public movement in the defense of the lake; this protest lasted for decades. The 
movement’s campaigns, which united members of the Academy of Science, prominent 
figures of the intelligentsia, students and journalists, while not succeeding in halting 
industrial development in the region, led to the implementation of strict environmental 
protocols.209 
The late 1960s saw the emergence of the militant Students’ Nature Protection 
Corps, which soon replaced the co-opted VOOP as a home for liberal urban thinkers, 
students, engineers and radicals seeking autonomy from the state. While by the late 1980s 
the Students’ Corps had more than 100 affiliates across the country with a membership of 
3500, its strategies of exposing game poaching and other forms of illegal environmental 
activities did little to influence policy-makers.210  
Following a decline in activism in the 1970s and early 1980s, the environmental 
movement re-emerged again in the second half of the 1980s in the wake of Gorbachev’s 
reform policies, which underlined the importance of environmental protection. The 
regime established the All-Union Committee on Environmental Protection to highlight its 
commitment towards environmentalism. In order to endow the organization with a 
modicum of legitimacy a non-Party chair was appointed under the leadership of Nikolai 
Vorontsov, a leading scholar at the Academy of Sciences. On the one hand, this provided 
the Committee with some independence, and on the other hand, due to Vorontsov’s 
personal contacts in the Kremlin, the organization had significant influence on the 
adoption of the first Soviet State Environmental Program in 1990.211 
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The new liberal political environment, however, provided opportunities not just 
for the introduction of top-down environmental initiatives; it also saw the emergence of a 
grassroots environmental movement. By 1990, the number of registered environmental 
groups was around 1,000.212 They boasted a wide range of memberships, organized 
public protests, petitions and strikes, and cooperated with anti-military and nationalist 
movements in order to influence decision-makers. Due to the state-party’s increasing 
responsiveness in the area of environmental protection and the arising political 
opportunities this interest presented, these environmental groups achieved some notable 
successes.  Beginning in 1988, for example, a campaign against the production of 
artificial protein concentrate started by ten residents in the town of Kirishi, near 
Leningrad, evolved into a mass movement encompassing several cities across the country 
and involving protests in which 10,000 to 15,000 people participated. As a result of the 
protests, the regime ultimately prohibited the production of artificial protein concentrate 
throughout the country in 1991.213 Moreover, a number of umbrella groups emerged to 
coordinate environmental activities at the regional and national level. The Socio-
ecological Union, for example, waged a nation-wide campaign against the construction of 
the Volga-Chograi canal, involving demonstrations in over one hundred cities joined by 
500,000 people and collecting more than one million signatures, which ultimately forced 
the government to cancel the project.214  
In addition, in many republics of the Soviet Union, especially in the Baltic region, 
ecological concerns were embraced by the nationalist Popular Fronts seeking 
independence from Moscow, which led to the emergence of a coalition between green 
movements and nationalist movements within and also across several republics.215 While 
in several republics the politicization of environmentalism thrived and public trust in the 
environmental movement was high, in the RSFSR the development of these movements 
was hindered by the lack of a unifying nationalism, the vast geographical distances 
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separating people and the absence of effective means of communication to bridge those 
distances.216 Moreover, the effectiveness of the environmental movement, despite these 
early successes, soon declined when the dissolution of the CPSU in August 1991 
deprived the politically diverse memberships from an ideologically uniting “enemy,” and 
the shock therapies adopted in the wake of wide-ranging economic problems brushed 
aside ecological concerns in Russia.217 
E. THE PEACE MOVEMENT 
One of the few associations surviving the heightened repression of the Andropov 
era was the Moscow Trust Group (MTG), founded in June 1982 by 11 intellectuals from 
Moscow with the aim to foster détente between the East and the West, promote human 
rights, and establish a “four-sided dialogue” between Soviet and American leaders and 
societies, in order to increase trust. While the MTG initially consisted of the founding 
intellectuals, later it was joined by young artists and writers from the samizdat scene, 
scientists, religious activists and university students.218 As a result of disagreement 
among the founding members about the MTG’s relationship with the state, however, and 
most likely with the active support of state authorities, in January 1983 some members 
split off the MTG to create the Friendship and Dialogue group. The new splinter group, 
with an active core of about 40 people consisting primarily of members of the 
intelligentsia, denied that peace activists were subject to state harassment in the Soviet 
Union and thus, never developed cooperation with the MTG, whose activists were often 
arrested by the regime.219 Having been denied official registration, the MTG’s first 
public protest against the use of nuclear energy in May 1986 was followed by harsh 
repression against its activists. The fear of repression had a detrimental 
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effect not just on the group’s core membership, which did not exceed 15 to 30 people in 
1989, but also on the protests organized by the group, which were fairly frequent but 
usually involved only a few dozens of people.220 
Despite its small size and the limited public space available, the MTG maintained 
close contact with similar groups across the country and from the West, and especially 
with various pacifist youth associations such as the “Toadstools,” a group of young artists 
and actors primarily from Moscow, who focused on raising public awareness about state 
oppression.221 Moreover, by the second half of the 1980s, in the wake of Gorbachev’s 
liberalizing policies and the growing dissatisfaction with the war in Afghanistan, the 
MTG’s public acceptance significantly increased, forcing the authorities to establish 
formal contact with the group when one of its activists was permitted to give an official 
speech at the Fourth International Meeting Dialogue of peace activists in Moscow in May 
1987.222 
Alarmed by the peace movement’s growing popularity and not being able to 
control the outburst of popular initiatives, the regime took active steps to limit the public 
space available to informal associations. In July 1988, a decree was issued restricting 
rallies and demonstrations, and in April 1989, another decree limited the freedom of 
speech. Moreover, the CPSU engaged in creating state-sponsored groups with agendas 
similar to that of the new CSOs, such as the Public Commission for International 
Cooperation on Humanitarian Problems and Human Rights or Green World, with the 
ultimate aim to delegitimize independent grassroots initiatives and to co-opt their 
members.223 These official organizations, however, were slow to adapt to changes and 
were often outpaced by public opinion, which inhibited them from gaining significant 
legitimacy and increasing their public appeal.224  
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F. THE LABOR MOVEMENT 
Since the 1930s trade unions in the Soviet Union were primarily concerned with 
keeping the working population quiet through the provision of welfare services, such as 
the allocation of housing and the administration of the state social security system. 
Instead of being separated on the basis of occupation, trade unions under the leadership 
of the CPSU were supposed to represent the interests of the whole working class; thus all 
workers within a particular branch of production, regardless of their professions and 
including the management, were members of the same union.225 This arrangement was 
meant to reinforce the notion that under Communism the workers and the management 
shared the same interests, but in reality it ensured the dominance of the latter.226 
Autonomous collective actions of workers (especially following the brutal massacre of 
striking workers at Novocherkassk in 1962 during the height of the Khrushchev regime’s 
policies of de-Stalinization) were rare and usually ended up in victimizing those 
involved.227 During the Brezhnev era workers were effectively kept quiet by establishing 
a paternalistic worker-management relationship, where workers, in exchange for 
tolerating miserable working conditions and the management’s violations, were awarded 
job security and relatively high wages.228 
The first independent workers’ organizations emerged in the wake of Gorbachev’s 
policies of economic restructuring (perestroika) and the increasing economic decline, and 
were deliberately stimulated by the party leadership in order to mobilize grassroots 
support for the economic reforms undertaken. The development of the autonomous 
workers’ movement accelerated in the period preceding the legislative elections in the 
spring of 1989 when, within the CPSU both the reformers (through local elections), and 
the conservatives (with the help of the newly established United Workers Front (OFT)), 
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vied for support among the working classes.229 The OFT included both white- and blue-
collar workers and strongly opposed private property and co-operatives, which lent it 
some credibility among workers despite its ties to CPSU officials.230 
The grassroots workers’ movement arguably received its biggest boost from the 
nationwide strike of coal miners in July 1989, protesting economic mismanagement, 
corruption and a decline in living conditions. Spreading out from the Kuzbass region in 
southwestern Siberia, the strike in which over 400,000 miners took part proved that by 
engaging in collective action workers could win significant concessions. Moreover, the 
protests marked the first time that workers set up strike committees in order to present the 
authorities with economic, ecological and, to a lesser degree, political demands; such 
demands included improving wages, benefits and working conditions, reducing 
managerial personnel and prohibiting the establishment of new, exploiting 
cooperatives.231 The autonomy of enterprise became a central demand for the miners 
only at later stages of the strike and was put on the agenda most likely because 
Gorbachev recognized that it represented a powerful means to direct workers’ anger at 
local authorities and the Ministry of Coal Industry, which were seen as hindering the 
economic reforms of perestroika.232 Having conceded to most of the miners’ demands 
within two weeks, the regime dissuaded workers from other branches of production from 
engaging in similar protests. Government representatives, for example, immediately 
engaged in direct negotiations with the railroad workers, who threatened to strike in 
August that same year and were told that, unlike the miners,’ their protests would not be 
tolerated.233 
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Nevertheless, the miners’ strike spread the seeds of an emerging grassroots labor 
movement. Following the agreement with the government, the strike committees were 
not disbanded immediately in order to supervise that the regime would not renege on its 
promises. Later, these strike committees were converted to workers’ committees at the 
city and the regional level.234 The following year saw the gradual politicization of 
miner’s demands, including calls for the resignation of the Union government and new 
elections to the seats in the USSR Supreme Soviets. However, these demands yielded 
little results and ultimately, growing out of the workers’ committees in October 1990, the 
Independent Miners’ Union (NPG) was established in order to facilitate worker 
empowerment.235 The NPG, despite having a membership of only 50,000 and thus 
representing only a small fraction of the overall number of miners, was less 
bureaucratized and more democratic than the official trade unions.236 
Another area where Gorbachev’s economic reforms promoted grassroots activism 
was with cooperatives. Cooperatives were mostly small enterprises providing consumer 
goods and services or engaging in construction. They were essentially isolated from the 
system of central planning and CPSU-control, which implied financial independence. By 
1988 the cooperative movement had gained enough momentum to form associations 
representing the interests and defending the rights of cooperatives. The political and 
financial independence of these associations was granted by the Law on Cooperation 
adopted in June 1988.237 The process of creating associations in self-defense, such as the 
Interregional Cooperative Federation, the RSFSR Union of Cooperatives or the USSR 
Union of Cooperatives, was accelerated over the course of 1988 and 1989, when several 
state agencies engaged in efforts to circumscribe the activities of cooperatives often by 
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disregarding the provisions of the new law.238 Nevertheless, fearing state encroachment 
and the loss of autonomy, many cooperatives opted to stay away from those associations 
and thus their membership was far from universal.239  
The first truly comprehensive national association of cooperatives was formed in 
July 1989 under the name Union of Associated Cooperatives (SOK). While it was created 
with the blessing of the government, fears of state interference were quickly dispelled 
when a leadership consisting of radical activists was elected. As a result of SOK’s 
growing popularity, aided by the establishment of its weekly newspaper Kommersant, 
representatives of the government soon engaged in talks with the organization’s leaders 
over issues such as new tax regulations and an amendment to the law on cooperatives. 
SOK’s role in policy-making was eventually formalized in July 1990, when it was 
granted a permanent presence in several governmental bodies. In order to further increase 
their legislative influence SOK leaders established links with workers’ strike committees 
following the coal miners’ strike in 1989.240 In a move, which was denounced by the 
government as a means of taking advantage of the striking workers, cooperatives 
supported strike committees financially or in some cases hired strikers fired from their 
jobs.241 Nevertheless, the incompatibility of interests, with the cooperative movement 
unambiguously endorsing the radical economic reforms and the workers strongly 
opposing the accompanying disassembly of the social welfare system, soon led to the 
break-up of the tenuous alliance between cooperatives and workers.242  
While the NPG and the workers’ committees had close links with the emerging 
democratic movement, they regarded the semi-autonomous Association of Socialist 
Trade Unions (Sotsprof) which was formed in July 1989 with the support of the official 
trade union federation, the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions (VTsSPS), with 
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great suspicion.243 Sotsprof provided legal defense and social benefits for its members; 
however, it also charged a membership fee that was three times as high as that of the 
official union.244 Moreover, Sotsprof was stricken with internal conflicts over the 
question of internal democracy versus less radical structures and material benefits, which 
was exacerbated by the fact that workers joining it did not need to give up their 
membership in the official trade union. Thus, through 1990 it failed to recruit a 
significant membership (in 1990 Sotsprof claimed a membership of 15,000 workers).245  
The VTsSPS ,on the other hand, whose membership included virtually all Soviet 
working people, was a giant bureaucratic organization devoid of any semblance of 
internal democracy, and thus it lacked legitimacy among workers.246 As it retained 
exclusive control over the distribution of social benefits, few workers decided to leave the 
organization in order to join new independent trade unions out of fear of losing those 
benefits.247 Nevertheless, the VTsSPS’s monopoly on trade union power soon vanished. 
As it supported the conservative wing of the CPSU at a time when the reformers took the 
lead under Gorbachev, the VTsSPS lost the backing of the authorities, and with it the 
privileges and material resources it was entitled to, and in October 1990 it was replaced 
by the General Confederation of Trade Unions (VKP). The VKP itself, however, lost its 
remaining legitimacy among the workers when following the 1991 miners’ strikes its 
leadership signed a no-strike agreement with the government. In the ensuing period the 
majority of union bodies split off from the VKP, rendering the organization largely 
irrelevant.248 
By late 1990 regional branch unions, such as the Federation of Independent Trade 
Unions of Russia (FNPR), were emerging in an attempt by enterprises, concerns and 
associations to achieve greater independence from the CPSU-controlled official trade 
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unions.249 The FNPR, opposing the VKP, soon found a partner in Boris Yeltsin, who 
strived to undermine the power of the Gorbachev-led CPSU and establish republican 
sovereignty. When Gorbachev, backed by the VKP, denounced and threatened to 
suppress the miners’ strike in 1991 the FNPR raised the prospect of a general strike and 
later supported Yeltsin in the Russian presidential elections in June 1991.250 
In 1991, a miners’ strike erupted that was tacitly encouraged by Yeltsin. Almost 
from the start, it was highly politicized, demanding the resignation of Gorbachev, the 
Union government and the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union, the highest legislative 
body in the USSR. It also differed from the earlier strike in that, following Gorbachev’s 
conservative turn in the fall of 1990, and a nationwide price hike the next spring, it was 
the first large-scale strike involving workers from outside the mining sectors.251 While 
miners from all over the Soviet Union could easily cooperate with each other in 1989, by 
the beginning of 1991, as a result of the growing sovereignty of the various constituting 
republics, unified workers’ action became increasingly more difficult. This became most 
evident in the different nature and targets of miner’s demands; while the miners of the 
Donbass region predominantly struck for economic concessions addressing the Ukrainian 
government, the Kuzbass strike in Russia directed its political demands largely against 
the Union government.252 Moreover, contrary to 1989, the strikers did not receive wages 
this time, which threatened a premature end to the protests. CSOs, such as the NPG, set 
up solidarity funds and collected food and aid to support the miners in need.253  
The alliance of the working classes and other liberal forces, however, proved 
fragile. When concerns over regime repression of the strikers emerged and word broke 
that Yeltsin and Gorbachev had secretly reached a deal about a new constitution that 
increased the sovereignty of union republics followed by their elections to the Soviet 
parliament and the presidency, most workers, apart from the miners, suspended their 
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strikes. Feeling betrayed by Yeltsin and the other working sectors, the miners, having at 
least gained significant economic concessions, finally decided to end their strike on May 
10, 1991.254 
Following the disillusionment of the grassroots labor movement under Yeltsin, 
soon the FNPR and the other official unions also became opposed to the government’s 
neo-liberal program of shock-therapy. The ensuing loss of government support, on which 
the official trade unions depended for authority and prosperity, coupled with the lack of 
credibility amongst their membership, should have contributed to the strengthening of the 
independent workers’ movement.255 The fact that this did not happen can be attributed to 
several factors. Autonomous labor organization outside the coal-mining regions, 
especially within the enterprises, remained weak and sparse in the period of transition 
between 1989 and 1991, as the administrations continued to keep workers quiet by 
conceding to some of their demands, but repressing individual activists at the same 
time.256 Moreover, the development of a grassroot workers’ movement was hampered by 
the anti-strike law passed following the miners’ strikes in the summer of 1989 and the 
growing reliance of workers on food distributed by the enterprise administration through 
the official trade unions.257 Finally, although the independent labor movement indeed 
gained in strength between 1989 and 1991, this development was promoted primarily 
from above through political patronage rather than being a result of genuine grassroots 
initiatives within the working class. As a result of this, Yeltsin was able to easily put the 
labor movement in the service of his own interests.  
After the newly elected President reasserted his power following the repulsion of 
the August 1991 coup attempt by hard-liners of the CPSU, Yeltsin incorporated members 
of the independent labor movement, such as the leaders of the miners’ committees and of 
Sotsprof, in his government. In doing so Yeltsin effectively co-opted the leadership of 
those grassroots workers’ organizations, who subsequently refrained from mobilizing 
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their memberships in the defense of labor rights for fear of losing their newly acquired 
power. Consequently, the independent labor movement soon took on a role similar to that 
of the official trade unions.258 Moreover, Yeltsin allowed the official trade unions, which 
he still feared because of their considerable organizational structure, to retain their former 
privileges, effectively relegating them as well into a position of dependence. Thus, while 
encouraging both independent and official unions to continue competing against each 
other, Yeltsin effectively stunted the labor movement by the end of 1991.259  
G. CONCLUSION 
Despite enjoying the political opportunities necessary for its reemergence in the 
wake of Gorbachev’s reform policies, civil society in the RSFSR was not able to play a 
meaningful role in the period leading to the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The 
following analysis provides arguments for the “weakness” of Russian civil society. 
Participation in associational life and collective action in the RSFSR was virtually 
non-existent in the period preceding Gorbachev’s coming to power, which was largely a 
consequence of the high barrier of fear within the population. Although the level of 
repression compared to other countries in Eastern Europe was not significantly higher in 
the RSFSR during the Cold War period, the memories of the millions falling prey to the 
terrors of Stalinism discouraged most people from publicly voicing dissent. Moreover, 
the totalitarian nature of the Soviet state, infiltrating every aspect of social life with the 
support of the KGB’s extensive network of informants, enabled the regime to become 
aware of embryonic forms of independent collective action and nip emerging dissent in 
the bud. This also allowed the regime to cut back indiscriminate repression against 
“suspicious” segments of the society after 1956 and instead target individual 
“troublemakers.” Furthermore, the vast geographic area of the Soviet Union, with the 
RSFSR in its center, coupled with its underdeveloped infrastructure and lines of 
communication, made it difficult for people to stay in touch and engage in collective 
action across several regions. This also increased people’s propensity for quiescence as it 
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was common for targets of regime repression to simply “disappear” without the public or 
Western human rights groups, for that matter, ever gaining knowledge of it. 
Participation remained stunted even in the wake of Gorbachev’s reform policies 
and the gradual breaking down of the barrier of fear. While in terms of sheer numbers the 
RSFSR saw a remarkable upsurge of CSOs, it lacked a mass-based social movement 
which could have acted as a negotiating partner engaging the regime in constructive talks. 
The reasons for this are manifold. Probably most importantly, the emergence of wide-
spread participation—and cooperation for that matter—was hindered by the absence of a 
shared national or ideological identity among activists. The republican fragmentation of 
the Soviet Union and the lack of an external occupying force prevented CSOs from 
rallying under the banner of nationalism, while the regime’s promotion of an overarching 
proletariat class mentality, most notable in the case of the all-encompassing branch trade 
unions, hindered the emergence of an ideological “us vs. them” scenario. Notable 
exceptions for significant participation promoted by a collective identity were the miners’ 
strikes and the environmental movement. In the case of the miners, the common dangers 
and hardships endured beneath the earth led to the emergence of a collective identity 
based on solidarity among the workers, while the environmental movement united people 
mainly on the basis of the common good and its apolitical nature. 
Other social movements, such as the human rights and the peace movement, 
simply lacked the popular appeal to attract mass memberships, which was a result of a 
combination of repression, isolation and the predominantly intellectual character of those 
grassroots initiatives. In the case of the human rights movement this was further 
aggravated by the narrowness and apolitical nature of its concerns which did not offer a 
political alternative to the existing Communist regime.260 
Participation in the labor movement, apart from the occasional miners’ strikes, 
was characterized largely by apathy, despite the political opportunities provided by 
Gorbachev’s reform policies. First, paternalistic worker-management relationships within 
labor unions, and later, at the time of the emerging independent labor movement, the 
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resource monopoly of the official trade unions, prevented workers from engaging in 
collective action or joining autonomous organizations out of fear of losing their jobs or 
having their social benefits cut. This also explains why memberships of the newly 
emerging independent trade unions, such as the NPG and Sotsprof, remained relatively 
low compared to that of the official trade unions, despite the latter having low levels of 
legitimacy and not representing effectively workers’ interests. Moreover, in the period of 
transition the workers’ movement became a playground for rivalries between the 
reformists and the conservatives within the CPSU, and later for the power struggle 
between Gorbachev and Yeltsin, as the opposing sides vied for support among the 
workers only to demobilize them after their political interests had been met. Thus, being a 
football for the political elite and lacking genuine grassroots worker initiatives, Yeltsin, 
emerging victorious from the fight against the Communists, had an easy time co-opting 
the labor movement, effectively terminating the opportunities for autonomous collective 
action.   
Finally, the official associations, such as Komsomol, VOOP, or the VTsSPS, did 
not promote the active participation of the masses. Although they included almost all 
people from a particular segment of society, often boasting memberships of tens of 
millions, the rigid bureaucratic structure of these large organizations and their tight 
supervision by the regime did not allow for the emergence of any semblance of 
autonomous collective action; instead they were largely created to provide control over 
the society and serve the interests of the political elite. Apart from participating in state-
sponsored activities and taking advantage of the social benefits provided by them, the 
memberships of the official associations remained largely passive, and as soon as the 
monopoly of the CPSU was abolished and the diminishing resources lessened the appeal 
of these organizations, they were disbanded or rendered irrelevant during the period of 
transition. 
Russian civil society was seriously lacking in terms of empowerment. CSOs were 
only able to influence decision-makers when they managed to rally sufficient popular 
support around their goals and only when those goals aligned with the interests of the 
CPSU and its efforts of increasing its own legitimacy. Thus, lacking both mass-based 
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popular support and government responsiveness, the human rights and peace movements 
suffered from weak empowerment. Apart from largely symbolic concessions, such as 
being allowed to take part in official conferences, the most they achieved under 
Gorbachev’s rule was to make the regime aware of the need to create state-owned 
interpretations of the issues they addressed. As a result, they prompted the establishment 
of state-controlled human rights, disarmament and other organizations. The 
environmental movement, on the other hand, as a result of the wide-spread social support, 
the large number of initiatives, its apolitical nature and, most importantly, the regime’s 
benevolence, was fairly successful in influencing state decisions. As a consequence of the 
decline in living conditions in the early 1990s, however, the movement lost its popular 
appeal when economic concerns began to trump environmental issues. Finally, the labor 
movement was able to wrest significant economic concessions from the state, largely as a 
result of the miners’ propensity for protest action, but its political demands were mostly 
left unanswered and the few that were fulfilled, such as enterprise autonomy, were 
largely imposed on it by members of the political elite trying to use the working class for 
their own purposes. Later, the co-optation of trade unions under Yeltsin deprived the 
labor movement of its remaining influence. In terms of empowerment the notable 
exception was the cooperative movement which acquired a permanent advisory position 
within the government and thus was able to shape state policies. Being isolated from the 
rest of civil society and seeking to fulfill its narrowly defined interests, the cooperative 
movement, however, did not promote the overall empowerment of Russian CSOs. 
As a result of harsh repression and fear of regime infiltration the RSFSR was 
virtually devoid of independent CSOs until the mid-1980s. The only exceptions were 
small dissident groups of intellectuals, mostly engaged in the area of human rights and 
usually forced to dissolve following repression against its membership, and unofficial 
environmental movements formed on an ad hoc basis. Hindering the emergence of an 
embryonic form of civil society, the RSFSR was suffering from the absence of large-
scale, integrative societal institutions providing at least some public space for 
autonomous collective action. As a result of its dependence and weakness the Russian 
Orthodox Church was not able to fulfill this role up until the late 1980s, when Gorbachev 
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engaged in improving church-state relations, leading to the slow restoration of religious 
autonomy and the adoption of a new laws ensuring freedom of conscience in 1990.261 As 
such, the Orthodox Church was not able to act as a safe haven for alternative thought 
during the periods of greatest repression, and even though following Gorbachev’s 
introduction of perestroika and glasnost it regained its autonomy, by then the overall 
slackening of state repression allowed for the emergence of alternative forms of 
independent societal life.  
While independent associational life indeed thrived in the second half of the 
1980s, most of these newly emerging autonomous associations, such as environmental 
and peace groups, were small, fragmented and were soon rendered irrelevant by the 
political and economic realities unfolding in the final years of the Soviet Union. Probably 
even more remarkably, in its final year, the RSFSR lacked a truly autonomous labor 
movement. Although in the wake of Gorbachev’s reform policies a number of 
independent workers’ initiatives emerged, they never acquired the organizational strength 
and, most importantly, the societal support necessary to ward off efforts of co-optation by 
the political elite.  
Russian CSOs also suffered from weak cross-cutting cleavages. Initially this 
might seem to be counterintuitive, given the Communist regime’s efforts to instill an 
overarching proletariat class mentality into society and thus rally people of different class 
and origin in huge mass-organizations. Even so, after over half a century the regime was 
not able to overcome the deep-seated mistrust dividing workers and the intelligentsia. 
The working class maintained deep contempt for the intelligentsia, which they regarded 
as being responsible for all the social grievances they had to endure, such as repression, 
disempowerment and fragmentation.262 On the other hand, although this view was 
somewhat challenged by the discipline and organization the miners showed during their 
strike in July 1989, most of the intelligentsia regarded the workers as brutish, uneducated 
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and receptive to populist and nationalist ideas.263 As a result of this attitude workers did 
not mingle with intellectuals, which contributed to the weak cross-cutting cleavages of 
CSOs within the RSFSR.  
The lack of mixing and cooperation between laborers and intellectuals also had 
profound effects on the prospects of democratization in Russia. The emerging democratic 
movement in the second half of the 1980s was dominated by the middle-aged 
intelligentsia concentrated in the big cities, while peasants, workers, women and the 
youth were largely left out.264 This isolated the democrats from large parts of the society 
and deprived them of the support from the masses of militant workers, which decreased 
their legitimacy in talks with regime representatives. On the other hand, the lack of 
intellectuals within the labor movement meant that members of the political elite were 
easily able to manipulate the demands of the workers, who lacked proficiency in 
articulating political claims. 
Severely limiting the role it was able to play during the period of transition, 
Russian civil society had to reconstitute itself practically from scratch in the late 1980s as 
the totalitarianism of the Stalinist period virtually erased all memories of its embryonic 
beginnings in the 1920s. Moreover, even the relative decline of repression during and 
following Khrushchev’s “thaw” did not promote the emergence of political opportunity 
“holdovers,” which CSOs could have resorted to in the wake of Gorbachev’s reform 
policies. One reason for this was the absence of an integrative societal institution able to 
harbor the seeds of civil society during the periods of greatest oppression. The other 
reason was that the human rights CSOs emerging in the late 1960s, as well as the 
environmental CSOs, apart from being too weak and too isolated, fearing state infiltration 
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Lacking these structures, the autonomous forms of collective action quickly disappeared 
in the face of repression, leaving no opportunity “holdovers” for the emerging CSOs 
under Gorbachev.265 
Finally, Russian civil society severely lacked civility and its underlying 
principles, making it unable to significantly promote efforts of democratization. As a 
result of the totalitarian nature of the regime that attempted to control every aspect of 
social life, the fear of repression was deeply ingrained within the populace and hindered 
the emergence of trust within and among CSOs. Tolerance was weak among CSOs as the 
gradual retreat of the regime from public space in the late 1980s allowed for the 
emergence of uncivil groups publicly embracing chauvinism and anti-Semitism, such as 
Pamyat (Memory), a group which focused on defending Russian culture from Zionist 
“infiltrators.”266 Apart from a few initiatives of human rights groups in the 1970s to 
provide relief to victims of repression and the support of some cooperatives to striking 
workers in the late 1980s, reciprocity was largely absent in civil society. Most notably, 
outside the coal mining regions solidarity did not take root within the labor movement, 
which was evident in the absence of an inter-factory strike structure among enterprises 
from different branches of production and the indifference of appeased workers towards 
the victimization of striking colleagues. Lastly, and most importantly, the divergence of 
interests and deep-seated mistrust hindered the emergence of cooperation among the 
various civil societal forces, such as between workers and the intelligentsia, or the 
cooperatives and the workers. Moreover, the political elite’s divide-and-rule strategy 
even thwarted cooperation within the working class, with both the independent and the 
official labor unions fighting over the scarce resources and for the favor of power-
holders. 
At the time of the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Russian civil society was 
severely lacking the traits of a good civil society. While Gorbachev’s economic and 
political reforms provided the necessary political opportunities, considering that civil 
society had to reconstitute itself virtually from scratch, the short period preceding the 
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political turmoil of 1991 allowed only for the emergence of an embryonic civil society, 
which was not capable of pushing the political elite towards greater democratization. In 
the ensuing period the solidification of the political establishment around Yeltsin’s 
presidential rule deprived civil society of the political opportunities for further 
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V. TUNISIA: A CIVIL SOCIETY RIPE FOR DEMOCRACY? 
A. INTRODUCTION 
When protests broke out in December 2010 in Tunisia following the self-
immolation of Mohamed Bouazizi, not many analysts believed that in less than a month’s 
time Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, the country’s long-standing iron-fisted ruler, would be 
gone. After all, Tunisia was regarded even by Middle Eastern standards as an extremely 
repressive country, where the state’s practices of infiltrating the private sphere of its 
citizens rivaled that of the Communist totalitarian regimes in Eastern Europe. On the 
other hand, the fact that—compared to most other Middle Eastern nations—Tunisia has a 
rather homogenous population in terms of ethnic and religious composition. It is also 
relatively rent-poor with a military that is small in size and has been kept largely under 
civilian control, and it has a comparatively large, educated middle class, which has 
always made it a more likely candidate for democratization. The regime’s repressive 
policies, however, coupled with its artful co-optation of potential opposition groups, 
ensured that it maintained thorough control over the populace, and hindered the 
emergence of a vibrant civil society.  
Drawing from the criteria developed in Table 1 of Chapter 2, Tunisia’s civil 
society will be evaluated. This chapter argues that as soon as widespread protests 
removed the barrier of fear in Tunisia, the slackening of state repression opened up public 
spaces previously unavailable to societal forces. Prior to 2011, Tunisian civil society had 
in fact developed characteristics that were inherent to a good civil society, including wide 
participation, a general sense of tolerance and cooperation, as well as memories of the 
struggle for autonomy. Following the overthrow of the Ben Ali regime, these factors have 
helped Tunisia to embark on the long and arduous road of democratization. 
The chapter begins by first looking at the labor movement and claims that despite 
the repressive policies of the state and its lack of internal democracy, the labor union 
under the Bourguiba regime, was able to exert considerable influence on state policies. 
The chapter then investigates the rise and fall of Islamism in Tunisia and finds that, due 
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to its elitist nature and its inability to provide social services, al-Nahda (the main Islamist 
movement) did not manage to increase its public base of support. What follows is an 
analysis of the Tunisian Human Rights League and its struggle to instill tolerance in 
society. The chapter then asserts that despite the Ben Ali regime’s increasing repression 
and co-optation of civil society organizations and the ensuing growing intolerance in 
society and decrease in associational activity, civil society forces were nevertheless able 
to mobilize and cooperate on a number of issues. The chapter concludes by claiming that 
cooperation and tolerance have played an important role in bringing down the Ben Ali 
regime and promoting democratization in Tunisia.  
B. THE STRUGGLE BETWEEN THE STATE AND THE LABOR 
MOVEMENT 
Following independence from France in 1956, in the early years of the regime of 
Habib Bourguiba, Tunisia embarked on a project of liberalization by rewriting the 
constitution, expanding access to public education and adopting a legal code that 
protected the rights of women, workers and private property. This process of 
liberalization, however, did not spread to the area of associations. A law adopted in 1959 
obligated all associations to obtain a permit from the Ministry of Interior which had wide 
discretion in granting or denying authorization.267 In addition, associations had to fit into 
a given set of categories in order to be eligible for registration, and as human rights and 
democracy groups were not a permissible category, they were often denied registration 
by the state.268 To make state control complete, most associations were funded by the 
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Moreover, the state, in an effort to exert greater control over the various 
autonomous groups and movements within society, moved to incorporate them into 
highly institutionalized unionist structures which could be influenced more easily. The 
largest and most important of these unions was the Tunisian General Labor Union 
(UGTT), the national confederation of labor unions. 
The UGTT played a major role during the struggle for independence from France, 
and after having gained independence, it became one of the two main pillars of the new 
state, next to Bourguiba’s Neo-Destour Party. These two organizations tried to reconcile 
and channel the different views emerging in society.270 Links between the two pillars 
were deep-seated as UGTT leaders were often appointed to government ministries. This 
practice, however, was not a selfless act on part of the regime but rather a product of 
pragmatic political considerations. For example, when Ahmed Ben Salah, the UGTT’s 
influential secretary general between 1954 and 1956 was appointed as minister of 
economy, the Bourguiba regime’s ulterior motive was to weaken the labor union’s 
leadership and rein in the unruly movement.271 
Ben Salah’s socialist vision of a planned development required for the state to 
control all social forces, including the UGTT.272 In line with this vision a more compliant 
leadership was installed at the top of the UGTT, which resulted in a drop in membership 
levels and a period of inactivity for the duration of the Ben Salah era until 1969.273 In the 
following decades, the UGTT maintained a peculiar relationship with the regime, 
alternating between co-optation and staunch opposition, the latter being the case 
especially when government policies threatened to adversely affect union membership. 
Moreover, even though the regime managed to co-opt the union leadership from time to 
time, the rank and file was notorious for not heeding the call of their co-opted leaders, 
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particularly in cases when decisions were made at the membership’s expense.274 For 
example, despite laws adopted in 1966 and 1976 requiring authorization by the UGTT 
and ten days’ advance warning for strikes, union officials were often forced to grudgingly 
follow the rank and file’s lead in order to preserve their credibility amongst the 
membership.275 Increasingly, this led the UGTT leadership to embrace the radical views 
of the militant activists, and by the mid-1970s the labor union once again became a 
vibrant organization with a broad popular support.276  
In trying to keep the radicalizing labor movement in check, Bourguiba—who had 
renamed the state party the Destourian Socialist Party (PSD) in 1963—was aided by 
strong economic growth in the 1970s which allowed the regime to buy off dissent in the 
form of wage increases. At the same time, the strong reliance of the labor union on public 
funds made it vulnerable to regime intervention in its internal politics.277 Nevertheless, 
labor activism rose to unprecedented levels, culminating in the first general strike in the 
history of post-independent Tunisia at the end of 1977. The following year the worsening 
financial crisis prompted the UGTT to organize a major demonstration, which ended up 
being brutally suppressed by the regime. The unruly elements among the UGTT’s 
executives were dismissed and jailed while a more compliant leadership was installed.278 
The regime crackdown produced a temporary drop in levels of UGTT 
membership and activity; however, the state, in order to bolster its own legitimacy and 
popular base, was quick to mend fences with the labor movement by restoring its 
autonomy.279  Furthermore, the UGTT succeeded in winning substantial minimum wage 
increases during the 1970s and, in the early 1980s, was able to significantly impact public 
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policies. Thus, despite these instances of state co-optation and repression the labor 
movement ultimately maintained some degree of independence and influence over the 
regime. 
The ensuing honeymoon between the state and the labor movement, however, did 
not last long. Due to the increasing economic problems, by the mid-1980s the regime’s 
ability to buy off dissent decreased, and thus, with the state becoming less tolerant, the 
worker’s demands for higher wages were increasingly met with violent crackdowns on 
the UGTT in 1984 and 1985.280 After suppressing the protests, the regime once again 
appointed a new, subservient executive committee in order to weaken the UGTT’s 
autonomy.281 
In addition to state interference and co-optation, the UGTT also suffered from a 
lack of internal democracy. This was especially prevalent under the leadership of Habib 
Achour during the 1970s, when union elections were regularly rigged and conducted by 
acclamation rather than by secret ballot to ensure a disproportionate representation of the 
Secretary General’s supporters. Similarly, dissenting local UGTT branches were outvoted 
by creating a multitude of new, loyal UGTT locals.282 Furthermore, the top-down nature 
of funding within the organization did not enhance internal democracy. Direct payments 
from the state ensured the financial power of the executive committee at the expense of 
the rank and file as local unions had to solicit funds from the center, depriving them of 
the ability to withhold membership fees as a means to influence the leadership.283 
Nevertheless, despite the lack of internal democracy and the political corruption 
of the leadership, union dissidents did not seek to create rival labor unions because of the 
bureaucratic barriers created by the state and due to fears that the regime might use a 
strategy of divide and conquer to further limit the autonomy of the labor movement.284 
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Concerns over such regime machinations were well grounded as Bourguiba, in order to 
reinforce state control of the unruly UGTT in the mid-1980s, discreetly supported 
dissenting breakaway unions (such as the National Union of Tunisian Workers in 1984) 
to undermine the position of the union leadership, and then reunited the labor movement 
under leaders who were known to be supportive of the regime.285  
Despite all these problems, there were also signs of change in terms of the 
responsiveness of the leadership to the base. Beginning from the 1980s, a new generation 
of leaders had come to power, such as Taieb Baccouche between 1981‒1984 and Ismail 
Sahbani between 1989 and 2000. They did not have first-hand experience of the 
independence struggle from France, nor did they maintain close ties to the central 
party.286 Instead, these new leaders were exposed to the radical student movements, the 
struggle of the rank and file, or the harshness of Tunisian prison cells, which increased 
their credibility amongst the base and helped them to maintain some distance to the 
regime.287 
Besides the labor movement, another important societal force in the anti-colonial 
struggle in Tunisia was the women’s movement. Similar to labor unions, following 
independence, the various women’s groups were soon brought under state control by 
incorporating them into the National Union of Tunisian Women, founded in 1958. The 
National Union lacked any autonomy, which became evident when Bourguiba married its 
first honorary president, Wassila Ben Ammar, in 1962. The remaining independent 
women’s organizations, which had close ties to the Communist party, were outlawed and 
disbanded following the adoption of the law on civil associations in 1959.288 
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C. THE RISE AND FALL OF ISLAMISM 
In Tunisia the early expressions of Islamism in the 1970s were particularly 
concerned with social decay of the youth, which was most prominently demonstrated by 
the casual dressing habits of women, the mixing of sexes and the presence of numerous 
coffee shops.289 During the 1970s Islamism gained traction mainly on university 
campuses and thus was largely supported by young, urban, middle-class students and 
teachers.290 The government initially regarded the Islamist movement, especially due to 
its depoliticized nature, as a counterweight to leftist sympathizers on university campuses 
and the UGTT.291 The Islamists seemed to confirm this perception when they condemned 
the protests organized by the UGTT in 1978 (for which they were heavily criticized by 
leftist actors), but soon they began to understand the importance of syndicate activism 
and public agitation in enlarging their social base.292  
In order to give the Islamist movement a more political character, Rachid 
Ghannouchi created the Islamic Tendency Movement (MTI) in 1981, which despite its 
relatively moderate and elitist nature compared to other Islamist movements and its non-
authorization by the regime, soon enjoyed wide popularity.293 After having gained 
control of the educational syndicate as a result of their strong backing on university 
campuses, the Islamists moved to infiltrate the UGTT. Ultimately in the elections to the 
Union’s General Congress in 1984, they managed to elect 70 members out of 220 
delegates.294  
The labor union’s repression following the protests of 1984 and 1985 created a 
vacuum amongst the civil society forces challenging the state, which was soon filled by 
the MTI. The Islamist’s rise in popularity did not go unnoticed by the regime, and as the 
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MTI’s clandestine organization offered few opportunities for regime infiltration, 
Bourguiba soon began to fear it even more than the labor movement.295 When the MTI 
escalated its demonstrations in 1986 and 1987, Bourguiba at last became intent on 
destroying the organization and imprisoned most of its leaders. Bourguiba’s relentless 
campaign against the movement, however, ultimately led to his downfall when his Prime 
Minister, Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, deposed him in a bloodless coup in November 1987. 
Ben Ali’s coup is credited with staving off threatening social unrest and the potential 
execution of non-violent Muslim activists.296 
What followed was a brief period of liberal reforms (during which the Socialist 
Destourian Party was renamed Democratic Constitutional Rally (RCD)), which fueled 
Islamist hopes for political emancipation. In order to comply with a new party code that 
prohibited the creation of political parties on religious grounds, the MTI renamed itself 
Hizb al-Nahda (The Renaissance Party) in early 1989 to prove its pro-democratic nature, 
but even so it was denied participation in the national elections that same year. 
Nevertheless members of al-Nahda ran successfully as independents in the elections. It 
was at that time that Ben Ali became convinced that the Islamist movement could not be 
controlled and therefore had to be eliminated.297 The civil war in neighboring Algeria in 
the early 1990s provided the Ben Ali regime with ample reason to silence political 
opposition under the pretext of religious extremism and the threat of terrorism. When a 
1991 arson attack against an RCD office in the capital was blamed on al-Nahda, the 
regime used the attack to justify a full-blown crackdown on the Islamist movement.298 
Al-Nahda’s defeat was mostly attributed to the fact that it refused to cooperate 
with other movements within civil society, particularly the workers and the lower middle 
classes, and thus, it was not able to enlarge its base of support outside university 
campuses.299 Moreover, another factor leading to al-Nahda’s relatively limited public 
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support, especially compared to that of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, was the Ben 
Ali regime’s successful reduction of poverty throughout the 1990s. It also created a 
monopoly on service provision and helped set up 6,000 neighborhood committees to 
improve living conditions across the country; this effort denied Islamists a foothold 
through charities.300 The regime also banned associations suspected of Islamic origin. All 
of these actions left very little room for independent Islamist service-providing NGOs, 
thus denying Al-Nahda access to significant parts of society.301 
D. THE TUNISIAN HUMAN RIGHTS LEAGUE  
It was not until the late 1970s that another important actor of Tunisian civil 
society emerged. In 1977, after a split in the ruling party, the Tunisian Human Rights 
League (LTDH) was created with the inclusion of dissenters from the PSD and other 
opposition parties which were banned from forming political parties.302 The LTDH 
became the first human rights group in the Arab world. By 1985 the LTDH found itself in 
an ideological crisis over the presence of Serges Adda, a Tunisian Jew, on its executive 
committee and the potential role of the organization in promoting the rights of women.303 
After a heated series of debates with Arab nationalists and Islamists who rejected the 
Western concept of human rights, a compromise, called the Tunisian Human Rights 
Charter, was adopted that allowed Adda to keep his position and created the Women’s 
Affairs Committee. In exchange future applicants were required to sign the Charter and 
commit themselves to the objectives of the organization.304  
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During the early years of the Ben Ali regime, women’s influence increased when 
Ben Ali allowed two women’s groups to join the LTDH in August 1989. This was a 
novelty because until then the ruling party had a monopoly on the issue of women.305 
The consensus within the LTDH’s leadership, however, soon ended when Moncef 
Marzouki, the new president, was attacked over his condemnation of the regime’s harsh 
crackdown on Islamists and Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait.306 When the LTDH 
renewed its condemnation of human rights violations committed against imprisoned 
Islamists in late 1991, the regime set out to muzzle the organization.307 
In 1992, the Ben Ali regime introduced amendments on the Law on Associations, 
which required that any association carrying out “general” activities (such as the LTDH) 
to admit any person that adhered to the organization’s principles and decisions, while it 
also prohibited individuals from the governing bodies of political parties to become 
directors or to assume responsibilities in the steering committees of those associations.308 
These amendments stripped the LTDH of its independence by allowing the regime to 
flood the League with pro-government members and to dissolve its steering committee, 
which at that time included several senior members of various political parties.309 Rather 
than comply with the terms of the amendment the LTDH opted to dissolve itself, but 
ultimately resumed its activities in 1994 after being reclassified by the regime as a non-
general association.310 
Thus, the LTDH, despite being harassed by the regime and other non-liberal 
forces in society, was able to voice concerns over human rights abuses, including those 
committed against Islamists, and convey a sense of tolerance to other actors in civil 
society.  
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E. THE END OF TUNISIAN CIVIL SOCIETY? 
By the late 1980s, Tunisia was widely viewed as having the potential for civil 
society, due to its political reforms, Western-oriented elite and progressive social 
policies.311 Moreover, civil society seemed to thrive, as the number of registered NGOs 
in Tunisia increased from 1,886 in 1988 to 5,186 in 1991, as a result of the Ben Ali 
regime’s political and economic reforms in the late 1980.312 While a great variety of 
associations emerged, engaging citizens in collective problem solving, this large number 
was elusive. It also included associations that existed mainly on paper.313 Nevertheless, a 
host of associations such as social centers and regional development associations brought 
together citizens from various social classes with diverse worldviews, and thus promoted 
the presence of cross-cutting cleavages. Other organizations advocated tolerance and 
legalism, such as the LTDH and the Association of Tunisian Lawyers. Therefore the 
regime’s relatively liberal policies, though short-lived, contributed to the emergence of 
some aspects of good civil society.314 
Despite these positive tendencies, civil society soon lost the limited independence 
it had gained over the previous decades when it was given the choice to either become 
co-opted by the state or face dissolution. The National Pact created by the Ben Ali regime 
in 1988 provided citizens with access to credit and consumer goods in exchange for 
renouncing civil and political liberties. The UGTT, which had been severely weakened in 
the mid-1980s, joined the pact without putting up too much resistance, while the left-
wing civil institutions—such as the human rights movement and women’s 
organizations—were offered government positions or other incentives in exchange for 
adhering to this new form of “social contract.”315 In a surprise move, Ben Ali also 
managed to get the backing of al-Nahda for his National Pact, despite putting most of the 
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movement’s leaders in jail and not promising any specifics in exchange.316 Thus, by the 
late 1980s the regime was able to effectively neutralize all civil opposition by offering 
vague prospects of democratization in exchange for political subservience. 
Moreover, in its efforts to extend its control over civil society the regime was 
aided by the alleged threat of Islamism. Following the crackdown on al-Nahda and other 
Islamist groups, opposition political parties and the neutralized UGTT closed ranks 
behind the regime which they preferred to an Islamist takeover.317 In addition, the regime 
also moved to co-opt the women’s movement by legalizing the independent women’s 
association, promoting their labor rights and adopting laws which safeguarded their rights 
within the family.318 Not surprisingly, the women’s association did not put up a lot of 
resistance against the state’s attempts, as the latter, promising to safeguard the existing 
rights, was seen as a lesser evil compared to the Islamists who fervently attacked the 
Personal Code during the 1989 elections.319 In doing so, the association exposed itself to 
harsh attacks from the Tunisian Communist Party, which launched a campaign deploring 
the Westernization of women (e.g., women’s struggle for greater freedom of expression) 
and their co-optation by the state.320 
Referring to the threat of militant Islamism, the state infiltrated through its party 
apparatus the various institutions of civil society and kept track of their activities.321 
Much like in the totalitarian regimes of Eastern Europe, state control was not limited to 
the public sphere. Through its widespread presence and its network of informers in 
society, the RCD also intruded into the private life of citizens, subjecting those who dared 
to voice dissent to various forms of harassment ranging from preventing enrollment at 
universities to obstructing certain health care services and blocking administrative 
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proceedings.322 As a consequence of this, distrust was widespread in the populace to the 
degree that “Tunisians became their own censors,” which led to a further decline in 
associational life.323 
Furthermore, the neoliberal economic reforms of the 1990s also hindered the 
development of good civil society in Tunisia. While the number of associations based on 
traditional patronage and kinship networks increased, especially in rural communities, 
organizations featuring cross-cutting cleavages declined, as did participation in other 
CSOs.324 Instead of undercutting primordial identifications and promoting the emergence 
of good civil society, market reforms reinforced traditional attachments because the 
structural adjustment programs mainly benefited large landowners who often had close 
ties to government officials. Moreover, they did little to improve the lot of the small 
peasantry, thus leading to huge inequalities.325 While the poorer farmers had no other 
choice than to subject themselves to traditional patron-client relations, wealthier farmers 
reinforced this process by preventing the farmer’s union from meeting, where small-scale 
farmers could have voiced their disagreement over agricultural policies.326 In addition, 
poorer farmers were also kept out of the union by introducing membership requirements, 
such as having a certain amount of land.327 Thus, while the neoliberal market reforms 
adopted by the Ben Ali regime strengthened primordial identifications in rural Tunisia 
and promoted intolerance in society, they contributed to the poor increasingly viewing 
formal institutions as defending the interests of the rich; this dynamic led to an overall 
decline in associational participation over the 1990s.328    
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By the late 1990s Ben Ali became obsessed with the idea that a coalition, headed 
by former politicians in alliance with al-Nahda, militant portions of the labor and student 
movements, the LTDH and legal opposition parties might try to overthrow him.329 In 
order to prevent this alliance from emerging, Ben Ali introduced an array of repressive 
policies aimed to hamstring protest movements and the organization of collective action. 
By effectively dissolving the ties between elite and popular politics, these measures 
crippled civil society, which during the preceding decades was able to influence 
government policies by establishing alliances with government elites and exploiting 
tensions within the state administration.330  
In line with its increased repression of civil society, the regime also attempted to 
discredit human rights activists from the LTDH and the CNLT (the National Council on 
Liberties in Tunisia, which was created by Marzouki in 1998 after he was ousted from the 
LTDH). They condemned repression against non-violent Islamists, by charging them 
with receiving funds from foreign governments and NGOs and committing immoral 
sexual acts.331 In addition, the state continued to “colonize” civil society by infiltrating 
the remaining independent NGOs with party members and thus bringing them completely 
under government control and influence, and by flooding civil society with a host of 
proxy CSOs providing needed services but remaining under regime control .332 
Furthermore, although the country’s law governing labor unions was generally 
regarded as liberal, with union founders only having to inform the government of their 
intentions in order to get legal recognition, in practice the regime erected bureaucratic 
barriers that made it impossible to create independent unions.333 For example, in 2007, 
500 UGTT members at odds with the union’s leadership over their unwillingness to adopt 
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a more resolute posture vis-à-vis the government, filed an application to create an 
alternative labor union; the regime simply refused to accept the founding documents.334 
Moreover, even if legal recognition was granted, state interference into the activities of 
unions was common. For example, the National Syndicate of Tunisian Journalists 
(NSTJ), founded in 2008 to replace the heavily co-opted Association of Tunisian 
Journalists and the only legally recognized union outside the UGTT, had its independent 
board replaced with one loyal to the regime. This occurred when the original board spoke 
up against the harsh treatment of journalists and the policies of restricting the freedom of 
press.335 In addition, the government also stopped the NSTJ’s public funding, forcing the 
newly founded union to rely on membership fees to maintain its operations.336  
The General Union for Tunisian Students (UGET), which was created in 1953, 
fared even worse. Although technically an association, due to its political influence and 
the fact that it was fulfilling union-like functions by protecting the interests of students 
and advocating on their behalf for better educational circumstances, the UGET was 
exposed to harsh government repression, including the arrest and torture of its members, 
leading to a significant decline in its membership.337 Partly due to internal divisions and 
partly due to the Ben Ali regime’s continued interference in its internal politics, the 
UGET was not able to hold a congress from 2003 until 2013, thus rendering the 
organization irrelevant for almost a decade.338  
Despite being emasculated, Tunisian CSOs occasionally joined forces to protest 
against the Ben Ali regime’s repressive policies and in doing so were sometimes able to 
score some victories. For example in 2000, Tawfiq Bin Brik, a Tunisian journalist went 
on a hunger strike to denounce the state harassment that was brought upon him and his 
family members for criticizing government policies. The LTDH, the CNLT, the Bar 
Association, the Democratic Women’s Association and the Tunisian Association of 
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Young Lawyers coalesced to condemn the regime’s repressive measures and to support 
Bin Brik and his family by issuing a joint press release and also staging hunger strikes.339 
In the end, the regime, fearing bad publicity abroad, dropped all charges against Bin Brik 
and ceded to most of his demands.340 
In terms of the most influential actor in Tunisian civil society, the UGTT, in 
exchange for supporting the Ben Ali regime’s political and economic reforms, was 
granted say in the economic and social decision-making processes in the early 1990s.341 
Again, state-decision making was based on political considerations to curb the autonomy 
of the labor union. Having received stakes in implementing the economic reforms of the 
regime, the UGTT had to abandon its calls for higher wages or broader political 
freedoms. Thus, it was largely relegated to safeguarding existing rights under the Ben Ali 
regime.342 The regime’s actions to limit the independence of the UGTT, however, did not 
stop here. In exchange for including the labor union in the formal decision-making 
process, the regime expanded its influence over the leadership and the structure of the 
UGTT by appropriating the right to appoint the secretary-general and transferring unruly 
union directors to public companies, stripping them of their political clout.343  
Despite becoming more compliant at the leadership level, the UGTT remained far 
from unified; at the lower levels it tolerated and maintained the expression of alternative 
views by union dissidents.344 In addition, even UGTT leaders had to maintain the 
semblance of internal legitimacy, and thus were often forced to condone the wildcat 
strikes of regional offices.345 
Moreover, despite the Ben Ali regime’s repression, whenever the UGTT or more 
often its local unions, voiced dissent and mobilized their membership, other CSOs were 
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quick to join the protests and demonstrations. For example, in 2002 the local UGTT 
union in Moknine initiated a strike without the central bureau’s authorization in order to 
force the owners of a textile factory to honor previous commitments. When the strike 
proved fruitless, outside actors, such as RAID-ATTAC Tunisia, a non-legalized anti-
economic liberalization organization, and the LTDH stepped in to provide support for the 
protesters by ensuring international media coverage and providing updated 
information.346 
In 2005, the slow resurgence of the labor movement became evident when the 
UGTT, for the first time since 1984, openly rejected a decision made by the president. 
This occurred when Ben Ali personally invited Ariel Sharon to the UN World Summit in 
Tunis.347 The ensuing strikes and protests, which UGTT regional offices and trade unions 
organized, were ultimately put down by the police. Even more significant, in 2008, the 
UGTT organized workers who were enraged over unfair hiring practices and widespread 
corruption in government circles to stage a strike in the mining region of Gafsa; the strike 
lasted six months before the military managed to break it up. These events showed that 
the UGTT, having the means to effectively mobilize against regime policies, was still the 
most important CSO daring to publicly voice dissent. Despite the regime’s efforts to 
subjugate the labor movement, the UGTT remained the major countervailing force to the 
state during the Ben Ali era, which was also reflected in the union’s culture highlighting 
the importance of “activism,” “independence,” and “internal democracy.”348 
F. THE REEMERGENCE OF CIVIL SOCIETY 
The protests that erupted after the death of Mohamed Bouazizi in December 2010 
were referred to by many analysts as social movements targeting economic misery and 
widespread corruption, which lacking leadership from formal opposition forces, would 
not be able to sustain themselves over a longer period of time.349 The resilience of 
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Tunisian civil society, however, proved them wrong. The unemployed graduates who 
started the demonstrations were soon joined by citizens from all strata of society, such as 
students, doctors, lawyers, professors and shopkeepers, turning the initial protests into 
massive movements of civil disobedience.350 In addition, the protests were backed by 
student movements, human rights activists and the local union groups acting 
independently from the central UGTT bureau. Labor union activists proved invaluable in 
organizing the unemployed and disenfranchised youth into a mass movement, while 
professional associations, such as those of lawyers and doctors, were the first to articulate 
political demands.351 These different CSOs cooperated through newly founded local 
councils, which helped to organize the demonstrations, and thus provided the institutional 
structure to maintain the momentum of the uprising.352  
The final nail in the Ben Ali coffin was delivered when, following the escalation 
of violence and the protests, the rank and file of the UGTT were able to pressure the 
union leadership to break with the regime, support the uprising and call for a general 
strike on January 14. On that day Ben Ali fled the country. 
Most analysts agree that the reason why the social pact maintained for over two 
decades dissolved so rapidly was the regime’s inability—due to its insatiable greed—to 
provide the middle class with access to an adequate standard of living in exchange for its 
acquiescence.353 It is also important, however, to acknowledge the importance that 
cooperation and the inherent sense of tolerance amongst the various forces of civil 
society played in bringing the uprising to a successful end. From January 14, when Ben 
Ali fled the country, to March 3, when the interim government announced elections for a 
Constituent Assembly, a grassroots coalition of labor unions, lawyers associations, leftist 
movements, human right organizations and Islamists from al-Nahda continued with the 
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protests in order to prevent the ancient régime from returning to power.354 Without the 
perseverance of this makeshift coalition, the success of the uprising would have been 
most likely provisional in nature. Moreover, this overarching sense of cooperation was 
carried over to the elections of the Constitutional Assembly on October 23, 2011, when 
al-Nahda, having won 37 per cent of the popular vote, created a coalition with the left-
wing nationalist party of the Congress for the Republic and the social democratic party of 
Ettakatol. 
G. CONCLUSION 
Most observers were taken by surprise when, after weeks of widespread protests, 
Zine El Abidine Ben Ali was forced to leave Tunisia on January 14, 2011. After all, 
protests had happened before in Tunisia, but the state was always able to overcome them 
through co-optation, minor concessions or outright repression. The demonstrations that 
erupted after the self-immolation of Mohamed Bouazizi, however, were different from 
previous ones in that they were supported by a wide-ranging coalition of civil society 
groups that managed to sustain the protest movement by turning grievances into political 
demands and thus address and mobilize large parts of the populace. This process was 
unforeseen by many analysts as civil society under the Ben Ali regime was widely 
regarded as being heavily repressed and bereft of its autonomy. This chapter, however, 
argues that over the decades of struggle against the regime (and sometimes within itself) 
Tunisian civil society has developed certain characteristics of good civil society that have 
made it more suitable to bring about political change compared to civil societies in other 
parts of the Arab world. 
From a structural point of view, Tunisian civil society differs significantly from 
other Arab civil societies leading up to the Arab Spring. What is most striking is the 
influential role the labor union plays not just within civil society, but also in interactions 
with the state. At times repressed, interfered or co-opted by the state, the widespread 
support the UGTT enjoys within society nevertheless ensures that it remains an 
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influential player whose position, demands and mobilizing capabilities have to be taken 
into account. Less influential, but still an important actor, the LTDH and later other 
human rights organizations, have ensured that by voicing concerns over human rights 
abuses legality and tolerance remain on the agenda. The third important actor within civil 
society, al-Nahda, differs markedly from other Islamist movements in the Middle East in 
that it has remained more elitist and moderate due to its restricted access to the Tunisian 
populace. On the one hand, the regime’s repressive policies banned the creation of all 
associations of religious origin, which deprived al-Nahda of the capability to interact with 
society under the banner of Islam. On the other hand, the regime’s monopoly on social 
services has meant that Tunisian civil society has never developed a large service-
providing sector through which al-Nahda could address the needs of the people. Finally, 
it is worth noting that as a consequence of the regime’s heavy-handed repressive policies 
Tunisia has been virtually devoid of any effective social movement through which 
society could engage in meaningful collective action outside the formal institutions of 
CSOs.355   
For most of its history, Tunisian civil society was in a constant state of struggle 
with the regime over its independence. At times, civil society was granted greater public 
space, e.g., during the liberal policies of the Bourguiba regime in the first half of the 
1970s and early 1980s, or the early years of the Ben Ali regime in the late 1980s, which it 
used to grow in strength, and reassert its autonomy. At other times, the increasing 
repression, the severity of legal constraints, the regime’s strategy to infiltrate CSOs with 
members of the state party to manipulate board elections or replace executive committees 
completely, as well as the financial control the regime exerted over associations deprived 
civil society of most of its autonomy. The regime nevertheless refrained from completely 
subjugating civil society because of its need to retain a sufficiently vigorous civil society 
that acted as a counterweight to the Islamist threat and, at the same time, bolstered the 
regime’s own legitimacy. In addition, CSOs, like the LTDH, were able to bolster enough 
international pressure to deter the regime from dissolving them.356 
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Moreover, even if Tunisian civil society was relegated to a semi-autonomous 
status and depended on the benign nature of the state, the mere fact that it was often 
engaged with the regime in a tug of war over membership and leadership issues meant 
that civil society did not settle for passivity despite the obvious risks of repression. The 
UGTT in particular, especially during the 1970s and early 1980s, enjoyed a relative 
independence which taught its membership the merits of autonomous collective action. 
Furthermore, these periods of expanded political opportunities allowed for the emergence 
of an organizational infrastructure, which survived the introduction of more repressive 
policies and provided members with memories of a more liberal environment of 
collective mobilization. Later, these political opportunity “holdovers” served as a 
mobilizing resource which strengthened civil society’s perseverance in the face of the 
regime’s repressive actions during the Arab Spring. 
Participation in associational life has usually depended on the level of repression 
exerted by the regime and the degree of confidence that collective action has a 
meaningful impact. While after the regime’s brutal crackdown on dissenters or the 
installation of a more compliant leadership participation in CSOs usually decreased, state 
concessions have often led to an increase in associational activity (and also militancy, 
which was best represented by the rising vigorousness of the labor movement in the 
1970s and early 1980s following successive wage increases). During the 1990s and 
2000s, rising inequalities and liberal economic policies implemented by the regime 
reduced popular confidence in the capability of CSOs to promote meaningful change, and 
passivity prevailed in civil society. This passivity, however, did not affect the UGTT, 
which through its local branches engaged in several protests in the in the 2000s, and 
which boasted an impressive 600,000 members and 15,000 unions nationwide at the eve 
of the protests in December 2010.357 Moreover, the collective action within the labor 
union also contributed to the political socialization of its members, who through strikes 
and demonstrations learned the limits of political participation and the cost of 
repression.358 Thus, most observers viewed Tunisian civil society as passive, and these 
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observers were therefore surprised by the outbreak of protests in December 2010. In fact, 
labor union activism and participation rose steadily over the preceding decade. 
In terms of empowerment, Tunisian civil society, despite the harsh repression by 
the regime, still managed to have an impact on state policies. Out of all CSOs, naturally, 
the labor union was the most successful in extorting concessions from the state, mostly in 
the form of wage increases during the 1970s and early 1980s. Later, during the early 
years of the Ben Ali regime, the UGTT received a formal role in the decision-making 
process as part of Ben Ali’s National Pact; however, in doing so, the labor union also 
relinquished much of its power to influence state policies. Other actors in civil society 
were only able to influence state policies when they confronted the regime with a wide-
ranging coalition and/or when their demands were backed up by substantial international 
pressure, as in the case of the journalist’s hunger strike in 2000.  
Nevertheless, as these cases demonstrate, the regime responded to some of the 
effectively presented demands made by civil society. These concessions reasserted CSOs 
in times of increased repression and taught them important lessons in articulating 
demands and effectively employing collective action. These skills were later put to test 
not just during the demonstrations of the Arab Spring, but also after the uprising, when 
for the first time in Tunisian history, CSOs actively engaged with government 
representatives in law-making. These negotiations resulted in a new, more liberal Law on 
Associations being adopted in September 2011.359 
Thus, as presented, Tunisian civil society possessed some characteristics of a 
good civil society, but what about cross-cutting cleavages and civility, which introduce 
crucial values required for democratization? Following the structural adjustment 
programs of the 1990s, CSOs, especially in rural communities, became advocates for the 
interests of the wealthier strata. This led to a drop in the numbers of poorer members who 
became increasingly disenfranchised by those CSOs. This “elitization” of parts of civil 
society led to a decline in cross-cutting cleavages. While this might seem to have 
adversely affected civil society, the fact that the UGTT and its nationwide network of 
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local branches incorporated people with a wide range of views and beliefs from all over 
the country implied that it was able to partially offset the negative consequences of the 
decline of cross-cutting cleavages elsewhere. 
Even more important, civility, and especially tolerance and cooperation, while 
naturally not embraced by the whole civil society, were nevertheless present in the 
practices of several CSOs and helped to overcome the general lack of trust, which 
permeated society due to the heavy repression of the Ben Ali regime. The emergence of 
tolerance was promoted by the Bourguiba regime’s liberal policies, which after gaining 
independence from France adopted laws protecting the rights of women, workers and 
minorities. Within civil society, the UGTT, while often lacking democratic practices in 
its internal politics, tolerated a vast array of different sentiments advocated by its 
membership. This allowed it to become a forum for oppositional views in a country, 
where dissent was otherwise heavily repressed. Since the late 1970s, the LTDH and later 
other human rights organizations advocated legality and tolerance even toward those who 
at other times charged human rights organizations with serving Western interests or 
adhering to non-Islamic values. Finally, and probably most significantly, the fact that al-
Nahda was barred access to notable parts of the society implied that it had fewer 
opportunities to engage in populist practices, and thus, it retained a more moderate and 
tolerant character. This tolerance implied greater acceptance of opposing views, even if 
those views were articulated by secular forces, which prepared the ground for 
cooperation with other parts of civil society. This was the final and presumably most 
important point in analyzing Tunisian civil society’s capabilities for democratization. 
The decades-old struggle with the regime over public space taught Tunisian CSOs 
the lesson that cooperation is the basis for having an impact on the state’s public policies. 
The more Tunisian CSOs were able to align behind a common goal, the greater was the 
likelihood that the regime, even if not conceding to their demands, would at least 
consider the issue at hand. This form of coalition-building was evident in the case of the 
journalist’s hunger strike. Due to the peculiar structure of Tunisian civil society, CSOs 
also learned that obtaining the support of the UGTT with its vast membership and 
resources of mobilization would drastically increase the chances for success. Thus, CSOs, 
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like in the case of the 2002 Moknine protests, increasingly became aware of the benefits 
of joining the UGTT during its demonstrations.  
Ultimately, this predisposition for cooperation among the various forces within 
Tunisian civil society would prove to be crucial in the protests leading to the ouster of 
Ben Ali and his regime. Moreover, this ability of Tunisian civil society forces to 
cooperate with each other, regardless of embracing secular or Islamic values, opened up 
the door for the country’s first, truly democratic elections in October, 2011. 
This conclusion by no means implies that the goodness of Tunisian civil society 
was sufficient or even necessary to bring down the regime. Neither does it imply that 
Tunisian civil society in its entirety possesses the characteristics of a good civil society. 
As recent events have shown, militant Islamism advocating intolerance and violence is on 
the rise, and to cope with it is one of the most pressing issues of the current political 
leadership. Nevertheless, the presence of a (partly) good civil society greatly enhances 
the prospects for democratization in the North African country. After all, Tunisia has 
successfully crossed the threshold of becoming an electoral democracy in 2011, which 
according to common belief would not have been possible without the favorable 
contributions of a vigorous civil society. Whether Tunisian civil society is strong enough 
to support the further democratization of the country remains to be seen. The fact that 
after nearly two years the achievements of the Tunisian revolution are still in place, 
however, warrants some cautious optimism. 
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VI. EGYPT: A CIVIL SOCIETY DERAILED? 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Most analysts were surprised by the vehemence of the protests that broke out on 
January 25, 2011, in Cairo, and elsewhere in Egypt, and ultimately led to the overthrow 
of one of the longest standing rulers in the Arab world in less than three weeks. After all, 
Egypt is one of the key countries in the region and after having defeated the threat of 
Islamism by the late 1990s, the regime backed by the military seemed to be stronger than 
ever. A closer look, however, shows that the protests which erupted in 2011 were not 
unprecedented. Since the mid-2000s the increasing levels of collective action had 
prepared the ground for the uprising. Moreover, the Islamists, far from being defeated, 
moved from challenging the state directly to overthrowing the regime by transforming 
society from the bottom up. Thus, when secularists and Islamists were able to put aside 
their differences in the beginning of 2011, the resulting coalition (of course largely aided 
by a neutral military) easily swept away Mubarak. Contrary to Tunisia, however, this 
makeshift coalition soon disbanded after the removal of Mubarak, opening up the door 
for an Islamist takeover.  
Drawing from the criteria established in Table 1 and the discussion in Chapter 2, 
Egypt’s civil society will be evaluated. This chapter argues that the predominantly bad 
nature of Egyptian civil society promotes the emergence of the uncivil Islamist regime 
and dims the prospects of democratization in the near future, despite the presence of 
countervailing forces within civil society. The chapter first analyzes the political 
opportunities regime policies provided civil society since the Free Officers coup in 1952 
and finds that, despite the liberalizing policies of the 1970s and 1980s, civil society was 
not able to take advantage of these opportunities because of the multi-front war it fought 
against regime repression, Islamist incursion and internal factionalism. The chapter then 
investigates the various civil society forces and finds that the majority of Egyptian CSOs 
sport attributes of bad civil society. The chapter concludes by claiming the acceptance 
and tolerance which brought down the Mubarak regime did not take hold within a civil 
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society dominated by uncivil values in the transitional period that followed, leading to the 
rise of the Islamist regime around Mohamed Morsi and the ensuing increase in 
repression.     
B. THE STATE AND CIVIL SOCIETY IN EGYPT 
Egypt has a long history of the traditional organizations and voluntary 
associations constituting civil society. While CSOs flourished in the Kingdom of Egypt 
between 1922 and 1952, under the Nasser regime many associations were closed, forced 
underground or incorporated into regime organizations.360 The vibrant civil society, 
which espoused a multitude of divergent views, was regarded not just by the regime but 
also large parts of the intelligentsia, as a threat to the unifying aims of the regime.361 In 
1964 the regime adopted Law 32, which tied the registration of any association to 
Ministry of Social Affairs (MOSA) approval, required associations to inform the MOSA 
about their activities, and placed significant limits on fundraising, allowing only 
membership fees and offerings during religious services to be collected without prior 
MOSA permission. 
Law 32 divided associations into two groups: welfare organizations, which had to 
conduct at least one specific activity, but were not restricted geographically; and 
development organizations (also called community development associations—CDAs), 
which could carry out any number of activities previously approved by the state, but were 
essentially restricted to one locality.362 Despite the severe constraints, most Islamic 
voluntary associations and business associations were able to function as they were 
largely able to self-fund through mosque collections and membership dues. 
Following Nasser, Egypt under Sadat embarked on a process of economic and 
political liberalization. Sadat knew that the main threat to his regime and his policies of 
reconciliation with Israel came from leftist, Nasserist groups and Islamic fundamentalists. 
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In order to counterbalance these groups and to address the mounting Islamic sentiments 
in society, he encouraged moderate Islamist factions, such as the Muslim Brotherhood, to 
play a more active role.363 This policy adjustment was most evident in the growing 
number of Islamic NGOs registered with the MOSA, whose percentage of the total 
number of registered NGOs increased from 17 percent in the 1960s to 31 percent in the 
1970s.364 Sadat’s measures, however, proved ineffective to stem the growing number of 
critics of his policies of economic and political liberalization, which led to a decline in 
living standards for the poor and growing inequalities. Ultimately, when he moved to 
arrest dissenters from all over the political landscape and civil society, including 
members of political parties, professional syndicates and various Islamist groups, he was 
assassinated by a militant Islamist activist in 1981.365 
What followed was a brutal crackdown on Islamist groups by the new President, 
Hosni Mubarak, during which over four thousand members of the Muslim Brotherhood 
were arrested. Mubarak, however, soon continued the policies of his predecessor when he 
attempted to encourage the secular opposition and the moderate Islamists, including the 
Brotherhood, to form a counterweight against the extremist Islamists.366 As a result of 
the regime’s policies, the 1980s and the early 1990s witnessed a growing polarization 
between secular and Islamist forces, which furthered intolerance and repression within 
civil society itself, leading to an overall decline in civility.367 
The process of liberalization initiated under Sadat and maintained during the first 
decade of the Mubarak regime provided civil society actors, such as NGOs, with greater 
autonomy on the condition that their activities retained an apolitical character.368 This, 
combined with the neoliberal economic policies of the regime, resulted in two opposing 
trends within civil society: while it led to the strengthening of the NGO sector and the 
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business groups (e.g., by the 1990s the number of NGOs alone reached approximately 
28,000), 369 it weakened grassroots and mass-based organizations, which contrary to the 
former, lacked the necessary financial and organizational background to take advantage 
of the new possibilities.370 
The increased role of NGOs in delivering services the state was unable or 
unwilling to provide (like providing cheap healthcare services), however, did not come 
with a similar increase in terms of empowerment: the NGOs had no right to organize 
their constituencies or influence the state policies governing the services they delivered; 
that is, they lacked any public advocacy mandate.371 
In the early 1990s, the growing Islamist threat prompted the regime to give up its 
liberal approach and adopt more repressive policies vis-à-vis the civil society. The 
previous policy of distinguishing between the Muslim Brotherhood and militant Islamists 
was abandoned, and the regime introduced laws subjecting the various Islamist groups to 
harsh repression.372 Using the threat of Islamism to justify its actions, the government 
also clamped down on the professional associations, such as the engineers and lawyers 
associations,which had a large percentage of Muslim Brotherhood leadership, and on the 
trade unions, which were hitherto the bases of oppositional activity within civil 
society.373 
After having won board elections in a number of professional associations, in 
September 1992, the Muslim Brotherhood also succeeded in winning the majority of 
board seats in the Bar Association elections. The Bar Association was long regarded as a 
bastion of liberalism; thus, the Brotherhood’s success signaled the growing number of 
younger Islamist-oriented professionals, who regarded the Brotherhood as the only 
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credible opposition. This was, however, only one side of the story. The Brotherhood’s 
success was also facilitated by the indifference of many professionals about voting in 
association elections, the infighting between leftist and liberal factions within the 
associations and the ability of the well-organized, highly motivated Islamist minority to 
mobilize its supporters.374 
The regime responded to the Muslim Brotherhood’s success in professional 
association elections by adopting a law in 1993 which required a high turnout in elections 
in order for them to be deemed valid and also included provisions to put associations 
under government control should voter participation fall below a certain threshold.375 
The uncivil nature of Egyptian civil society was best represented by the fact that, despite 
this blatant intervention of the regime in the internal elections of professional syndicates, 
the law was positively received by the secular forces embracing an anti-Islamist 
position.376 While this move made secularists vulnerable to charges of siding with the 
regime, its underlying causes were to be found in the secular intelligentsia’s fear of an 
Islamist takeover, compared to which the authoritarian practices of the Mubarak regime 
were seen as a lesser evil.377 
During the 1990s, the Muslim Brotherhood suffered from a generational dispute 
between the top leadership and the younger activists in professional associations and on 
university campuses over the leadership’s cautious response to repression, its reluctance 
to share power and to cooperate with secular civil society groups and its unwillingness to 
display greater tolerance towards the extension of the rights to women and Copts.378 The 
organization also suffered from the fact that wealthy benefactors from the Gulf States 
provided Islamic activists with alternative sources of revenue, which limited dependence 
on financing from the Muslim Brotherhood and enabled Islamists with varying views and 
objectives to work under the umbrella of the Brotherhood without having to follow the 
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call of the leadership.379 This dilution of membership interests, coupled with the 
organization’s vague goals, limited the willingness of other CSOs to cooperate with the 
Muslim Brotherhood, restricting the latter’s reach and influence.380 Finally, the regime’s 
policies also weakened the Brotherhood’s grassroots network of social service and 
religious organizations. The laws governing NGOs enabled the state to oversee the 
activities, leadership elections and funding of the service providing organizations, while a 
law introduced in 1996 placed the Brotherhood’s private mosques under similar 
restrictions.381 Thus, by the end of the 1990s, all these external and internal constraints 
severely weakened the Muslim Brotherhood. Nevertheless, the Brotherhood retained its 
mobilizing capabilities, as a result of which in the 2005 Parliamentary elections the 
independents backed by the Brotherhood won about 20 percent of the contested seats. 
Following the crackdown on the Muslim Brotherhood, the regime also took a 
confrontational course toward the trade unions, which it crippled by adopting a law under 
the structural adjustment program that deprived workers most at risk of being terminated 
from the right to vote. It also significantly eased the reelection of incumbent leaders, who 
were generally members of the ruling National Democratic Party (NDP).382  
On the other hand, advocacy groups—like women’s, environmental and human 
rights organizations—were spared from governmental harassment and continued to 
thrive. These new advocacy organizations began to play the roles that the weak 
opposition groups were not able to fulfill, like representing the rights and interests of 
workers and farmers, who were troubled by increasing unemployment rates and the 
prospects of an unprofitable land reform.383 In addition, many secular and Islamist 
activists took advantage of the relative peace these advocacy groups enjoyed and 
continued their oppositional political agenda under the guise of these groups.384   
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These advocacy groups enjoyed their relative freedom until the end of the 1990s, 
when the regime, without much input from the civil society, introduced Law 153 in 1999, 
severely limiting the activities of most NGOs. While it retained the MOSA’s authority to 
dissolve NGOs and deny foreign funding, Law 153 was originally intended, by reducing 
reporting requirements and increasing the freedom to raise money domestically, to lessen 
restrictions on apolitical social service organizations providing much needed services the 
government was unable to provide. On the other hand, it was also intended to severely 
limit the activities of oppositional advocacy organizations by requiring civil companies, 
such as human right groups, to register as NGOs which would have implied their 
dissolution on the grounds of conducting “political” activity.385 
When Law 153 was declared unconstitutional a year later, the government, again 
without consulting with civil society organizations, introduced Law 84 which remains in 
effect to date. While it is an improvement over the previous law by narrowly defining the 
scope of political activities NGOs are forbidden to undertake, it significantly increases 
the authority of the MOSA over NGOs in terms of foreign funding, registration and 
dissolution. Under the law NGOs have to report regularly their membership composition 
and sources of financing to the MOSA which also monitors their activities. The law also 
places harsh restrictions on the cooperation with international organizations.386 
Despite having grown in size and strength for the last two decades, the affected 
advocacy NGOs failed to step up effectively against the plans of the government due to 
the lack of consultation and coordination within and among the various groups, and the 
overall low level of trust, which was further exacerbated by the regime’s divide and rule 
strategy: while some groups registered under the new law in hopes of avoiding 
government persecution, others viewed this as a betrayal of their cause.387 Moreover, the 
total dependence of the advocacy NGOs on foreign funding, coupled with their limited 
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popular appeal, a consequence of the fact that very few local people have personally 
invested in their success, made them particularly susceptible to government charges of 
illegitimacy and serving individual and foreign interests.388 
Apart from legal constraints, civil society in Egypt was also hampered by a 
peculiar form of corporatism. Contrary to the classical corporatist formula in which all 
members of a group receive economic benefits in exchange for political domination, 
under Sadat and Mubarak the regime adopted a tighter form of corporatism, also known 
as co-integrationism, where at the expense of the broader membership only the top group 
leaders were co-opted into the system through special privileges, patronage networks and 
institutionalized corruption.389 This has been particularly prevalent in the case of labor 
unions and business organizations whose leaders were often also members of the ruling 
NDP party. 
Co-integrationism has also been effective in coopting NGO leaders and activists 
by offering them better positions elsewhere in governmental or semi-governmental 
organizations, while letting them retain their positions as head of the NGOs. Hafez Abu 
Seada, director of one of the largest and oldest NGOs in Egypt, the Egyptian 
Organization for Human Rights, for example, has been appointed to the board of 
directors of the National Council for Human Rights, a semi-governmental institution.390 
This also shows that beyond the co-optation of NGO leaders, the Mubarak regime was 
also working to make CSOs deemed dangerous, such as advocacy and human rights 
groups with a political agenda, seem redundant by creating state-controlled organizations 
that seemingly fulfilled similar functions.391 
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C. THE QUALITY OF CIVIL SOCIETY  
According to official estimates, by the end of 2008 there were about 30,000 CSOs 
in Egypt, 392 and out of those about 16,800 were registered NGOs in 2011.393 The 
majority of those NGOs are made up of either religious or development associations. 
Around 43 percent of all NGOs are of Islamic origin. Largely independent from 
the state and Western funding, they are able to sustain themselves through the donor 
payments of individuals, international Islamic NGOs or the governments of other Muslim 
countries.394 As they are considered the most active associations, are well organized and 
have a wide popular base, during the Mubarak era their activities were closely scrutinized 
by the state. In order to avoid harassment by the MOSA under Mubarak, many Islamic 
NGOs registered as CDAs.395 CDAs adding up to another 25 percent of all NGOs, are 
heavily dependent on state funding and have leadership often recruited from the state 
bureaucracy.396 
Islamist associations controlled by the Muslim Brotherhood have a particularly 
strong appeal among students in universities. This trend dates back to the Sadat era and 
its liberalizing policies when the Brotherhood was able to win control of all student 
associations within the universities by offering a variety of services to students, such as 
providing cheap copies of expensive textbooks or giving financial aid to students in 
need.397 These Islamist associations, however, restricted membership and services to 
those who adhered to “certain moral standards;” for example, in student associations 
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women could only use the transportation means provided by the Brotherhood when they 
wore the veil, and students having trouble affording clothing were offered Islamic 
garments.398 
Another significant part of Egyptian NGOs consists of advocacy groups—such as 
human rights, women’s and environmental organizations—which depend largely on 
foreign funding. The political nature of their activities puts them in constant 
confrontation with the state; therefore, like Islamic NGOs during the Mubarak era they 
were often subject to state harassment and persecution. 
Business associations in Egypt constitute a small, albeit influential group within 
civil society. They largely benefited from the economic policies of Sadat and Mubarak, 
which replaced the public sector and the centrally planned economy of the Nasser period 
with a return to capitalism and the private sector. They used their contacts inside the 
government, their knowledge, money, access to the media and support of international 
partners to pressure the regime to implement a liberal economic program. Their 
efficiency was further enhanced by the fact that business associations were few and small 
in membership, and the similarity of their interests enabled a greater degree of 
cooperation among them compared to other associations.399 Despite being empowered to 
influence state policies, business associations did not promote democratization because 
they were afraid that democratic elections would bring to power the Muslim 
Brotherhood, whose policies would destabilize the economy by prohibiting banks from 
paying or receiving interest or by scaring away tourists through its harsh legal system.400 
Professional associations are probably the most active civil society organizations 
in Egypt due to their capability to provide union-like benefits to their membership, the 
higher education and political awareness of their members and their relatively 
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independent financial resources.401 In addition, the fact that they are usually well-linked 
to their international counterparts and have direct access to the centers of production and 
service institutions provides them with a certain degree of protection from excessive 
government repression.402  
Participation in council elections within professional associations usually does not 
exceed 10 percent of those who have the right to vote.403 Apart from a general lack of 
interest in politics, this reflects also a lack of any sense of belonging and loyalty to the 
group. In addition, only a low proportion of the membership takes part in association 
activities and projects, which reflects a low level of commitment (e.g., in 1988 in the 
Doctors’ Syndicate only 22 percent of the membership participated in health care 
projects).404 Similarly, the proportion of the beneficiaries from association projects to the 
total number of members is extremely low, reflecting the limited extent of the services 
provided by these associations to their members (e.g., in 1989 the beneficiaries from the 
health care project in the Engineers’ Syndicate amounted to only three percent of the total 
number of members).405 
Apart from a disenfranchised membership, internal divisions and factionalism 
weaken professional associations vis-à-vis the state and make them vulnerable to Islamist 
incursions. Further weakening associations are a lack of common interests among its 
membership (e.g., differences within the Bar Association between public sector lawyers 
and private sectors lawyers) and the longevity of leadership (e.g., in the Engineers’ 
Syndicate Osman Ahmad Osman held the syndicate leadership from 1979 until 1991). 
Moreover, a lack of democracy and the dictatorial style of the leadership (e.g., in the 
Lawyers’ Syndicate the decision to invest the syndicate’s pension fund was taken solely 
by the leader and his entourage without asking the general assembly) are exacerbated by 
intolerance among the different factions, corruption and reluctance to abide by 
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democratic rules (e.g., falsification of election results).406 All these characteristics show 
the failure of these associations to rid themselves of the authoritarian patterns of the 
regime they attack, leading to the further alienation of its membership. 
Moreover, authoritarian practices are not restricted to the professional 
associations under secular control. Syndicates, where the Muslim Brotherhood took over 
the leadership, have experienced a similar decline in the degree of fairness in council 
elections, the rate of leadership circulation or the degree of integrity.407 
One of the most influential professional associations in Egypt is the Judges’ Club. 
Established in 1939, its stated aim is to ensure the independence of the judiciary from the 
executive branch.408 While this independence was never realized under the consecutive 
authoritarian regimes, the club’s ability to provide benefits to its members and make their 
voices heard, prompted most Egyptian judges and some district attorneys to voluntarily 
join the organization.409 By June 2011, the club’s membership reached 9,557.410 
Members’ participation in collective actions gradually increased over the 2000s. The 
judges, for example, organized a number of protests and strikes in 2005 and 2010, when 
they were denied their constitutional right to monitor parliamentary and presidential 
elections, or in 2006, when judges protested against government intervention in the 
judicial process.411 As one of the goals of the club is to present a politically impartial 
image of judges, the organization has usually refrained from cooperating with other civil 
society forces, and thus its demonstrations were often easily broken up by the regime.412 
Nevertheless, despite its apparent ineffectiveness, the opposition mounted by the club 
provided other judicial institutions with favorable conditions for challenging the regime. 
In the years preceding the Arab Spring, for example, the Supreme Administrative Court 
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ruled against the regime in several instances regarding minimum wage increases, 
electoral misconduct or government corruption.413 This way, the Judges’ Club 
represented a source of opposition to the Mubarak regime, which therefore kept a close 
eye on the club’s actions. 
Another important professional syndicate is the Egyptian Journalists’ Association. 
Established in 1941, it has been active in more public debates than any other professional 
association in Egypt.414 It has constantly challenged the regime on issues such as the 
freedom of expression, or the protection of journalists, and has several times supported 
other CSOs, like the advocacy NGOs during the campaign against Law 153 in 1999 and 
Kifaya (which will be described later) in its demands for constitutional amendments in 
2005.415 While the Journalists’ Association was not able to influence government 
policies in a meaningful way, the regime nevertheless feared it because of the wide 
access the association enjoyed to the public.416 It therefore became the target of regime 
interference through membership co-optation or manipulation of leadership selection 
processes.417 
Among the Egyptian CSOs, the labor unions were always the most important in 
terms of membership and representativeness. The vibrant labor union activism Egypt 
enjoyed since its independence in 1922, however, was put to an end in 1957, when the 
Egyptian Trade Union Federation (ETUF) was formed, like all trade unions, under the 
auspices of the state. The ETUF incorporated elected committees representing worker’s 
interests from each of the trade unions. The ineffectiveness of the ETUF, particularly in 
dealing with the negative consequences of the liberal economic policies implemented by 
the state during the Sadat era and the first decade of the Mubarak regime, led to 
widespread discontent among workers which was reflected by the decline in membership 
levels of labor organizations (according to some estimates from the 13 million workers in 
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Egypt only 3 million had joined labor unions in the early 2000s).418 Nevertheless, 
because of its still massive and representative nature, the Mubarak regime employed a 
wide array of tools, ranging from co-optation to outright repression, to control the ETUF 
and especially its leadership.419 While co-integrationism worked at the top level, the 
regime failed to establish control over all elected committees which, due to their greater 
accountability towards their constituency, became catalysts of membership mobilization 
in times when the co-opted leadership was unwilling to act.420 These individual trade 
unions organized and held an increasing number of strikes during the 2000s. At times 
they forced the regime to change its decisions, especially when it came to the 
privatization of state-owned enterprises.421 
Moreover, beginning in the mid-2000s, informal groups formed by workers were 
emerging which, employing illegal forms of protests (e.g., sit-ins, strikes), were deemed 
to be more effective in voicing grievances, promoting demands and unifying conflicting 
interests.422 As a result of the reemerging labor activism, in December 2008 the property 
tax collectors established the Real Estate Tax Authority, which was the first independent 
trade union in Egypt for decades. 
Sporadic and limited demonstrations were first tolerated by the regime beginning 
in the early 2000s, such as those in solidarity with the second Palestinian intifada in 
2000-2002 or those against the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003.423 These protests gradually 
opened up public space, leading to the emergence of several social movements in Egypt. 
Established in August 2004, Kifaya, the Egyptian Movement for Change, for the 
first time in Egyptian history dared to directly criticize the president and his family when 
it waged a campaign against Mubarak’s participation in the 2005 presidential 
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elections.424 Despite the campaign’s failure, Kifaya’s supporters, including activists and 
members of different political parties, moved to broaden the movement’s base of support 
by embracing basic reform demands such as the suspension of the state of emergency and 
the end of the regime’s monopoly over power.425 Besides succeeding to organize dozens 
of demonstrations over the next few years, because of the movement’s elitist nature, 
narrow ideological platform and internal disputes, Kifaya was never able to attract large 
masses (especially from the youth and working classes), and by 2008 it had lost much of 
its appeal.426   
The April 6 Youth Movement emerged out of a Facebook page established to 
support a national general strike proclaimed for April 6, 2008, by textile workers in 
Mahalla.427 While the organizers planned for the participation of more than 70,000 
members nationwide, in the end only a few thousand people took to the streets in Cairo 
and some university campuses.428 In the ensuing repression the founders of the 
movement were detained, and since then April 6 has continued to operate as a loose civic 
movement.429 While its demonstrations did not attract a large number of people over the 
next few years, the April 6 movement which included youth from different political 
parties, movements and organizations still played a crucial role in mobilizing people for 
the protests that led to the fall of the Mubarak regime by distributing leaflets and raising 
public awareness.430 
The April 6 movement was also instrumental in initiating the campaign “We are 
all Khaled Said,” in honor of the twenty-eight-year-old businessman who was dragged 
from an Internet café in June 2010 by the police and beaten to death for having uploaded 
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an Internet video revealing the corruption of the police.431 The “We are all Khaled Said” 
Facebook page had 473,000 members by January 2011, and the collective identity it 
provided to its followers proved to be essential in mobilizing the masses for the protests 
on January 25, 2011.432 
D. THE ROLE OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN BRINGING DOWN THE REGIME 
Contrary to Tunisia, in Egypt (besides the individual labor unions) social 
movements played a crucial role in bringing down the regime. In fact, the demonstrations 
on January 25, 2011, were initiated by social movements such as the April 6 Youth 
Movement and Kifaya.433 On the other hand, traditional Egyptian CSOs were as much 
surprised by the vehemence of the anti-regime protests in January 2011 as the regime 
itself. The Islamic CSOs backed by the Muslim Brotherhood, for example, only joined 
the demonstrations after it became clear that the balance of power had shifted in favor of 
the protesters and the leadership of these organizations faced mounting pressure from 
their own ranks (especially from the younger members) to participate.434 This, however, 
did not mean that members of traditional CSOs did not take to the streets, but they 
participated on an individual basis rather than as representatives of their respective 
organizations.435 Indeed, the success of the mobilization was based largely on the fact 
that it happened outside of formal structures and was therefore largely apolitical and non-
ideological. This appealed to the youth who got increasingly disenfranchised from the 
traditional CSOs that largely reproduced the authoritarian patterns of the regime in their 
dealings with each other.436 
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Another important factor for the success of the revolution was that the youth was 
able to establish linkages to the revived trade unionism. Beginning from the mid-2000s, 
the declining living standards, a consequence of the liberalizing economic policies of the 
regime, prompted workers to protest against worsening pay and corruption. These 
socioeconomic demands also appealed to the younger activists and students, and during 
the January/February protests this created an effective alliance between the youth and the 
workers.437 
Due to the unwillingness of the ETUF to take part in the demonstrations, most 
trade unions joined the protesters on an individual basis.438 On January 30, 2011, some 
breakaway unions joined by representatives of workers from throughout the country 
created the Egyptian Independent Trade Union Federation as a counterweight to the 
ETUF.439 When on February 8 some unions of this new federation called for a strike 
demanding the ouster of Mubarak, tens of thousands of workers joined the protests.440 
Workers continued to flock to the protests the following days, and on March 11 Mubarak 
resigned. 
E. NOTHING NEW UNDER THE SUN 
The underdevelopment of good civil society and political organizations implied 
that after the ouster of the Mubarak regime the only associations to which citizens could 
turn to express their grievances and get help were mostly the Islamist organizations of the 
Muslim Brotherhood, which meant that following Mubarak’s fall only the Islamists had 
the infrastructure in place to mobilize supporters effectively.441 Moreover, understanding 
the political and social constraints of the environment in which the Muslim Brotherhood 
was operating, beginning in the mid-1990s the organization’s younger leaders engaged in 
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issuing pamphlets on women’s rights, Copts and political pluralism, which were intended 
to show the Brotherhood’s shift towards greater tolerance and moderation, thus making 
cooperation with it seem more appealing for other CSOs.442 In addition, the Brotherhood 
created an image which seemingly underlined its pro-democratic nature: it supported the 
Judges Club’s efforts to increase the independence of the judiciary, called for constraints 
on the executive and the strengthening of the legislative and advocated the development 
of civil society.443 The majority of Egyptian society bought into this image of moderate 
Islamism, and as a consequence of this, the Muslim Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice 
Party (together with the Salafist al-Nour Party) dominated the parliamentary elections in 
2011‒2012, while the Muslim Brotherhood’s candidate, Mohammed Morsi, won the 
presidential elections in 2012. 
Secular liberal and pro-democracy CSOs, however, soon became disappointed 
with their new rulers as the shift in power in favor of the Islamists did not lessen 
repression against civil society in the following period of transition. In some instances it 
even increased compared to that of the Mubarak era. In December 2011 and January 
2012, for example, several pro-democracy NGOs were raided by the Interior Ministry 
and judiciary officials under the pretext of having received foreign funding. The 
hypocritical nature of these raids is shown by the fact that there has been little complaint 
about the largely opaque financial assistance Islamist groups receive from Gulf States.444 
Furthermore, following the raids the Egyptian Ministry of Social Solidarity and 
Justice proposed a draft Law on Associations and Foundations to replace Egypt’s existing 
Law 84 of 2002, which was almost identical to a draft prepared in March 2010 by a 
committee composed of members of the now-disbanded NDP and chaired by ex-Prime 
Minister Abdelaziz Hegazy.445 This draft law would have imposed harsh restrictions on 
the registration and operation of Egyptian CSOs, put restrictions on Egyptian CSOs 
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cooperating with foreign CSOs and receiving foreign funding and grant the Minister of 
Insurance and Social Affairs and “any other relevant party” wide discretionary powers to 
dissolve CSOs.446 Thus, although the new law was meant to replace Law 84, which was 
widely regarded as repressive, the restrictions in the new proposal were in some areas 
even stricter than those of the Mubarak regime. The future of this draft proposal, 
however, remains uncertain since the mounting domestic and international discontent 
with the Morsi regime culminated on July 3, 2013, when the Islamist president was 
removed by the military, and the constitution drafted by the Islamists was suspended. 
F. CONCLUSIONS 
The protests in January and February 2011 were initiated by the youth and the 
upper-middle class who were soon joined by people from all classes embracing different 
views and beliefs in a spirit of tolerance, including the poor and the upper classes, urban 
and rural residents, peasants, workers and women, as well as Copts and Muslims.447 The 
question then has become, how much of this spirit of acceptance and tolerance spread 
over into the sphere of civil society after the ouster of the Mubarak regime? 
In Egypt, the majority of CSOs are made up of either advocacy NGOs or service 
providing NGOs. Despite their huge numbers and contrary to Western beliefs, these 
NGOs cannot function as agents of democratization for several reasons. First, advocacy 
NGOs, such as human rights, women’s and environmental organizations, suffer from a 
lack of cross-cutting cleavages and autonomy. Trying to master the bureaucratic barriers 
of domestic and foreign funding, these NGOs have often had to employ educated, foreign 
speaking personnel which gave them an aura of elitism, alienating the less educated 
masses. The fact that most of these NGOs reside in Cairo and Giza and have weak 
connections to rural Egypt does not help either.448 In addition, as the majority of these 
NGOs are controlled by the upper class, they usually have no interest in the development 
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and political incorporation of the lower classes.449 The Egyptian form of co-
integrationism, in which the state co-opts the leaders of those NGOs in exchange for 
economic benefits, plays a significant role in this. Thus, contrary to a civil society 
contributing to democratization, where citizens join voluntary associations to promote 
aggregate societal interests, advocacy NGOs often serve the particular interests of 
educated or elitist groups.450 
Furthermore, as presented, advocacy NGOs are often the only organizations 
within Egyptian civil society possessing the necessary skill sets to communicate with 
Western partners and apply for Western funding. As anti-colonial sentiments still linger 
within Middle Eastern societies, Western funding often undermines the legitimacy of 
these NGOs in the eyes of the society; a phenomenon often exploited by regimes to 
weaken and repress NGOs with foreign connections. Even if these NGOs are allowed to 
continue their operations, governments make sure that foreign funding goes to social 
groups that are deemed either insignificant or supportive of the regime. 
Second, non-governmental advocacy organizations are usually single-issue groups 
with small local constituencies and thus are not suited to challenge authoritarian regimes, 
a task which usually requires a wide popular base. They are also hampered by a weak 
organizational set-up, the lack of external audits, absence of strict internal rules and 
regulations and administrative inefficiency.451 The fact that they largely depend on 
foreign funding, apart from casting doubt on their legitimacy, creates an additional 
problem by inciting competition for external donors among those NGOs. Thus, scarcely 
any communication, much less cooperation exists between advocacy NGOs, which 
weakens their ability to lead and mobilize effectively.452 In addition, because of their 
weak horizontal links, there is no umbrella organization representing all those NGOs vis-
à-vis the government, a fact which weakens their ability to influence state policies.453 
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The low civility in terms of trust and cooperation, the absence of cross-cutting cleavages, 
the lack of empowerment and the low participation of the constituency of the advocacy 
NGOs, coupled with the successful co-integrationism by the regime, was particularly 
apparent when the Egyptian government pushed through Law 153 in 1999, and later Law 
84.  
Then, if advocacy NGOs, for the aforementioned reasons, are not capable to 
further democratization, can service-providing NGOs fulfill this role? The answer is they 
cannot, again for several reasons. Due to the state’s inability to provide even basic 
services sometimes, the regime has provided these NGOs with a wide array of political 
opportunities, as long as their activities remain largely apolitical. Thus, NGOs being 
primarily responsible for providing services have not attempted to mobilize their 
beneficiaries for any kind of advocacy activities out of fear of state repression.454 This 
has translated into an absence of empowerment, which makes service-providing NGOs 
incapable to influence state policies. The process is furthermore reinforced by the fact 
that because of the service providing nature of their activities, the constituencies of these 
NGOs (despite being large in size) are not incentivized to participate actively. 
Moreover, because the large majority of service-providing NGOs have an Islamist 
background, they would not even consider mobilizing their constituencies for advocacy 
activities. Instead, unable to topple the state itself, the Islamist movements in Egypt have 
sought to “achieve their revolutionary goals directly by gradually remaking Egyptian 
society and culture” in a bottom-up approach through civil society.455 As the Islamists 
themselves lack tolerance towards differing views within society, which hinders 
cooperation with other societal groups, CSOs under Islamist influence, such as social 
service providing NGOs, suffer from an absence of civility. Furthermore, membership is 
not free in these associations, as in exchange for the services provided, they require 
members to adhere to certain Islamic norms and values, which leads to a decline in cross-
cutting cleavages.   
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Thus, while having retained a certain degree of autonomy from the state, similar 
to advocacy NGOs, service-providing NGOs, especially those of Islamic origin, sport 
several attributes of bad civil society which makes them incapable to promote 
democratization. 
Business associations are among the most powerful CSOs in Egypt when it comes 
to influencing government policies. Given their common goals of promoting liberal 
economic policies, cooperation among business associations is widespread, which 
empowers them vis-à-vis the state. This empowerment, however, does not translate into 
demands for greater democratization as the main aim of business associations is to seek 
benefits for their members and the rule of the demos, especially if it is dominated by 
Islamist values, would most likely harm their particularistic interests. In addition, their 
elitist nature, small membership, low tolerance towards the lower classes and close ties to 
the government imply the absence of cross-cutting cleavages, low civility, and—despite 
their financial independence—a semi-autonomous status. Thus, business associations in 
Egypt cannot act as agents of a good civil society.  
Professional associations in Egypt have a long history and have usually been one 
of the most active traditional CSOs (next to the labor movement) challenging the regime. 
Despite the constant source of opposition they present, professional associations have 
been rather ineffective in influencing state policies. The main reason for this is that while 
they call for greater democratization, professional associations (secular and Islamist-led 
alike) themselves display low internal civility in terms of intolerance and low levels of 
reciprocity, which leads to the alienation of the membership and therefore a decline in 
participation. Another problem is that despite their relative independence in terms of 
financing, internal factionalism usually weakens these associations to the point that they 
are easily co-opted by the regime or taken over by Islamists.  
Finally, while differing views within professional associations usually imply the 
presence of cross-cutting cleavages, this does not further cooperation with other CSOs 
because of widespread co-optation or intolerance at the leadership level. Thus, 
professional associations in Egypt, despite their inherent capabilities to further 
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democratization and promising attempts by some associations (such as by the Judges’ 
Club or the Egyptian Journalists’ Association), are nevertheless hampered by the 
attributes of bad civil society. 
Turning to those CSOs that have played a major role in bringing down the 
Mubarak regime, it is apt to say that while it was largely social movements that initiated 
the protests by mobilizing people, the labor unions were crucial in sustaining the 
demonstrations and helping them to reach the tipping point. Both social movements and 
labor unions were enabled to act as catalysts of change because they exhibited some 
attributes of good civil society. Both maintained a relative independence from the regime: 
while the social movements evaded state control through their loose structure and 
extensive use of social media, the individual labor unions enjoyed a relatively wide 
independence because the heavily co-opted central leadership of the ETUF was not able 
to effectively exert control over all of them. Participation was on the rise as both the 
social movements, through the social media, and the labor unions, which boasted a huge 
membership, since the mid-2000s were increasingly able to mobilize their constituencies 
on the basis of common interests (which were predominantly economic grievances in the 
case of the labor movement and human rights issues or calls for political reforms in the 
case of the social movements). While both lacked effective empowerment, the labor 
unions were nevertheless able to influence state decisions (even if not policies) from time 
to time, which ingrained a sense of hope and perseverance in union activists.  
Both social movements and labor unions were marked by the presence of cross-
cutting cleavages. While this is not evident in the case of social movements like Kifaya, 
which had, despite coming from various political movements and parties, a rather narrow, 
elitist base, or the April 6 movement, whose core members were predominantly from the 
urban youth, their loose structure and the virtual anonymity of the social media allowed 
for the participation of a wide array of people with different views, beliefs and social 
backgrounds. In terms of the labor movement, the huge structure of the ETUF 
encompassed labor unions from all over the country and boasted a widely diverse 
membership. What was probably of the utmost importance, however, was the 
predisposition for tolerance and cooperation on the part of social movements like that of 
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the April 6 movement which allowed them to link up with the labor unions and form a 
coalition that would prove to be crucial in bringing down the Mubarak regime. 
As presented, while social movements and labor unions display some (even if not 
all) attributes of good civil society, the major part of Egyptian civil society is made up of 
CSOs that clearly do not fit into this category. NGOs, which constitute over half of all 
CSOs, either lack effective empowerment or suffer from the absence of civility. Business 
and professional associations are primarily hampered by the lack of autonomy and cross-
cutting cleavages. To this comes the increasing polarization between the secular and 
Islamist camps within civil society that leads to the predominance of uncivil attributes. 
Finally, while liberalization in Egypt started earlier than in most other Arab countries, 
civil society did not benefit from this permissive environment enough to develop political 
opportunity “holdovers,” which it could have resorted to in the period following the 
ouster of the Mubarak regime.  
Beleaguered from two sides, civil society’s independence and civility was 
severely curtailed by the regime’s repression and co-optation  on one side and by the 
Islamist incursion on the other. Especially the latter proved to be detrimental for the 
development of a good civil society, as after the fall of the Mubarak regime the resulting 
political opportunities emerging due to the slackening of state repression were not 
exploited by a civil society heavily permeated by uncivil attributes. This also implies that 
the widespread acceptance and tolerance witnessed during the uprisings did not take hold 
in civil society in the period of transition that followed. Instead, the historic moment soon 
passed when the new power-holders engaged in actions and proposed laws that were even 
more repressive than those of the Mubarak era. 
In summary, the predominance of bad civil society in Egypt renders the prospects 
of democratization in the near future rather dim. Not all is lost for Egypt, however, as 
after the removal of Mohamed Morsi by the military it seems the country could get 
another chance to do it better this time. The question then becomes whether those CSOs 
that possess attributes of a good civil society but were largely put on the sidelines since 
the uprisings of 2011, such as the youth-based social movements and the labor unions, 
will be able to reclaim civil society from the Islamists in the future. 
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VII. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION 
This chapter provides an overview of the role of civil society in political 
transformation in the Eastern European countries of the former Communist Bloc. 
Applying the conclusions drawn to the Middle Eastern case studies, the chapter then 
highlights important regional differences in the application of the individual criteria.  
A. EASTERN EUROPEAN CASES: POLAND AND RUSSIA 
1. Participation 
Comparing participation in associational life in Poland and Russia what is striking 
at first sight is the sheer difference in terms of numbers of people joining civil society 
organizations or engaging in collective action. Participation in Poland was extremely high 
during the period of Solidarity, but just as important, it was also present in periods of 
heightened repression. People engaged in collective action in the decades preceding 
Solidarity and even after the introduction martial law despite the risks involved. Contrary 
to this, participation in genuine grass-roots activity in Russia, apart from the 1920s, was 
weak to non-existent throughout most of the era of Communism. The level of repression 
does not provide a clear answer to this discrepancy as, apart from the horrors of 
Stalinism, repression of autonomous activity in Russia was not significantly higher than 
in Poland. Moreover, while both Russia and Poland featured totalitarian regimes, power-
holders in both countries soon abandoned the goal of controlling every aspect of societal 
life to target active “troublemakers.” Thus, even if limited and put under heavy 
constraints, some public space was available in both countries for autonomous collective 
action. The reason for the weakness of grassroots action in the case of Russia lies 
elsewhere. 
One decisive factor leading to increased grassroots mobilization in Poland, which 
was lacking for the most part in Russia, was the presence of a shared national and 
ideological identity uniting CSOs with starkly different societal backgrounds. Polish 
people regardless of class and origin fought for the survival of the national idea for 
centuries. When Polish sovereignty was again threatened by an external force, the Soviet 
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Union, distinct societal forces were able to rally under the flag of nationalism. Similarly, 
the Polish United Workers’ Party, regarded by many Poles as puppets of the Soviets, had 
to fight for its legitimacy from the very beginning. Thus, the emerging ideological “us vs. 
them” scenario, with the PZPR on the one side and the Polish people on the other, 
promoted the mobilization of Polish civil society against the common “enemy,” which 
eventually culminated in the roundtable talks between the opposition and the regime.  
Contrary to that, the republican fragmentation of the Soviet Union and the lack of 
a direct threat (aside from the United States) to Russian identity during the Cold War 
period hindered the emergence of nationalism as a uniting factor in the Russian Soviet 
Federative Socialist Republic. Moreover, the regime promoted an overarching proletariat 
class mentality with the ultimate aim to avoid the emergence of an ideological split 
within society. The effects of this were especially salient in the case of the labor 
movement which being bereft of an ideological “enemy” became a playground for 
competing political interests in the period of political transition. Thus, devoid of a uniting 
nationalism and ideology, Russian civil society had little propensity for mobilization 
against the existing regime. This also explains why despite the mushrooming of CSOs in 
the wake of Gorbachev’s economic and political reforms, no mass-based social 
movement emerged in Russia, which could have engaged the regime in talks over 
political transition. 
The low levels of participation, also a result of concerns over job security, were 
further aggravated by the monopoly of official trade unions in Russia. Contrary to 
Poland, where the deteriorating economy prevented the state from supporting the official 
trade unions with significant resources and thus workers were less dependent on them for 
maintaining their standard of living, in Russia the declining economy did not hinder the 
state from contributing to the prosperity of the official trade unions. Thus membership in 
them continued to be the only means to get access to an array of social welfare benefits. 
Independent trade unions, on the other hand, usually lacked significant resources and thus 
workers were not keen on joining them for fear of losing their benefits in the official 
labor unions. Therefore, contrary to Poland, membership in the independent trade unions 
remained low throughout the period of political transformation. 
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Thus, in terms of participation, the sheer number of CSOs in itself does not 
promote democratization; the underlying motives for participation also have to be taken 
into account. In this regard it is important to highlight the importance of an underlying 
shared national or ideological identity, which has the capability to mobilize the whole 
civil society, or at least the majority of it, against a common a target in order to achieve a 
common goal. Moreover as the case of Poland shows, participation of the labor 
movement in oppositional grassroots activity is crucial for forcing the regime to engage 
in talks with the opposition. Worker mobilization, however, depends on the presence of 
independent trade unions enjoying sufficient legitimacy to attract a significant number of 
workers. Thus, in Russia where the labor movement was largely co-opted and bereft of its 
autonomy, civil society was not able to exert grassroots pressure on the political elite 
during the period of transition.   
2. Empowerment 
Empowerment-wise, it is important to note that the legitimacy the regime enjoys 
significantly affects the influence civil society can exert on policy-makers. In Poland the 
regime had to struggle with its low acceptance among the populace, which forced it to 
concede more often than not to the demands of CSOs, especially to that of the workers’ 
in order to retain a modicum of legitimacy. The labor movement, in particular, with its 
sheer numbers and the ability to control the means of production, if able to engage in 
collective action, is specifically empowered to wrest concessions from power-holders. 
The demands of the working class, however, usually focus on economic issues such as 
the improvement of living conditions. In order to empower civil society as a whole, 
economic demands have to be supplemented with political ones as any political 
concession by the regime, no matter how small, leads to a corresponding increase in 
public space available to autonomous grassroots actors. In Poland, striking workers in 
1970 already articulated political demands, such as the creation of independent trade 
unions or the publication of uncensored newspapers. 
At this point, however, it has to be noted that in order to truly empower civil 
society, political demands have to emerge as a result of genuine grassroots activity and 
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they have to transcend the boundaries of class interest. While this was indeed the case for 
the Polish workers, whose demands for greater autonomy were soon picked up by the 
intelligentsia leading to the emergence of the Solidarity movement, the Russian miners’ 
strike of 1989 tells a different story. There the miners’ economic demands, which focused 
mostly on the improvement of their own living conditions and which were largely met by 
the authorities, were complemented by political demands, such as autonomous mining 
enterprises, only at the encouragement of members of the political elite who saw the 
collective action of workers as a means to advance their own political interests. 
Therefore, even though the labor movement became highly politicized in the period 
leading to the dissolution of the Soviet Union, instead of exerting influence over power-
brokers, it was the political elite, which for the most part controlled the grassroots activity 
of workers.  
Moreover, effective empowerment also presupposes that the demands with which 
the regime is confronted include issues that the power-holders cannot use for their own 
advantage. The environmental movement in Russia, for example, despite ostensibly 
scoring some notable victories against state authorities, lacked real empowerment 
because the regime, eager to take advantage of every possibility to increase its own 
legitimacy, was easily convinced to side with the protesters against the “evil” local 
authorities on issues that were largely regarded as apolitical in nature. As the case of the 
wide variety of emerging social movements in Poland after the abolishment of martial 
law shows, engaging the regime on apolitical issues is not necessarily a bad thing in 
itself; it can expand the range of topics the regime deems legitimate and thus negotiable. 
In order to work this presupposes, however, the presence of a radical dissident 
movement, which pushes power-holders towards negotiations with grassroots activists 
deemed more moderate. While in Poland former radical leaders of the Solidarity 
movement released from prison in the mid-1980s posed a formidable challenge to the 
state, such a radical dissident movement was largely missing in Russia. 
Finally, political opportunities, such as the need to obtain financial aid from 
international actors in the wake of economic decline, can significantly contribute to the 
empowerment of civil society. Contrary to the Soviet Union, where despite the failure of 
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Gorbachev’s perestroika international aid remained a taboo (at least until the final stages 
of the dissolution of the USSR), in Poland the regime’s resort to Western aid during the 
1980s created opportunities for civil society to press the government to honor its 
commitments and introduce greater political liberalization. 
All in all, the empowerment of civil society is promoted by the low internal 
legitimacy of the regime, the presence of genuine political demands transcending the 
boundaries of class interest, the existence of a radical dissident movement which can 
push the regime towards negotiations with moderate grassroots activists and political 
opportunities provided by external actors, which CSOs can take advantage of in order to 
influence power-holders. 
3. Autonomy 
State-socialist Poland had a long history of independent associational life and 
autonomous collective action, which did not cease to exist even in the wake of martial 
law, as dissidents created a parallel underground civil society providing autonomous 
space for collective action devoid of state interference. Moreover, even during the height 
of repression, civil society enjoyed some limited public space as the regime was forced to 
grant the new official organizations, which were established following the dissolution of 
Solidarity, at least a modicum of autonomy in order to endow them with a minimum of 
legitimacy in the eyes of Polish society. The official trade unions in the late 1980s 
recognized the declining legitimacy of the regime. Thus, to avoid losing their public 
appeal compared to that of the emerging independent trade unions, they tried to assert 
their autonomy from the state as much as they could, siding with members of the 
opposition during the roundtable talks with the regime. Lastly, the independence of the 
Polish Catholic Church throughout most of the period provided a safe haven for 
autonomous thinking and association. 
Contrary to Poland, the RSFSR was almost completely devoid of autonomous 
associational life and collective action. Those independent movements and associations 
which managed to survive for a longer period of time, such as some human rights, 
environmental and peace groups were too small and fragmented to be the seeds of an 
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autonomous civil society, and eventually most of them were rendered irrelevant by the 
changing economic and political environment in the early 1990s. The emerging new 
independent CSOs in the wake of Gorbachev’s reform policies suffered from the same 
deficiencies as they lacked a strong societal support and were mostly isolated from each 
other. Importantly, the independent trade unions which emerged out of the autonomous 
collective action of workers, lacking resources and thus a mass membership, were unable 
to ward off co-optation by the political elite. Moreover, contrary to Poland, official trade 
unions in Russia depended on the state for their prosperity and were thus not able to sever 
their ties to the political elite. This also contributed to their low legitimacy in the eyes of 
the workers. Lastly, the RSFSR was devoid of a large-scale integrative societal 
institution, which could have provided a shelter for alternative views and beliefs. Because 
of its dependence and weakness the Russian Orthodox Church was not able to fulfill this 
role. 
In summary, independent associational life and collective action is most likely to 
take root in civil society if, apart from an overall slackening of repression, the regime 
suffers from low legitimacy, autonomous thinking and organization finds shelter in an 
underground civil society or a large-scale integrative societal institution and emerging 
CSOs enjoy sufficient social support and obtain the necessary resources to withstand 
regime co-optation. 
4. Cross-Cutting Cleavages 
The difference between civil societies in Poland and in Russia was probably the 
greatest in terms of cross-cutting cleavages within CSOs. In Poland the Solidarity 
movement, based on the alliance of workers, professionals, intellectuals, men and 
women, old and young, was a prime example of a grassroots initiative strengthened by 
cross-cutting cleavages. Moreover, Solidarity was permeated not just by the cross-cutting 
cleavages of people coming from different societal backgrounds; its resilience was also 
strengthened by the fact that it was joined by people from both sides of the ideological 
divide. At this point it is important to note that members of the PZPR joining Solidarity 
did this voluntarily and out of their own conviction, not as a means of the regime to 
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subvert and co-opt the movement. Naturally, the kitchen-sink nature of Solidarity meant 
that it encompassed a vast array of views, thoughts and beliefs, which ultimately led to 
the emergence of dissent, competition, and attrition within the movement. However, this 
was not a one-way process as it also implied that the people bringing in alternative 
thoughts and views, and thus changing the way Solidarity worked, were themselves 
subject to the impact of the range of cross-cutting cleavages they encountered, leading to 
their own transformation and ultimately to the transformation of their host organizations. 
The Catholic Church played an extraordinary role in strengthening the cross-
cutting cleavages of Polish civil society. The preservation of national identity endowed it 
with a role, which transcended class-boundaries and united people from across the 
society under the banner of nationalism. During periods of heightened repression it 
provided shelter for people regardless of class and conviction. Lastly, it played a very 
important role as an intermediary, bringing together workers and the intelligentsia, and 
later preparing the ground for negotiations between the dissidents and the regime. 
Contrary to Poland, Russian civil society suffered from weak cross-cutting 
cleavages. Despite the attempts of the regime to instill a proletariat class mentality by 
promoting the classless character of official organizations, the deep mistrust dividing 
workers and the intelligentsia did not allow for the emergence of strong patterns of cross-
cutting cleavages. Due to the weakness of the Orthodox Church, Russia also lacked a 
societal integrative institution which could have brought together workers and 
intellectuals. As a result, the emerging democratic movement in the late 1980s was 
dominated by the intelligentsia, which prohibited it from garnering mass support and 
gaining the legitimacy necessary to engage the regime in meaningful negotiations. On the 
other hand, neither was the fledgling labor movement able to exert significant pressure on 
the power-holders, as the weak cross-cutting cleavages within the movement left the 
workers vulnerable to political manipulation. 
All in all, strong cross-cutting cleavages endow civil society with the necessary 
legitimacy to confront the regime in negotiations over political transformation, strengthen 
the resilience of CSOs to resist co-optation and fragmentation and instill tolerance 
towards alternative views and thoughts within civil society. The presence of a large-scale 
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integrative societal institution bringing together people from across society significantly 
contributes to the strengthening of cross-cutting cleavages. 
Political Opportunity “Holdovers” 
The significance of political opportunity “holdovers” is that their presence can 
significantly shorten the time necessary for civil society to reconstitute itself following 
periods of harsh repression. This becomes evident by comparing the development of civil 
societies in Poland and in Russia. In Poland, the memories of a liberal-pluralist past 
preceding the Communist takeover, coupled with the slackening of repression in the late 
1970s and early 1980s, and ultimately, the emergence of the mass-based popular 
movement of Solidarity, provided civil society with ample opportunity to establish lasting 
“holdovers.”  These “holdovers” were able to survive the period of harsh repression 
under martial law in the form of a parallel civil society. Given the presence of these 
opportunity “holdovers,” civil society was able to reconstitute itself quickly after the 
decline in state repression, providing the regime with a strong and legitimate negotiating 
partner with which to engage in constructive talks. 
In Russia, on the other hand, the terrors of Stalinism erased all memories of the 
relatively vibrant associational life in the 1920s and, despite the slackening of repression 
in the late 1960s and during most of the 1970s, the absence of an integrative societal 
institution and the lack of a mass-based social movement prevented the emergence of 
political opportunity “holdovers.” Thus, when Gorbachev’s reforms provided political 
opportunities for the emergence of autonomous associational life and collective action, 
civil society had to reconstitute itself virtually from scratch. Given the rapid dismantling 
of the totalitarian regime, this did not allow for the emergence of a strong civil society 
able to check the political elite and act as a constructive negotiating partner in the period 
of political transition. 
5. Civility 
The abundance of civility within Polish civil society, and the lack thereof in the 
case of Russia, provides ample reason why democracy could take root in the former and 
why its emergence was blocked in the latter. Polish civil society possessed all the 
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underlying principles of civility. Most importantly, cooperation among the various 
segments of civil society developed in the second half of the 1970s, after earlier 
experiences of failed collective action showed that success can only be attained by 
individuals and groups acting together. The basis for the emerging coalition of the 
workers, the intelligentsia and the Catholic Church was the notion of a self-limiting civil 
society organized around the common values of human rights, dignity, and openness. 
These common values also allowed for the quick reconstitution of the cooperation of the 
various CSOs during the roundtable talks with the regime.    
Cooperation was also promoted by the widespread tolerance for alternative views 
within Polish civil society and, most importantly, by the presence of solidarity among the 
various social classes. CSOs in Poland, in the period leading up to the emergence of 
Solidarity, were able to overcome their narrowly defined individual interests and 
participate on the basis of solidarity, which meant that CSOs from all over society 
supported each other and that protest action was usually terminated only after the 
demands of all CSOs involved had been met. 
Complementing the civility of Polish civil society, beginning from the late 1970s, 
social interactions were guided by trust and reciprocity. Trust was most evident when 
collective action was maintained even in the face of harsh repression, especially during 
martial law, while reciprocity promoting cooperation between the workers and the 
intellectuals emerged in the second half of the 1970s, when the intelligentsia first 
provided support to the victims of repression. All these values ensured that the process of 
democratization in Poland in the late 1980s would be irreversible. 
Contrary to Poland, Russian civil society suffered severely from a lack of civility. 
The slackening of regime control over public space in the late 1980s led to the emergence 
of a number of intolerant CSOs embracing chauvinistic and anti-Semitic values. 
Moreover, even when the majority of civil society did not display openly intolerant traits, 
the overall lack of the principles of civility in social interactions prevented a democratic 
mindset from taking root in Russian society. Cooperation among CSOs was severely 
hampered by the deep-seated mistrust prevalent between workers and the intelligentsia, 
which was also evident in the low levels of reciprocity. At the same time, the lack of 
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solidarity prevented CSOs, such as the workers and the cooperatives, from overcoming 
the divergence of their interests. The absence of solidarity was especially salient in the 
case of the Russian labor movement where it led to an overall decline of participation in 
protest action. Because of the widespread fear of workers of losing their jobs or having 
their social welfare benefits cut, authorities were able to easily buy off dissent among the 
working populace. As a result, individual victimized strikers could not count on the 
support of their appeased colleagues. Lastly, competition between the independent and 
the official trade unions over scarce resources and for the favor of the political elite 
further lessened the prospects of cooperation within the labor movement. 
In summary, while cooperation is probably the most important principle of 
civility, without the beneficial effects of solidarity, trust, reciprocity and tolerance, it is 
unlikely to emerge among CSOs. The presence of solidarity is especially crucial, because 
it mobilizes CSOs for goals other than their own, prevents the isolation of collective 
action and lessens the regime’s capability of buying off dissent. 
6. Concluding Remarks 
While in the case of Poland all criteria of a good civil society were present at the 
time of political transformation, Russia was severely lacking in most of these traits when 
Yeltsin sealed the dissolution of the Soviet Union. This, however, does not imply that 
Russian civil society in its entirety was bad. In the wake of Gorbachev’s reforms several 
human rights, environmental, peace, and other groups emerged which were autonomous 
and exhibited the principles of civility. Participation in them, however, never reached a 
critical mass. They also lacked empowerment and suffered from weak cross-cutting 
cleavages. 
The question then arises why, amidst the arising political opportunities of the late 
1980s, did a good civil society shun the country that managed to have a relatively vibrant 
associational life even during the late period of the oppressive Tsarist regime, and the 
political turmoil in the decade following the Communist takeover? Two important 
propositions can be given to answer this question. 
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First, it has to be noted that Russian civil society was completely devoid of 
political opportunity “holdovers,” which it could have resorted to during its period of 
reemergence. This does not imply that political opportunity “holdovers” are crucial for 
the emergence of a good civil society. Based on a liberal-pluralist past, however, they can 
significantly reduce the time needed for a good civil society to reconstitute itself. Russian 
civil society did not enjoy the luxury of time, as the dissolution of the Soviet Union and 
the solidification of Yeltsin’s semi-authoritarian presidential rule happened at a pace 
which was hard to follow for Russian people and Western observers alike. While not 
suggesting that given enough time and all other things being equal Russia would have 
seen the emergence of a good civil society, the absence of political opportunity 
“holdovers” significantly impaired civil society’s chances of having an impact on the 
political transformation of the country. 
Second, what is most striking is that in the country allegedly “ruled by the 
proletariat,” the labor movement was relegated to near insignificance during the period of 
transition. Lacking most of the criteria of a good civil society, the workers became a 
football for the interests of the emerging new political elite. Given the importance the 
labor movement played in the democratization of Poland, this might suggest that the 
reason for the absence of a good civil society, and thereby indirectly the failure of the 
democratic movement in Russia might be tied to the weakness of the grassroots 
initiatives of workers. After all, without the masses of workers giving legitimacy to 
democratic claims, the political elite had little reason to engage in talks with the emerging 
democrats. 
B. MIDDLE EASTERN CASES: TUNISIA AND EGYPT 
Comparing Tunisian and Egyptian civil societies’ participation levels, it is evident 
that in terms of the sheer numbers of CSOs in proportion to the overall population, 
Egyptian associational life far surpassed that of Tunisia. Based on the conclusion drawn 
from the Eastern European cases, however, high numbers of isolated and fragmented 
CSOs are not indicative of a good civil society. Instead, what is important is participation 
of CSOs based on a shared national or ideological identity, which can bundle collective 
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action for a common cause. The long history of state building in both Tunisia and Egypt 
promoted the emergence of relatively strong national identities within civil societies, 
which was manifested in the ability of protesters in both countries to rally under the 
banner of national unity against the oppressive regimes.456  
What differentiates these cases from Poland, however, is that in the Eastern 
European country national identity went hand in hand with the ideological goal of 
establishing a secular democratic political system. This ideological goal was largely 
missing in the case of Tunisia and Egypt, where protesters from all over society agreed 
on the need to get rid of the authoritarian rulers, but the divisions among secularists and 
Islamists prevented the emergence of a common understanding on the political system to 
follow. While in the case of Tunisia the differences did not hinder the establishment of an 
interim government, based on a coalition of secular and Islamist parties, in Egypt the 
political arm of the Muslim Brotherhood became the principal governmental party (until 
its ouster by the military) brushing aside differing views from other parts of civil society. 
Thus, instead of the idea of national unity acting as a mobilizing force for the creation of 
a good civil society, in terms of participation some other factors have to explain the 
differences between Tunisian and Egyptian civil societies. 
First, it is worth noting that both nationalism and ideology, apart from their 
unifying role, can also be conducive to the emergence of a bad civil society if their 
underlying principle is guided by intolerance towards others. Lacking a significant 
external threat, collective action based on national identity was directed in both Tunisia 
and Egypt against the authoritarian regimes. Thus, nationalism did not foster intolerance 
towards external parties. The Arab-Israeli conflict, however, due to its historical legacy, 
had a much greater impact on the ideological unity of Egyptian civil society than it had 
on Tunisia, spurring intolerant patterns of behavior in the former. 
Second, based on its significant role in Poland’s transition, the labor movement’s 
involvement in collective action might shed some light on the differences of Tunisian and 
Egyptian civil societies. While the official trade unions in both countries boasted huge 
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memberships and through their local branches, which showed signs of good CSOs 
engaged in collective action in the period preceding the revolts of the Arab Spring, 
following the ousters of the Ben Ali and Mubarak regimes their participation was marked 
by stark differences. While in Egypt, the ETUF and the new independent trade unions 
were largely left on the sidelines in terms of participating in the formation of the 
 
country’s political future, the UGTT in Tunisia remained heavily involved by acting as an 
intermediary in negotiations between the government and the opposition, and thus 
continued to exert grassroots pressure on the political elite.457 
In terms of empowerment of civil society similar to the Polish case, both the Ben 
Ali regime and the Mubarak regime suffered from low internal legitimacy as a result of 
their repressive, authoritarian nature and the widespread corruption present in 
governmental affairs. This forced them to co-opt the leaderships of unruly CSOs, while 
appeasing militant workers by granting largely economic concessions. As it did in the 
Polish case, the concessions taught CSOs lessons in articulating demands and employing 
collective action more effectively. Thus, instead of appeasing workers, regime 
responsiveness over time increased their militancy. The significance of this became 
evident during the uprisings of the Arab Spring, when the labor movement in both 
Tunisia and Egypt tipped the scales in favor of the protesters. 
Moreover, both in Tunisia and Egypt CSOs increasingly understood that they 
could only hope to wrest concessions from the regime when their demands (economic 
and political alike) transcended the narrow boundaries of their own class interests. This 
proved to be crucial during the revolts of the Arab Spring when secularists and Islamists, 
workers and intellectuals alike were able to put aside their differences and support the 
demands of the other side. This unlikely alliance, however, soon fell apart in Egypt when 
the Muslim Brotherhood became less responsive to the needs of other CSOs after its 
political arm had successfully competed in the 2011 and 2012 parliamentary, Shura 
Council and presidential elections. In Tunisia, on the other hand, a multitude of CSOs 
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continued to support each other even after Ben Ali’s flight, leading to the ouster of the 
remnants of the ancién regime and civil society’s deep involvement in the adoption of 
several new laws, such as the one on associations in September 2011.458 
While in the case of Tunisia and Egypt one cannot speak of the presence of 
radical dissident movements pushing the regime towards negotiations with moderate 
CSOs, the fact that in Tunisia the moderate al-Nahda has come to power, as opposed to 
radical Islamists, enhances the prospects for negotiations with civil society. Contrary to 
this, in Egypt the ouster of Mohamed Morsi and the Freedom and Justice Party from 
power by the military will most likely result in the radicalization of the again outlawed 
Muslim Brotherhood, significantly reducing the opportunities for dialogue between the 
regime and a major part of civil society. 
Finally, while Tunisia becoming a privileged partner of the European Union in 
November 2012 opens up new political opportunities for the empowerment of civil 
society, the foreseeable spread of radicalism in Egypt will most likely limit the 
emergence of external political opportunities that CSOs will be able to take advantage of 
in influencing power-holders. 
In terms of independence, preceding the Arab Spring the regimes in both Tunisia 
and Egypt provided some public space to autonomous associational life and collective 
action in order to bolster their own legitimacy and establish a state-controlled civil 
society acting as a counterweight to radical Islamism. In Tunisia, the lack of a mass-
based Islamist movement, however, allowed room for some genuine CSOs, most notably 
the UGTT and the human rights movement. These movements tried to assert their 
independence from the state.  
By contrast, civil society in Egypt was beleaguered from two sides. On one side, 
CSOs struggled to fend off regime efforts of co-optation; on the other, they became too 
weak to resist an Islamist takeover during the process, which usually led to internal 
bickering and factionalism. Thus, even in the periods when the liberalizing policies of the 
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regime allowed for the emergence of some autonomous forms of associational life, 
Islamist infiltration, accompanied by uncivil attributes, prevented genuine grassroots 
activism from becoming ingrained in Egyptian civil society. Moreover, while emerging 
social movements and independent trade unionism in the period preceding the Arab 
Spring indeed carried the seeds of autonomous collective action, following the ouster of 
the Mubarak regime they were outmaneuvered by a civil society under Islamist influence 
and thus, were largely left on the sidelines in shaping the political future of the country. 
In addition, while in Egypt (and to a much lesser degree also in Tunisia) 
autonomous thinking and associational life did indeed find shelter in mosques and other 
religious institutions, contrary to the Polish case, these manifestations of grassroots 
activism were not able to act as messengers of good civil society as they were heavily 
influenced by intolerant forms of Islamism. 
Finally, the autonomy of civil society was severely hampered in Tunisia and 
Egypt before the revolts of the Arab Spring; the regimes in both countries exerted 
considerable financial control over CSOs and foreign funding was often used as a pretext 
by the authorities to delegitimize associations trying to achieve greater financial 
independence. In Egypt, however, the repression against CSOs receiving foreign funds 
continued even after the overthrow of the Mubarak regime, while in Tunisia civil 
society’s need for foreign assistance in the wake of the Arab Spring was largely 
recognized and facilitated by the adoption of a legal framework.459 Moreover, in Egypt 
criticism is largely directed against Western assistance provided to secular liberal and 
pro-democracy CSOs, but not against the financial sources Islamist groups obtain from 
the Gulf States. By contrast, in Tunisia the financial backing al-Nahda and other Islamist 
forces receive from the Gulf is subject to profound public scrutiny.460 
In terms of cross-cutting cleavages, CSOs in both Tunisia and Egypt suffered 
from a lack thereof, which undermined their capability to resist regime co-optation and 
fragmentation. The only exceptions to the rule were the UGTT in Tunisia and the various 
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new social movements and the ETUF in Egypt, which boasted diverse memberships and, 
in the case of the labor unions, a nationwide network of local branches, enabling them to 
better withstand regime efforts of co-optation. Thus, contrary to Poland, where it was the 
Catholic Church which acted as a large-scale societal institution bringing people together 
from across society, in Tunisia and Egypt this role was in part played by the labor 
movements. 
There was, however, also a significant difference regarding cross-cutting 
cleavages in Tunisian and Egyptian civil societies. Whereas in Tunisia large parts of the 
civil society underwent a process of “elitization” which also affected the Islamists of al-
Nahda, in Egypt the civil society and, most importantly the Muslim Brotherhood, was 
largely devoid of a similar process. As a result, while in Tunisia the elitist al-Nahda had 
difficulties establishing links with large parts of the population, in Egypt the Muslim 
Brotherhood’s vague goals and service-providing character appealed to people from 
across the whole society, enabling it to infiltrate a wide array of CSOs. Thus, while cross-
cutting cleavages generally contribute to greater resilience and tolerance within civil 
society, the fact that in Egypt it was to be found in an organization that lacked tolerance 
in many aspects hindered the emergence of a good civil society there. 
In terms of political opportunity “holdovers,” the development of civil societies in 
Tunisia and Egypt starkly diverged from one another. In Tunisia in the wake of the Ben 
Ali regime’s short-lived liberal reforms at the end of the 1980s many CSOs embraced 
values reminiscent of that of a good civil society such as participation, legality and 
tolerance towards alternate views. Following the significant increase of the authoritarian 
tendencies of the Ben Ali regime, this might not have resulted in the emergence of 
political opportunity “holdovers,” but the fact that in Tunisia the Personal Code 
guaranteed a minimum level of liberal rights, and that Tunisian civil society was less 
threatened by an Islamist takeover, allowed some seeds of a good civil society to take 
root. The memories of a relatively liberal environment of collective action later served as 
a mobilizing resource in the face of regime repression during the 2010‒2011 uprising and 
allowed for the quick reemergence of a civil society able to shape the development of the 
political future of the country in the period of transition. Contrary to this, even though 
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civil society in Egypt enjoyed a comparatively longer period of political liberalization, 
because of the Islamist incursion into CSOs the political opportunity “holdovers” that 
emerged served largely the interests of the Muslim Brotherhood, which was able to 
quickly reconstitute itself in the aftermath of the Mubarak regime’s ouster and dominate 
the national elections in the ensuing period. What follows is that, while political 
opportunity “holdovers” might take hold even in civil societies exhibiting uncivil 
attributes during periods of political liberalization, they have to be a result of tolerant 
grassroots activism in order to promote the reemergence of a good civil society. 
Finally, in terms of civility, civil societies in Tunisia and Egypt during the Arab 
Spring showed many similarities to the Polish Solidarity movement in 1980. CSOs in 
both Arab countries understood that they had to cooperate with each other in order to 
achieve their common goal of getting rid of the long-standing repressive regimes. This 
common goal helped secularists and Islamists overcome the deep-seated mistrust dividing 
them, much like the workers and the intelligentsia were able to put aside their differences 
in Poland. Values such as solidarity, reciprocity, and tolerance emerged during the 
protests when CSOs with starkly different worldviews and agendas supported and aided 
each other in the face of regime repression. 
There was, however, a big difference between the Tunisian and Egyptian civil 
societies and the Solidarity movement. While Solidarity was the archetype of a self-
restraining civil society not intent on challenging the power of the state, CSOs in both 
Arab countries united with the aim of toppling the ruling regimes. This had profound 
consequences on the development of civil societies in the countries analyzed. The fact 
that civil society in Poland focused primarily on self-organization implied that the 
tenuous fabric of cooperation between the vastly different societal groups did not come 
under strain from the disagreements that otherwise would have likely emerged over the 
political future of the country. This allowed Polish civil society to instill the basic norms 
of civility which later promoted its unified engagement in constructive talks with the 
regime over political transformation.  
On the other hand, civil societies in Tunisia and Egypt did not enjoy this period of 
relatively harmonious coexistence because immediately after the overthrow of the Ben 
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Ali and Mubarak regimes they were confronted with the realities of deciding the political 
future of their countries, which threatened to cut through the tenuous fabric of 
cooperation between the various CSOs. The fact that this did not occur in Tunisia might 
be attributed to the overall higher levels of tolerance ingrained in society by the 
progressive laws of the Personal Code and the relatively moderate character of its 
dominant Islamist movement, which for the time being allowed for the maintenance of 
the fragile alliance between secularists and Islamists. In Egypt, on the other hand, the 
deep polarization between secularists and Islamists, ingrained in society in part as a result 
of regime policies over the preceding decades, soon came to the fore when the uniting 
goal of overthrowing the Mubarak regime disappeared and the starkly contrasting ideas 
on the country’s future political (and social) system deprived CSOs from a common 
ground of understanding.  
Thus, what follows is that civil society needs to embrace some basic norms of 
civility before democratization can take place. As the case of Egypt shows, if civil society 
lacks values such as tolerance, cooperation, and solidarity, its liberation from under the 
yoke of an authoritarian regime will most likely not increase the prospects of 
democratization. Instead, civil society itself might reproduce the same authoritarian 
patterns it has been fighting against.    
C. CONCLUSION 
This analysis has demonstrated that, in line with Eva Bellin’s argument of 
fighting Middle East exceptionalism,461 civil societies in the former Communist Eastern 
Europe and the Arab world can be subject to a comparative study highlighting their 
similarities, discrepancies, and their roles played in democratization. It also found, 
however, that conducting a cross-regional analysis effectively requires differentiating 
between good and bad civil societies. By introducing a list of objective criteria, this 
allowed for avoiding the pitfall of not being able to speak of civil society in the Middle 
East in case the nature of Arab grassroots activism did not align with Western 
conceptions of the idea. 
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With regard to the individual criteria, the thesis found that participation, 
empowerment, autonomy, cross-cutting cleavages, political opportunity “holdovers,” and 
civility all contribute to the emergence of a good civil society, which in turn significantly 
increases the likelihood that a democratic polity will take root and the process of 
democratization becomes irreversible. The analysis, however, does not provide clarity on 
the significance of each individual criterion in the process. At this point it has to be 
surmised that their significance is most likely dependent on the political opportunities 
arising and is bound to change over time. 
On the other hand, the study highlighted important regional differences in the 
application of the criteria. In terms of participation it found that apart from reaching a 
critical mass with the active involvement of the labor movement, grassroots activism 
should not only be guided by an overarching national identity, but also be based on an 
ideological unity regarding the nation’s future political development. Empowerment-wise 
it is important that regime responsiveness is not limited to satisfying narrowly defined 
class-based economic interests, but also includes genuine, grassroots based political 
concessions to the benefit of the whole society. In terms of autonomy it found that 
contrary to Eastern Europe, CSOs in the Middle East not only have to fight regime 
attempts of control and co-optation, but they are also vulnerable to Islamist incursion. 
While in Eastern Europe cross-cutting cleavages were often promoted by religious 
institutions, in the Middle East this role is partly played by the labor movements.  
Furthermore, the study also found that cross-cutting cleavages play a beneficial 
role only in the case they are found in CSOs embracing values of civility. Similarly, 
political opportunity “holdovers” only promote the emergence of a good civil society if 
they convey memories of grassroots activism based on civility. Finally, based on the 
study’s findings, what can be asserted is that without the all-encompassing presence of 
civility and its underlying principles of tolerance and cooperation a good civil society is 
very unlikely to emerge in any society. While in Eastern Europe civility was in many 
cases strengthened by the self-restraining nature of civil society, the absence of this 
notion in the Middle East largely inhibits the emergence of good civil societies. 
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Moreover, it has to be reconfirmed that good civil society in itself is not sufficient 
or even a necessary precondition to put a non-democratic country on the path of 
democratization. A complex set of political opportunities must align in order for 
democratization to happen. For the purposes of this thesis the roles of two of them will be 
highlighted in the case of Poland and Russia: regime responsiveness and a political 
society based on a good civil society. While Poland had both a regime willing to engage 
in talks with the political opposition over political transformation and a democratically 
aligned political society emerging out of the Solidarity movement, in Russia political 
transformation was largely a product of elite bargaining made possible by the weakness 
of the oppositional political society. Thus, while a good civil society might be required to 
provide a fledgling democratic movement with the necessary impetus, and once on track, 
ensure the irreversibility of the democratic process, it is by no means the only factor 
students of democratic theory have to take into account. 
Finally, the thesis also shed light on the need to apply different conceptions of 
civil society to Eastern Europe and the Middle East. Dissidents in Eastern Europe 
understood civil society mostly in the Lockean sense of a self-regulating entity 
counterbalancing state power, to which, given the fact that the totalitarian nature of the 
oppressing regimes rendered direct opposition hopeless, they added elements of the 
Gramscian view on the need to first hegemonize social relations within civil society in 
order to challenge political power. The influence of the Gramscian idea became most 
evident in the self-restraining nature of civil societies in most countries of Communist 
Eastern Europe. 
On the other hand, this notion of a self-restraining civil society was entirely 
missing in the case of Tunisia and Egypt. Civil society’s mobilization to topple the 
repressive regimes in the Arab world suggests that the application of the Marxian concept 
of revolutionary transformation reunifying state and society in order to bring about 
civility might be more appropriate in the Middle Eastern context. As the case of Egypt 
shows, however, without a state providing order through laws and regulations, civil 
society threatened from within by the incursion of Islamism may not be able to reproduce 
the patterns of civility necessary for promoting democratization on its own. This idea of a 
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civil society waging a two-front war against regime repression and Islamist incursion 
constitutes the conundrum of good civil society in the Middle East. On the one hand, as 
the Eastern European examples have proved, civil society needs to develop civility from 
within to effectively push an authoritarian regime towards greater democratization. On 
the other hand, in line with the Hegelian idea, if civility is not forthcoming by itself, the 
state needs to step in to create a public space favorable to civility through the means of a 
legal framework. In the Middle East, the presence of both of these conditions seems to be 
elusive. As the case of Tunisia might prove, however, a combination of a civil society 
featuring norms of civility supported by a tolerant form of Islamism and a political 
society adhering to those norms may very well provide the answer to the conundrum. 
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